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Abstract
is thesis proposes a novel method for allocating multi-aribute computational
resources via competing marketplaces. Trading agents, working on behalf of
resource consumers and providers, choose to trade in resource markets where the
resources being traded best align with their preferences and constraints.
Market-exchange agents, in competition with each other, aempt to provide
resource markets that aract traders, with the goal of maximising their proﬁt.
Because exchanges can only partially observe global supply and demand
schedules, novel strategies are required to automate their search for market
niches. By applying a novel methodology, which is also used to explore, for the
ﬁrst time, the generalisation ability of market mechanisms, novel aribute-level
selection (ALS) strategies are analysed in competitive market environments.
Results from simulation studies suggest that using these ALS strategies,
market-exchanges can seek out market niches under a variety of environmental
conditions.
In order to facilitate traders’ selection between dynamic competing
marketplaces, this thesis explores the application of a reputation system, and
simulation results suggest reputation-based market-selection signals can lead to
more eﬃcient global resource allocations in dynamic environments. Further, a
subjective reputation system, grounded in Bayesian statistics, allows traders to
identify and ignore the opinions of those aempting to falsely damage or bolster
marketplace reputation.

is thesis is dedicated to the loving memory of Peggy Robinson.
You were right, the hard work did pay oﬀ.
If nothing is going well, call your grandmother.
—Italian proverb.
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INTRODUCTION
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Scenario
e signiﬁcant growth of Internet-enabled devices is accompanied by a
continually increasing demand for access to computational resources and
services, in order to satisfy an ever growing user base. is is resulting in current
system-centric approaches to resource allocation becoming limiting [63].
Examples of these approaches include those used to allocate resources within
paradigms such as cloud and grid computing, which oen rely on omniscient
centralised mechanisms with full knowledge of the resources under control.
Concomitant to this technological growth, the biggest untapped source of
computational power is now likely to be the combined distributed resources of
individual user machines, distributed across space and time and connected by
commonplace high-speed Internet connections. Added to this, when one
considers that most of these resources will be siing idle for long periods of time
[124], designing economic mechanisms for incentivising the provision of these
excess resources, and then allocating them to users who desire them most,
becomes of interest.
Market-based approaches [30], have been suggested as a way to eﬃciently
allocate resources between competing self-interested agents in distributed
seings [35, 63]. Within this ﬁeld, the domain of Meanism Design concerns
itself with the design of market mechanisms whose resource allocations satisfy
certain designer-speciﬁed objectives, for example that allocations are
economically eﬃcient, by maximising the total utility surplus across all agents.
While theoretical approaches have resulted in mechanisms that satisfy several
desirable properties in restricted seings, oen these approaches are not practical
for the design of market mechanisms is more open real-world environments.
Instead, considerable aention has been given to the empirical design and
analysis of market mechanisms [31, 136], oen using agent-based approaches
[183] to create rich coevolutionary simulation models of market-based systems
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[118]. Particular aention has been given to the study of the Double Auction
market mechanism using these approaches because it allocates distributed
resources eﬃciently under a wide range of seings [33], and theoretical analysis
is impractical in all but the most restricted of cases [59]. Signiﬁcant aention has
been given to the study of competing double auction marketplaces
[174, 160, 132, 117], and the impact their competition has on allocations of
single-aribute resources (commodities) [23].
However, computational resources are complex multi-aribute resources,
and resource consumers and providers tend to have diﬀerent preferences and
constraints over aributes. is can make allocating computational resources
eﬃciently challenging, and lile aention has been given to studying double
auction approaches to achieving this. With that in mind, this thesis considers a
novel approach for allocating multi-aribute computational resources using
multiple competing double auction marketplaces. Within such an approach,
multiple market-exchange agents each provide double auction markets for
particular types of resources, that is, each resource exchanged within the same
market has the same aribute values. Trading agents, working on behalf of
resource consumers and providers, are expected then to select between markets
depending on which type of resource most suits their preferences and constraints
at the present time, while marketplaces, in competition with each other, are
expected to select the types of resources to be traded within their market that
most satisfy market segments within the trader populations.
3
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1.2 Researestions
is thesis is concerned with the design and empirical analysis of market
mechanisms for the allocation of distributed multi-aribute computational
resources, within environments where resource consumers and providers have
potentially diﬀerent preferences and constraints over resource aributes, and
market mechanisms are unaware of these a priori.
In general, the overarching research questions that this thesis considers are:
• How can multi-aribute computational resources be allocated within
distributed environments which use multiple market mechanisms?
• How can we beer design mechanisms that perform well within such
models of resource allocation? Further, how can we improve the
mechanism design and analysis process to more carefully consider the
generalisation properties of these mechanisms?
e method of study used within this thesis is inspired by empirical approaches
taken within similar domains, such as for the study of double auction market
mechanisms in isolation, e.g., the JASA simulation framework [76], or double
auction market mechanisms in competition, e.g., the JCAT simulation framework
[24]. In the same spirit, the research questions posited above are studied within a
rich agent-based simulation environment, speciﬁcally developed to model both
the competition between consumers and providers over multi-aribute resources,
and the competition between marketplaces over traders that potentially have
very diﬀerent preferences and constraints over resource aributes. e outcome
of simulations of these rich agent-based models of competitive behaviour is a
complex coevolutionary market-based system, where agents learn over time. As
such, care is taken when analysing this system, by using appropriate statistical
and computational methods wherever necessary. Analysis within this model is
done in both a qualitative and quantitative context. antitatively, metrics
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including: the economic eﬃciency of resource allocations across the system; the
proﬁts that marketplaces generate by fees levied on traders; or the proﬁts made
by traders from the buying and selling of resources, are used to measure the
impact of various mechanisms. alitatively, considerable thought has been
given to helping the reader visualise behaviours within this complex
market-based system, using a variety of visualisation techniques.
1.3 esis Contributions
e main contributions of this thesis are:
• A novel methodology for measuring the generalisation properties of
competing market mechanisms in coevolutionary trading environments,
and an application of the methodology to market mechanisms submied to
TAC Market Design Competitions, demonstrating its eﬀectiveness.
• A novel approach to the allocation of multi-aribute computational
resources within distributed environments, relying on multiple competing
marketplaces satisfying market segments by running markets for certain
types of computational resource.
• e formulation of trader decision-making models for valuing
multi-aribute computational resources and reasoning over these
marketplaces, as well as a method for determining the optimal allocation of
computational resources between these traders.
• e ﬁrst clear formulation of the automatic niing problem, which presents
itself when marketplaces must decide what type of resource market to oﬀer
to traders with unknown resource preferences and constraints.
• An analysis of the eﬀectiveness of two approaches for tackling the
automatic niching problem, using the previously developed methodology to
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measure performance in a variety of environments they are expected to
operate in.
• e ﬁrst application of a reputation-based approach for facilitating
selection between double-auction marketplaces by integrating reputation
information into market-selection strategies.
• An analysis of the performance of reputation-based approaches to
market-selection, demonstrating that subjective reputation information
improves market-selection decisions, which leads to more eﬃcient
allocations globally.
e approach to resource allocation presented within this thesis does not require
the presence of an omniscient central resource allocator, or the solving of
computationally expensive optimisation problems, in order to allocate
multi-aribute resources. e distributed nature of multiple competing
marketplaces oen results in several diﬀerent types of resource market, from
which traders can migrate to the one that most satisﬁes their preferences and
constraints; this behaviour does not require any coordination between
marketplaces. While directly comparing this approach to other methods of
multi-aribute resource allocation is not within the scope of this thesis, this
approach is certainly suitable for allocating distributed computational resources,
because it satisﬁes a number of desirable properties that other approaches do not.
One of the themes underlying this thesis is generalisation and robustness,
and the contributions made throughout concern themselves, directly or indirectly,
with aempting to improve the generalisation and robustness of both market and
trader mechanisms, by designing mechanisms that perform well in a variety of
representative environments, not merely randomly generated instantiations. is
is supported by the application of a novel methodology to the assessment of some
of these mechanisms, which is also shown to, when applied to market
mechanisms previously championed in the literature, ﬁnd they are brile to
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several environmental situations. Another theme within this thesis involves
competition between marketplaces, and research within this thesis concerns itself
with exploring diﬀerent aspects of competition between market mechanisms. In
general, it is hoped that the methods developed for analysing the performance of
mechanisms under competition, within this thesis, can be used by anybody who
is interested in empirically analysing competition between marketplaces, be it
from a computer science, economics, or marketing, perspective.
1.3.1 Publications
e following publications have arisen out of work carried out within this thesis.
[145] E. Robinson, P. McBurney and X. Yao “How specialised are specialists?
Generalisation properties of entries from the 2008 TAC Market Design
Competition,” in proceedings of the 2009 Trading Agent Design and Analysis
Workshop (TADA 2009), IJCAI 2009, 2009.
[146] E. Robinson, P. McBurney and X. Yao “How specialised are specialists?
Generalisation properties of entries from the 2008 and 2009 TAC Market
Design Competitions,” Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: Designing
Trading Strategies and Meanisms, volume 59 of Lecture Notes in Business
Information Processing, pp. 178–194, Springer, 2010.
Further, work from chapters 5 and 6 is being prepared for submission to relevant
journals.
1.4 esis Outline
e remainder of this thesis progresses as follows. Beginning in Chapter 2, the
concept of computational resource allocation within a distributed utility
computing model is introduced, and future resource allocation issues are
highlighted, with particularly reference to the current limiting system-centric
approaches. e chapter considers a variety of current market-based approaches
for allocating multi-aribute resources, and highlights the unstudied approach
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considered within this thesis, of allocating computational resources using
competing double auction marketplaces.
Chapter 3 builds on gaps in the literature identiﬁed in Chapter 2.
Speciﬁcally, it highlights that current methods for analysing and measuring the
performance of market mechanisms in competitive environments have not given
much aention to the general performance of market mechanisms across a
variety of environmental situations. Within the chapter, a methodology for
measuring, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the generalisation ability of
double auction market mechanisms is presented; application of this methodology
to a variety of market mechanisms within CAT tournaments demonstrates that
many are not robust against a number of environmental changes.
In Chapter 4 a novel model for allocating computational resources via
competing double auction marketplaces is developed. In contrast to similar
models that deal with single-aribute resources, this model considers the
allocation of multi-aribute resources, and qualitative diﬀerences between the
models presents new challenges in the form of requiring new mechanisms.
Firstly, decision-making models appropriate for determining preferences over the
multi-aribute computational resources are developed, based upon marketing
models grounded in consumer theory. Using the multi-aribute utility trader
models, visualisations of trader payoﬀs for various resource types, demonstrate
the challenges that marketplaces face in locating the popular market niches
across a variety of trader contexts. Because typical methods for calculating the
allocative eﬃciency of resource allocations in single-aribute models are not
appropriate for the multi-aribute resources considered in this model, a new
algorithm is developed for making this calculation that allows the allocative
eﬃciency of the approach to be measured in simulations throughout the thesis.
Chapter 5 tackles the main research challenge noted in Chapters 2 and 4,
viz., how competing market-exchanges can automatically locate market niches
that satisfy segments of a trader population. To that end, the automatic niing
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problem is described, and several aribute-level selection (ALS) strategies are
proposed to tackle this problem, based upon n-armed bandit and evolutionary
optimisation, approaches. A comprehensive computational study is carried out to
assess the performance of these strategies by applying the methodology
developed in Chapter 3 within the market-based model developed in Chapter 4. In
general, simulation results show that several strategies are able to automatically
locate market niches within a variety of environmental seings, and that in many
cases competing marketplaces can self-organise to cover market niches that
satisfy all market segments within the environment, leading to desirable
allocations.
Chapter 6 complements the automatic market niching mechanisms
introduced in Chapter 5 by considering new approaches for trader
market-selection over competing marketplaces using niching mechanisms. While
reputation approaches have been widely applied in electronic marketplace
seings, no work currently addresses the suitability of reputation approaches to
signalling the expected behaviour of marketplaces. Highly reputable
marketplaces should oﬀer resource markets that traders want to trade in, as well
as execute trades that are proﬁtable for traders. Chapter 6 explores how
reputation approaches facilitate beer trader market-selection decisions, and
demonstrates that a subjective reputation approach, grounded in Bayesian
statistics, improves traders’ market-selection decisions, resulting in more eﬃcient
resource allocations globally. Analysis is carried out using agent-based
simulations, while an initial investigation studying the inﬂuential properties of
certain traders is undertaken via a statistical analysis of emergent
market-recommendation networks.
Chapter 7 draws conclusions based upon the research carried out within
the thesis, reviews the contributions that this thesis has made, and discusses how
this work can be extended in the future.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED
WORK
To know the road ahead, ask those coming ba.
—Chinese proverb
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is chapter introduces problems associated with allocating multi-aribute
computational resources, distributed across space and time. It focusses on
market-based approaches to computational resource allocation, and highlights
the unstudied potential approach of commodifying multi-aribute resources and
allocating them via competing double auction marketplaces. Simulation
approaches for designing and analysing competing marketplaces are reviewed,
and gaps concerning approaches for measuring the general performance of
market mechanisms are highlighted. Further, some trust and reputation
approaches within electronic markets are reviewed, and it is argued that their
suitability for signalling expected marketplace behaviour needs to be further
analysed.
e rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 introduces the
notion of computational resources for utility computing and the current
system-centric models governing their allocation. A distributed model of
agent-based computational resource allocation is motivated, and some desiderata
concerning such a model are considered, which current system-centric models of
resource allocation fail to meet. In Section 2.2 current approaches to market-based
resource allocation are introduced, focussing on both centralised and fully
decentralised mechanisms. e appropriateness of these mechanisms is
considered against the requirements for allocating multi-aribute resources in a
distributed environment, and it is concluded that none are strictly appropriate for
several reasons. e double auction—the market mechanism this thesis focusses
on—is introduced in Section 2.3. It is shown, however, that while eﬃcient
resource allocations can be achieved with the mechanism, multi-aribute variants
are computationally prohibitive, and not scaleable to large systems. At this point
in the chapter, the novel approach studied within this thesis is proposed: that
multi-aribute resources could be commodiﬁed and allocated across multiple
markets run by competing market-exchanges. Section 2.4 focusses on empirical
models and approaches within the literature for studying resource allocation via
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competing marketplaces, and concludes that less aention has been given to
measuring the general performance of market mechanisms, across diﬀerent
environmental seings. Section 2.5 discusses trust and reputation approaches as a
means of signalling and sanctioning behaviour in electronic marketplaces. While
much aention has been given to the application of reputation approaches in
general, almost none has been given to how approaches can be applied to
signalling marketplace behaviour in a competitive environment, and what impact
it has on resource allocations. Finally, Section 2.6 summarises the chapter, and
highlights why the work within this thesis is required.
2.1 Agent-based Computational Resource Allocation
A computational resource is an abstract term that can refer to either
computational hardware, soware, or a services composed of both. e
consumption of a computational resource involves permied access to some
computational hardware or soware for a speciﬁed amount of time. Conversely,
the provision of computational resources involves temporarily relinquishing
access to some hardware or soware, by allowing another entity access to it.
With the advent of virtualisation [7], computational hardware platforms can be
carved up into many smaller virtualised resources, each running, for example, an
entire operating system—system virtual maines—or speciﬁc instances of some
soware—process virtual maines.
System virtual machines are typically required less frequently, but for
longer periods, while process virtual machines are typically used more frequently
but for much shorter periods, and oen to run speciﬁc tasks. Regardless of the job
or function of the computational resource being used, a common feature is that
each resource usually has multiple aributes. For example, a computational
resource in the form of a system virtual machine might be described in terms of
its: memory capacity, storage capacity, CPU speed and number of CPU cores.
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Alternatively, a computational resource in the form of an image-resizing process
virtual machine might be described over its guaranteed availability and
image-resizing speed.
2.1.1 Utility computing
As Buyya et al. [22] observe, as far back as 1969, UCLA researchers—working on
the Internet’s precursor ARPANET—had already begun considering the
possibilities that might emerge from a globally connected network of
computational devices:
As of now, computer networks are still in their infancy, but as they
grow up and become sophisticated, we will probably see the spread
of ‘computer utilities’ which, like present electric and telephone
utilities, will service individual homes and oﬃces across the country.
Kleinrock [86, p. 4.]
Much in the same way that water, gas, and electricity are public utilities, utility
computing refers to the bundling of computational resources into distinguishable
units, and then providing those resources on-demand; importantly, resources
should be made available in a way that allows the consumer to easily adjust their
utilisation.
e cloud model of utility computing
Within the commercial IT domain, the provision of on-demand computational
resources has aracted the aention of major IT vendors, including HP, IBM,
Oracle, and Amazon [63]. A new paradigm has emerged—cloud
computing—which describes the provision of location-independent resources in
an on-demand fashion. Resources are allocated to users across the Internet from a
cloud provider, usually a major IT vendor with a massive and powerful hardware
infrastructure. According to Armbrust et al. [4] the main characteristics that
separate the cloud computing model from other paradigms are: (i) the appearance
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of inﬁnite computational resources that scale with the user’s demand, known as
elasticity; (ii) a small barrier to entry because their are no hardware costs; and
(iii) the ability to pay for resources on-demand. Based upon these compelling
characteristics, the beneﬁts are clear to consumers. However, as Briscoe and
Marinos [19] note, there are some fundamental issues with the cloud computing
model: (i) because massively centralised hardware infrastructures provide all
resources, when there is a failure it is massive and systemic; and (ii) because ever
decreasing hardware costs mean cloud providers are growing exponentially,
resulting in huge environmental impacts and massively under-utilised systems.
Briscoe and Marinos argues that these concerns could be overcome by the
implementation of a community cloud—a cloud provider infrastructure built on
top of individuals’ computational resources, where both consumers and providers
are distributed across the Internet.
Large-scale distributed computational resources
Combined individual machines, distributed across the Internet, are possibly the
biggest untapped computational resource, and many if not most will be siing
idle most of the time [140, 124]. Using volunteer computing models, some of this
computational power has been utilised in a distributed fashion. For example, the
SETI@home [153] and BOINC [15] projects harness users’ idle computer time to
perform distributed computational tasks. As of January 2011, the combined
computational power of BOINC volunteers sits at 4.6 petaFLOPS; currently, the
most powerful supercomputer only manages 2.5 petaFLOPS¹.
Volunteer computing projects explicitly rely on altruism from their
user-base, who provide their computational resources for running tasks delegated
by a central coordinator. While the economic beneﬁts to consumers within a
utility computing model are clear, individual users are only likely to provide
resources if there are economic beneﬁts to doing so. Further, among the common
¹hp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11644252
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characteristics that any utility computing model should have, Rappa [139]
identiﬁes:
• reliability: the service or resource should be available when and where the
user needs it;
• usability: the service or resource should be simple to use at the point of use,
thus integrating into the user’s environment easily;
• utilisation rates: user demand for the services or resources may vary
signiﬁcantly over time, but there should always be available capacity for
users.
Many of these objectives are in practice diﬃcult to achieve, particularly when
one considers these desiderata in terms of large-scale, decentralised collections of
resources. For a system such as this to work, in a computational and economic
sense, it will need to operate without the intervention of human resource owners
or users. erefore, Soware Agents have been proposed to help solve resource
coordination and utilisation problems within these large-scale systems.
2.1.2 Soware agents as economic actors
According to Wooldridge and Jennings [184] a soware agent has the following
properties:
• autonomy: they operate without the direct intervention of humans or
others, and with self-control over their state and actions;
• social ability: they are able to communicate and interact with other agents;
• reactivity: they perceive their environment and react to changes within it;
• pro-activeness: they are not only reactive, and can exhibit goal-oriented,
deliberative behaviour.
e general role of soware agents is to represent, and perform tasks for, their
owners. In terms of a distributed utility computing environment, these tasks
might include: locating, valuing, and competing over resources, or coordinating
processes by which resources can be allocated across agents. As Wooldridge [183,
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pp. 7-8.] notes, no system is entirely composed of a single agent, and aention is
given to the ﬁeld of multi-agent systems from two viewpoints: (i) agents as a
paradigm for soware engineering; and (ii) agents as a tool for understanding
human societies.
Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) [167] takes a petri dish
approach to modelling economic processes, through the boom-up interactions
of economic agents in a multi-agent system, and is an example of where the
second viewpoint has had a powerful impact on the understanding of human
economies. e work carried out within this thesis, however, aligns itself more
with the ﬁrst viewpoint. From an engineering perspective, as McBurney and Luck
[103] suggest: any large-scale, open and dynamic system needs to adopt the
multi-agent systems paradigm, with respect to its design and implementation. An
advantage of the multi-agent system approach is that systems can be iteratively
engineered in-vitro using a wide array of simulation tools, allowing one to
immediately see the impact system designs have on both individual and systemic,
behaviour. Further, these agent-based approaches oen require no more
complexity or implementation than necessary to model the individual
decision-making behaviours of individual actors within the system.
Economic agents
e term “economic actor” [101] speciﬁcally refers to a model of an individual
decision maker, typically eschewing non-rational actions, thus always aempting
to maximise its utility, which is used as a measure of relative happiness or
satisfaction. While at one stage modelling human behaviour in this way was
considered reasonable, such simplistic theories have given over to more
multidisciplinary concepts, such as bounded rationality [156], which is the idea
that individuals’ decision making is inﬂuenced and limited by other factors, such
as the amount of information available and how long it takes to process.
However, while economic rationality might be too strong an assumption for
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human behaviour in general, it can prove useful as a way of modelling
decision-making behaviour in soware agents. In order that soware agents are
able to perform tasks for users, there needs to be: (i) a method of specifying what
these tasks should be; and (ii) a way of specifying to the agent what actions it
should take to achieve its task. e ﬁrst requirement, depending on the
environment and required tasks, can be satisﬁed by either hardcoding some
pre-deﬁned behaviour, or allowing the agent to learn, perhaps under supervision.
Within a computational resource allocation system, soware agents can
work on behalf of users in either resource provision or consumption roles. Utility
theory, or more speciﬁcally in a computational resource domain, multi-aribute
utility theory, can be an eﬀective way of allowing agents to make autonomous
decisions inline with their owners’ preferences and constraints over diﬀerent
resource aributes. Within economic interactions, soware agents can be told
what actions to choose by being provided with a utility function, which the agent
can use to make a preference ordering over diﬀerent possible outcomes [183,
pp. 107.]. us, faced with several choices an agent will go with the one that,
according to its utility function, will satisfy it the most. Typically, some
assumptions are made about the type of utility model used. Modern Consumer
eory [71, part i.] tells us that human preferences are best described using
ordinal utility functions, that is, described entirely in terms of rank between
alternatives. However, for decision making agents, and the algorithms they
employ, it is oen preferable to accept the more outdated theory of cardinal
utility [152], which can, if used with care, accurately model user preferences.
2.1.3 Computational resource allocation desiderata
A signiﬁcant desideratum that concerns the design of resource allocation
systems, is that of facilitating economic eﬃciency. Speciﬁcally, when dealing with
a utilitarian model, it is the allocative eﬃciency of a resource allocation
mechanism that is of interest. An allocation is said to be strictly eﬃcient iﬀ the
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total utility of all participants involved is maximised; as a consequence, such an
allocation is also Pareto eﬃcient. However, within the design of any large-scale,
distributed and open system, there will always be practical issues and constraints
that must be adhered to whenever possible; there are certainly objectives that
must be met when considering the suitability of approaches for allocating
distributed computational resources. Unfortunately, these practical objectives are
oen in conﬂict with the overarching one of allocating resources as eﬃciently as
possible, and tradeoﬀs must be made between objectives [136]. erefore, in
reality many resource allocation mechanisms are not strictly allocatively eﬃcient,
and the role of a multi-agent system designer is to strive for eﬃciency while
complying with practical system constraints or alternative objectives. When
designing a distributed resource allocation mechanism, for example, one might
consider the following desiderata:
• availability: the allocation mechanism should always be available to agents,
not just across locations, but across time—it shouldn’t involve periods of
inactivity;
• robustness: the approach should be robust to failure—the entire system
should not be reliant on a single point;
• scalability: the approach should scale with the number of participants in
the system, which in the case of massively distributed utility computing,
could be thousands or more;
• expediency: users or agents should not be le waiting to receive the
outcome of an action—resources should be allocated as quickly as possible;
and
• open: there should be no barrier to entry, and the approach should not
prevent users or their agents from participating.
Current system-centric approaches used within grid and cloud computing models
for allocating resources fail to meet some of these requirements. In the main, it is
unclear how resources can be eﬃciently allocated within an oligopolistic
retail-inspired model. Firstly, it is likely there will be many times when there is,
for example, excess supply, but prices won’t be adjusted to reﬂect that. Secondly,
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acting in an oligopolistic fashion precludes users from making their
computational resources available for provision, further hindering competition.
Particularly, with the massive growth of Internet-enabled devices, and thus the
continual requirement for access to more computational services and resources,
to satisfy a growing user base, means that traditional system-centric approaches
to controlling and allocating these resources is particularly limiting [63]. In any
distributed and open system, where any agent can seek to either provide or
consume resources, it is important that agents are able to compete for resources,
so that those who value them most receive them. As Broberg et al. [20] note,
market-based approaches are a possible way of allowing participants to compete
over resources, without the need for a global overview of either side of the
system required by a system-centric approach.
2.2 Market-based Meanisms for Multi-attribute
Resource Allocation
e traditional resource allocation approaches discussed in the previous section
all have some fundamental issues, each of which may eventually prove
insurmountable. is section considers the domain of Market-based Control
(MBC) [30], in which market-based mechanisms are utilised to control the
allocation of distributed resources, oen in complex systems. MBC advocates
that, rather than allocating resources according to quantity limits and capacity
(which requires an omniscient centralised planner), a system’s resources should
instead be allocated according to economic need, as determined by price [68].
Market-based control is founded on the idea that rational self-interested agents
will compete over resources, and that they will be allocated to those who place
the highest value upon them. us, the design of the market-mechanism that
governs the resource allocation is fundamentally important for achieving the
desired objectives of the designer.
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Within the discipline of economics, the ﬁeld of Meanism Design concerns
itself with the design of market-based mechanisms for resource allocation
problems [63]. Mechanism design treats the designing of mechanisms as seing
the rules of a game for self-interested agents, such that when followed in a
rational way, participants’ interactions will lead to designer-desirable outcomes
[40]. Mechanism design researchers oen have societal objectives in mind when
designing market mechanisms; a common goal is the eﬃcient allocation of
resources, which is usually deﬁned as the maximisation of the total utility over all
agents in the system. By using game-theoretic techniques, the challenge is to
design a mechanism that uses the strongest game-theoretic solution concept
possible [126]. Mechanism designers usually wish to build market mechanisms
that satisfy (see [136], for example) the following properties:
• incentive compatible: participants should be incentivised to report their true
preferences, usually in terms of declaring their true valuation for the good
being traded in the market;
• budget balanced: if the mechanism rewards participants to reveal their true
preferences using money, the net transfer of payments should be zero, i.e.,
the mechanism does not run at a loss;
• eﬃcient: the allocation that the mechanism makes should (in some way) be
optimal, e.g., the total utility over all participants should be maximised;
• individually rational: participants should be beer oﬀ (in an expected sense)
using the mechanism than not.
An important result oen relied upon in mechanism design is the revelation
principle, which states that any mechanism can be turned into an
incentive-compatible direct-revelation mechanism [126, 130]. Incentive
compatibility is desirable for optimally allocating resources, while a
direct-revelation mechanism means that the only available action an agent has is
to communicate its preferences; thus, agents can only perform one action, which
is to report their preferences truthfully to the mechanisms. In such a case, very
strong claims can be made, indeed proved, about the optimality and thus power,
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of such a market mechanism. However, there are some considerable problems
with the revelation principle. While it states that any mechanism can be turned
into an incentive-compatible direct-revelation mechanism, it says nothing about
the computational cost of performing that operation [126, p. 36.], such as, for
example, polling every agent in a system for their preference type [137]. Other
strong assumptions are oen also made, such as implicitly trusting the market
mechanism, and that agents will always act rationally. us, the mechanism
design desiderata listed above, and the general approach and assumptions, are in
conﬂict with the desirable properties of a computational resource allocation
mechanism listed in Section 2.1.3. Some new approaches have been made to
improve the practical aspects of mechanism design, e.g., algorithmic meanism
design [115] only considers mechanisms that are computationally practical, and
trust-based meanism design [40] considers mechanisms where traders may not
fully trust each other, oen because of conﬂicting design objectives, the design of
appropriate mechanisms for the problem at hand is usually non-trivial [63] and
complex, and theoretical approaches are oen not practical.
2.2.1 Centralised approaes
A common mechanism for determining where resources should be allocated is to
hold an auction. e most common type of auction, the English Auction, is oen
found in auction houses dealing with art or antiques. In such an auction, bidders
shout out monotonically increasing bids until no-one wishes to improve upon the
last price submied. In the simplest seings auctions are a good method for
allocating resources to those who value them the most, because the auction
participants are oen able to get an overview of the market and the interest in
item being auctioned. Multi-aribute auctions [14, 11, 13, 26, 41] are auctions
where rather than submiing single prices, as in English Auctions, bidders are
required to submit a bundle of aributes, describing a range of diﬀerent outcomes
they would be happy with, and what they would be prepared to exchange for each
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outcome. Typically, multi-aribute auctions are single-sided, and oen, as Bichler
et al. [14] note, designed in terms of facilitating procurement within complex
resource markets; an example might be a government procuring goods or services
to ﬁnd the cheapest supplier that satisﬁes their requirements. Multi-aribute bids
are oen evaluated by the auctioneer, using a scoring-rule or utility function,
which allows it to compare bids orthogonally. How these rules are designed is an
active area of research [26, 41]. e fact that typically multi-aribute auctions
only allocate single-units within each auction, means they can be prohibitive for
allocating large volumes of resources. While multi-unit versions have however
been considered, some of the advantageous properties of the single-unit versions,
including the eﬃciency of allocations, is lost [14].
Combinatorial Auctions [114] are multi-unit auctions that aempt to
overcome some of the limitations of traditional multi-aribute auctions. A
combinatorial auction considers the allocation not of individual goods with
multiple aributes, but entire bundles of diﬀerent goods. Examples might include
for example, the various aspects of a package holiday: ﬂights; connections; and
hotel. Importantly, goods are said to be combinatorial only when the value of the
bundle is greater than the total of each item’s individual value [12]. While
combinatorial auctions are able to eﬃciently allocate resources, the winner
determination problem, that is, the optimisation problem needed to be solved to
optimally allocate resources, is a reduction of a graph clique problem, and thus
NP-hard [148]. While the problem is NP-hard, some aempts have been made
to provide more computationally reasonable estimation algorithms for calculating
optimal allocations, particularly in terms of iterative mechanism that can ﬁnd
sub-optimal allocations in polynomial time [125, 126]. Similar approaches have
been proposed and evaluated in multi-aribute auction formats [163, 13].
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2.2.2 Decentralised approaes
e centralised auction-based mechanisms discussed thus far, while oen
resulting in allocatively eﬃcient outcomes, rely on considerable amounts of
central control or global views, which is at odds with the general aims of
market-based systems—to exhibit the decentralised, robust nature of human
economies [35]. Several approaches have been proposed for the design of agents,
and in general mechanisms, for the decentralised allocation of resources. In terms
of being applicable to computational resource allocation, there are two are two
main approaches: bargaining over resources using negotiation protocols, or
broadcasting ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ posted oﬀers across retail markets.
Lewis et al. [92] take a decentralised retail-inspired approach to the
allocation of computational resources, deﬁning evolutionary market
agents—resource sellers that use simple evolutionary algorithms to learn
appropriate prices for selling resources. Within their model, no centralised node
or coordinator is required to manage the resource allocation process. Rather, it is
assumed that a decentralised population of resource consumers and providers are
able to interact with each other and post oﬀers publicly to the rest of the entire
system. While Lewis et al. focussed on single-aribute resources, the approach
has also been generalised to multi-aribute cases [93]. While Lewis et al.’s
approach satisﬁes a number of desirable properties, such as robustness through
decentralisation, it has a number of drawbacks. It assumes that sellers have an
unlimited amount of resources, and it is unclear how eﬃcient allocations would
be in scenarios where sellers were resource constrained, or indeed, how sellers
would ensure their prices were visible to all buyers in the system.
Bargaining agents can use a more complex formal framework for
negotiations. Some heuristic approaches to bargaining, such as Barbuceanu and
Lo [6]’s, utilise models that can order preferences over multi-aribute resources.
Bilateral negotiations progress with each agent considering an oﬀer according to
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their valuation model and returning a (generally concessive) counter oﬀer, or
rejecting the deal entirely. Heuristic bargaining approaches are not capable of
considering externalities, or indeed communicating outside of the bounds of the
proposal space [78], which can lead to ineﬃcient negotiations and an inability to
communicate other important information. Argumentation approaches [128, 78]
aempt to remove some of these limitations by allowing agents to communicate,
for example, supporting arguments as to why their proposal should be accepted,
or to notify the counterparty of particular constraints that can’t be broken.
As with decentralised retail-inspired approaches, it is unclear how well
bargaining approaches result in eﬃcient allocations across systems of distributed
agents. Work on CATNETS [53, 54] has aempted to answer these types of
question. Eymann et al. [53, 54] consider fully decentralised resource allocation
mechanisms for computational grids that rely on networks of diﬀerent soware
agents acting as providers or coordinators. Each agent uses negotiation
techniques to make a trading decision, and an underlying decentralised
peer-to-peer infrastructure allows agents to communicate prices and oﬀers.
While this approach is reasonable for small cases, as the number of participants
scales to several hundred, results in [54] suggest the fully decentralised nature
signiﬁcantly aﬀects convergence on an eﬃcient price equilibrium.
2.2.3 Problems with existing approaes
In this section a number of centralised and decentralised market-mechanisms
have been reviewed from the perspective of multi-aribute computational
resource allocation in large-scale systems. While each approach has a number of
advantages, both approaches have signiﬁcant issues or limitations, which do not
sit well with the desiderata listed in Section 2.1.3. e signiﬁcant advantage of
centralised auction-based approaches is that in many cases they are able to
achieve two things: (i) elicit the true preferences of bidders; and (ii) use this
information to calculate the most eﬃcient allocation, usually by solving an
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optimisation problem. However, these outcomes are reached at a signiﬁcant cost:
• non-distributable: it is unclear how multi-aribute and combinatorial
auctions could be distributed across many locations in a large system, while
maintaining their primary advantage of allocating resources eﬃciently;
• one-sided: the centralised mechanisms considered thus far only install
competition in one side of a market, giving a potentially unfair advantage
the side running the auction [151];
• non-interruptible: there could be a signiﬁcant gap between the
commencement of a centralised auction, and the resulting allocation,
during which time the environment or preferences of the agents may
change considerably;
• computationally prohibitive: eliciting the true preferences of agents, and
then solving the resulting allocation problem is generally NP-hard, and
near realtime resource allocations with large systems of agents seems
impossible with current computational hardware.
Some research has been undertaken to generalise multi-aribute and
combinatorial approaches to two-sided exchange markets [127, 151], but there are
still many issues remaining in terms of computational cost and the
non-interruptible nature of the mechanisms. Cliﬀ and Bruten [35] were one of the
ﬁrst to suggest that a centralised approach to resource allocation, whether via
market mechanisms or not, opposes the decentralised, robust nature of real-world
economic markets; a call was made for focussing on developing agents that are
capable bargaining behaviours, that is, to distribute the intelligence of the
mechanism across the system. In real-world free-market economies, competition
between market participants drives the allocation process. However, the fully
decentralised approaches studied in Section 2.2.2 hinder this in a number of ways:
• hidden-prices: two signiﬁcant issues hinder economic competition in fully
decentralised systems—either transaction prices are private and not
available publicly, or prices are unevenly distributed across a decentralised
network;
• illiquidity: in large-scale systems, where market participants have
heterogeneous preferences and constraints, it can be hard to ﬁnd suitable
trading partners;
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• barrier to entry: agents capable of multi-aribute negotiating need to have
sophisticated levels of cognitive reasoning.
Price discovery is essential to allow competition over resources and ensure that
those who value them most, receive them. In the CATNET approaches [3, 54],
however, prices have to be communicated in an ad-hoc way around the system,
potentially puing agents on the periphery at a disadvantage. Further, as Bichler
[12] notes: in bilateral bargaining situations, one-to-one negotiations determine
the price and conditions of any deal. is suggests that outcomes are
economically indeterminate, because agents with higher cognitive capabilities
will determine the conditions and prices of deals.
When Cliﬀ and Bruten [35] highlighted the importance of distributing the
intelligence of market mechanisms by endowing market participants with
bargaining behaviours, they emphasised that to allow economic competition to
occur within a market, bargaining agents need to be able to consider other recent
trade prices when forming their own. If there is a mechanism to make price
information to available to all market participants, bargaining behaviours do not
need to be considerably complex for eﬃcient outcomes to be achieved. Cliﬀ and
Bruten demonstrated this by showing that a population of minimally intelligent
traders [33] can arrive at economically eﬃcient allocations without the need for
any omniscient central mechanism controlling allocations. is mechanism, the
double auction, forms the core of the market-based system proposed within this
thesis, and is discussed in the next section.
2.3 Double Auctions
is section introduces the Double Auction—a family of two-sided auction
mechanisms where multiple potential buyers and sellers submit oﬀers, seeking to
engage in purchase transactions over some good. As a market-mechanism for
allocating computational resources, whose providers and potential consumers are
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distributed over space and time, a double auction has some nice properties:
• institutional: as a centralised auction mechanism, it provides a single
location for participants to trade;
• price discovery: participants have access to the current market price for the
resource they are trading;
• two-sided: the double auction supports multiple buyers and sellers
simultaneously bidding in an aempt to transact.
While a centralised institutional mechanism may appear to conﬂict with some of
the desiderata in Section 2.1.3, e.g., by being a weak-point of failure, in reality,
multiple double auction mechanisms are easily distributed across a system, and
participants can migrate between them at will [23]. Further, double auction
mechanisms do not require knowledge of the whole system, and merely act as a
point for traders to compete over resources, rather than making any dictatorial
allocation decisions. Because they are two-sided auctions, both buyers and sellers
can compete over resources, ensuring no side of the market has an unfair
advantage.
2.3.1 Double auction basics
e term ‘double auction’ is rather misleading. While many auction mechanisms
are considered double auctions, in reality double auction is an umbrella term for
many two-sided auction types, each with diﬀerent rules but sharing some
characteristics. Double auction variations are used by most of the stock and
commodity exchanges around the world, but generally each has diﬀering rules. In
a double auction, traders simultaneously submit prices—referred to as shouts—to
the market [58]. Buyers’ shouts are known as bids, and indicate that they are
prepared to purchase at a price not exceeding their speciﬁed oﬀer price. Sellers’
shouts are referred to as asks; an ask is an indication that the seller is prepared to
sell at a price not less than their speciﬁed oﬀer price. Bids and asks can be
mated when their prices crossover, that is, when the bid price is at least that of
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the ask price. Once a bid and ask are matched, a transaction is formed between
the buyer and seller, and they exchange good for cash. One common type of
double auction is the clearing house auction, or call market [49]. A clearing house
auction is periodic, that is, like the classic English auction there is a period of
bidding, and then a period of allocation. Once bidding is over, the auctioneer
assesses all oﬀers and determines which traders will be matched, and at what
price. It is common in call markets for all matched traders to transact at the same
price, which is typically known as the clearing or market price, because it is the
price at which, given all of the oﬀers, the most transactions can be executed. An
illustrative example of how the market is cleared is given in Figure 2.1. Clearing
bids asks
14 6
14 7
13 9
12 9
10 10
9 13
9 14
Figure 2.1: Each number represents the price of an oﬀer shouted into the mar-
ket. Once the submission period is over, the auctioneer determines the clearing (or
market) price. In this case the market price is 10. All possible trades, i.e., those on
or above the clearing price will take place with a transaction price of 10. us, the
price discovery is performed by the market mechanism rather than the traders. For
example, one bidder has over-bid and oﬀered a price of 14, but they will only pay
the market price.
house auctions are useful for trading items that don’t have continually high
amount of interest, because they provide an extended period of time to collect
potential oﬀers before allocating resources. Further, traders do not have to worry
about over-bidding, because the price discovery process is done by the
auctioneer. Clearing house auctions do a good job of discovering market prices, by
spending time gathering information about trader preferences, in the form of
collecting oﬀers, resulting in more eﬃcient allocations. However, their periodic
nature does not sit well with the desideratum that resources should be allocated
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quickly, e.g., it may be impractical for a soware agent to wait for the next
auction iteration. Further, the periodic nature means that clearing house markets
can take longer to react to exogenous environmental inﬂuences acting on the
system, such as sudden shis in supply or demand. An always-on continuous
double auction mechanism, where market prices are determined, and resources
allocated instantly, is more appropriate.
2.3.2 Continuous double auctions
Unlike the clearing house auction, an auctioneer running a continuous double
auction (CDA) clears the market as soon as two oﬀers match. In a CDA market
traders always have an indication of the current market spread, which typically
displays the currently unmatched highest bid and lowest ask. us, traders using
the CDA market mechanism always have access to the current market price
(oen called the market quote), which is the price they must pay that instant to
either buy or sell a resource. CDA mechanisms are the double auction variants
that are most likely to be found running in ﬁnancial institutions around the
world, particularly as a way of allocating heavily traded assets. It is common to
refer to the entities running CDA auctions as either market institutions, or
market-exchanges; this thesis uses the second term. Given that CDAs allocate
resources in a continuous, reactive way—as soon as two oﬀers cross in the
market, and all at potentially diﬀerent prices—the resulting allocations are oen
very eﬃcient. Expectedly, CDAs have therefore received a large amount of
aention from within the Economics, and increasingly also the Computer Science
research communities.
Reaing competitive equilibrium with minimally intelligent traders
Competitive Equilibrium is a term used to describe the concept of equilibrium in a
two-sided exchange environment (where prices can be dictated by both supply
and demand). Equilibrium usually implies stability; if a market reaches
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competitive equilibrium, trades all tend to take place at a certain price, known as
the competitive equilibrium price (oen denoted P). Further, competitive
equilibrium results in allocations that are allocatively eﬃcient, in terms of
maximising total trader utility, which is a desirable objective for a computational
resource allocation system. To understand how competitive equilibrium is arrived
antity
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10
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Demand
Figure 2.2: Example supply and demand curves for a resourcemarket. Supply curves
always slope upwards (the higher the price of a resource, the greater the number of
traders willing to supply the resource). Demand curves almost always slope down-
wards (the lower the price of the resource, the greater the number of trader want-
ing to purchase it). Given supply and demand schedules, the curves can be built
by iterating through all prices and recording the quantity of traders that would be
willing to trade at that price. Assuming traders can only trader a single unit, at a
price of 10, for example, ﬁve sellers would be willing to trader, but at that price 35
buyers are eager to buy, resulting in an excess demand of 30, which is ineﬃcient in
terms of maximising total utility across all traders. Likewise, at a price of 10 there
is an excess in supply of 30  10 = 20. However, at the equilibrium price P = 20,
the quantity willing to be supplied is equal to the quantity demanded, thus the
market is at competitive equilibrium. In this the equilibrium quantity is a range
Q 2 [10–15], but the quantity exchanged will tend towards the maximum limit
[157, p. 114.].
at, and to further support the argument for the applicability of using double
auction mechanisms for allocating computational resources, example supply and
demand curves are shown in Figure 2.2. ese curves are built from the private
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valuations of a group of 35 traders who wish to consume or provide an imaginary
resource. An allocation of this resource is eﬃcient when supply and demand are
equal, i.e., the 15 traders who can, trade at a price of 20. However, the CDA
mechanism cannot enforce this, because it does not know traders’ valuations, and
it allocates individual resources constantly, without building a picture of the
supply and demand schedules. Yet, equilibrium outcomes are achieved using this
mechanism, even in markets with relatively few traders [157, 67]. is outcome is
down to the price discovery process, speciﬁcally that traders always know what
they need to pay, at that present time, to buy or sell a resource.
e primary feature is the double auction structure: in order to
realize any gains from exchange, a trader must either seize the market
price, or accept the market price of another. is necessity both limits
each agent’s inﬂuence on prices (via Bertrand competition) and also
conveys high quality information to other agents.
Friedman[57, p. 71.]
From a Computer Science perspective, designing agent-based traders that are
capable of behaving in this way is of paramount importance for applications such
as the one this thesis is interested in.
In seminal work, Cliﬀ and Bruten [33], building upon previous, but
ultimately incorrect conclusions [66], developed the Zero-intelligence Plus (ZIP)
trading agent, which, using simple machine learning techniques, is able to reach
competitive market equilibrium under a range of market conditions. Further, it is
a very simple algorithm which is computationally cheap to run.
2.3.3 Multi-attribute double auction approaes
Up to this point, double auctions, and particularly the continuous double auction,
have been discussed with respect to single-aribute resources. e
double-auction is, in its most common conﬁguration, designed only to allow
traders to indirectly negotiate over price. erefore, all resources or goods that
are supplied across a typical double auction market are commodities, that is, each
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item allocated is qualitatively indiﬀerent to any other. Within the literature, a
small number of multi-aribute double auction mechanisms have been proposed,
which will now be reviewed. Fink et al. [56, 55] have built formal models for
trading multi-aribute goods using a CDA mechanism. As an example
application, they consider a market for trading new and used cars with four
non-price aributes. Each buyer and seller is assumed to be able to specify quite
complicated constraints and preferences to the auction, e.g., “I’ll pay $200 more if
the car is red, but no more than $10,000 if it is black.” As such, traders submit
oﬀers not as a single price, but as a bundle containing (amongst other things) a
set of car types of interest, and real-valued functions describing preferences and
constraints over those types. ere are a number of reasons why Fink et al.’s
model is not suitable for the application considered in this thesis. Firstly, in a
single-aribute CDA mechanism, when an oﬀer is submied, it only has to be
compared to the highest (lowest) unmatched bid (ask), which is a cheap
operation. In Fink et al.’s mechanism, each oﬀer submied, being of a
multi-aribute nature, must be compared to many unmatched oﬀers; indeed, the
matching operation is equivalent to a single-sided multi-aribute auction’s
mechanism. Secondly, Fink et al. diﬀerentiate between indexable orders (those
that are only interested in a single type of car), and non-indexable orders (as the
example above, where a trader is interested in a range of diﬀerent types of car). In
an eﬀort to reduce computational cost, potentially more eﬃcient allocations are
sacriﬁced by only matching non-indexable to indexable orders, reducing the
diﬃculty of the matching problem. Both Engel et al. [51] and Schnizler et al. [151]
do consider the more complicated case of optimally matching a two-sided market
where oﬀers are submied with multiple aributes. As well as being considerably
harder than in the CDA-based mechanism used in [56, 55], the computational
complexity of the resulting optimisation problems in [51] and [151] is
considerably worse than the single-sided mechanisms discussed in Section 2.2.1.
In both [51] and [151], integer programming solutions are developed, however,
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based upon reported results, they are only feasible for real-time allocations of
computational resources between low numbers of traders, e.g. less than 100.
2.3.4 Commodifying multi-attribute resources
In practice, the continuous nature of the CDA mechanism precludes it from
optimally allocating multi-aribute resources with any kind of expedience, when
the mechanism accepts multi-aribute oﬀers, i.e., oﬀers specifying not just price,
but also constraints and preferences over other aributes. e rest of this section
motivates this thesis’s proposal that multi-aribute computational resources can
be allocated via competing CDA marketplaces. It discusses how the ﬁnancial
world deals with allocating hundreds of thousands of multi-aribute goods every
day, how the techniques used to achieve this have begun to feed into utility
computing models, and concludes with the proposal for multi-aribute resource
allocation via competing marketplaces.
Unlike cash instruments, such as company stock, which have an equivalent
value to all market participants, more complex instruments, e.g., those that are
derived from aspects of other instruments, can have diﬀerent values to diﬀerent
participants, due to their multi-aribute nature. An Option is an example of a
multi-aribute ﬁnancial derivative. An option contract between two parties
stipulates the buyer of the contract is entitled to, at some future point speciﬁed by
the contract, either buy or sell some underlying asset, to or from the seller of the
contract. ey have a long past², and until 1973 they were traded over the counter
(OTC). OTC transactions involve direct or indirect (via a broker) negotiation over
the aributes of the contract being exchanged. Given the distributed nature of the
global economy, and contract heterogeneity due to non-standardised aributes, it
was oen hard to ﬁnd parties to trade with, and exchange would take
considerable time.
²ere are references to option-like contracts between people in the Bible [123, p. 1. ], for ex-
ample, and certainly a well-recorded instance of option contract trading for Tulips, in seventeenth
century Holland.
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e solution to this was (along with the standardisation of the various
contract aributes) the opening of the Chicago Board Options Exchange [28]
(CBOE) in 1973; with its opening began a new era of exange-traded options.
Exchange-traded options are, as the name suggests, traded over an exchange,
usually either a call market or a CDA market. e signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
exchange-traded and OTC traded options, is that there is no negotiation over
non-price aributes in the exchange-traded case, that is, all non-price aributes
are ﬁxed to some speciﬁc values. Each option contract variation is traded within
its own market, and thus there are separate auctions for each variant. To deal
with the diﬀerent preferences and constraints that traders have over contract
aributes, option exchanges run multiple markets, giving traders the ability to
trade the option contract variant that best meets their preferences and
constraints. One fundamental challenge that an exchange owner faces is deciding
how many diﬀerent types of markets to run, and what type of contract variant
should be traded within each market. To improve the liquidity within markets,
exchanges oﬀer a subset of markets that have a large interest from traders. An
Type Underlying Strike Price Expiration Current Bid Current ask
CALL IBM 145 19/01/11 6.20 6.30
CALL IBM 150 19/01/11 2.96 3.00
CALL IBM 155 19/01/11 1.05 1.10
CALL IBM 160 19/01/11 0.30 0.32
PUT IBM 145 19/01/11 1.61 1.62
PUT IBM 150 19/01/11 3.45 3.55
PUT IBM 155 19/01/11 6.65 6.75
PUT IBM 160 19/01/11 10.90 11.00
Table 2.1: A ﬁctional example of eight diﬀerent option contract variations for the
same underlying asset. Each row in the table speciﬁes a separate market for con-
tract types with the aributes speciﬁed in columns 1–4.ese aributes include the
underlying asset, whether purchaser is given the option is to buy or sell the un-
derlying (Type), at what price (Strike Price), and on what date (Expiration). Each
market is a separate auction, and the current market quote for each type of option
contract is shown in columns 5 (bid) and 6 (ask). Traders can choose to join any
of the separate markets and shout oﬀers, according to whichever market they are
interested in.
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illustrative example is shown in Table 2.1, which lists some ﬁctional markets for
exchange-traded IBM options. Each contract has four non-price aributes, which
traditionally would be negotiated over. Rather, these aributes are ﬁxed at
speciﬁc levels and markets for a range of diﬀerent contract variations are
provided; each market has a current market quote—the current price to buy and
sell instantiations of those contracts.
e standardisation of complex multi-aribute ﬁnancial derivatives has
allowed for the emergence of commodiﬁed multi-aribute contract markets
running across distributed exchanges, lowering cognitive requirements of
automated trading strategies. Rather than having to design agents that can
negotiate over complex aributes with brokers, simple CDA trading strategies
such as ZIP can be utilised. Recently, similar exchange-based approaches have
begun to emerge within the utility computing model. Cloud providers such as
Amazon have recently begun to introduce a market-based approach³, by
providing call markets for allocating diﬀerent multi-aribute computational
resources. Consumers choose the market that best meets their requirements and
submit bids for access to instances of the speciﬁed market resource. Knowing its
own supply schedule, based upon its current excess capacity, Amazon essentially
acts as multiple sellers on the sell-side of each market, clearing the markets at
prices that balance supply and demand. A selection of these resource types is
shown in Table 2.2; each of the resource types has a diﬀerent market price,
dependent on the available supply and demand. Because Amazon is aware of its
hardware capacity, it has explicit knowledge of the entire supply schedule. Based
upon that, human experts can optimise the selection of aribute-levels for each of
the resource markets, to best match the demand of users, and optimise revenues.
³hp://aws.amazon.com/ec2/spot-instances/
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Compute Units (CPU) Memory Storage I/O Performance Architecture
1 1.7 GB 160 GB Moderate 32-bit
4 7.5 GB 850 GB High 64-bit
8 15 GB 1,690 GB High 64-bit
6.5 17.1 GB 420 GB Moderate 64-bit
13 34.2 GB 850 GB High 64-bit
26 68.4 GB 1,690 GB High 64-bit
Table 2.2: Six diﬀerent Amazon EC2 Instance Types. Each row represents a diﬀer-
ent type of computational resource oﬀered on-demand by Amazon web services.
As you can see, each instance type has diﬀerent aribute values, which will be
preferable to diﬀerent types of consumers. Amazon provides a separate exchange
market for each resource type, and consumers submit bids for purchasing instances
of the described resources. Amazon decides which resource markets to oﬀer based
upon its explicit knowledge of the supply schedule, i.e., it knows how much excess
capacity is in its system, and the hardware constraints of its infrastructure.
Summary
While Amazon is an example of where market-based approaches are being
considered for complex computational resource allocation, in their case they have
full knowledge of one side of the market. us, they can optimally specify what
resource markets should exist, e.g., those in Table 2.2, based upon knowledge of
their resources. However, the distributed resource providers and consumers
considered within this thesis are distributed across space and time, with diﬀerent
preferences and constraints, resulting in global supply and demand schedules
being unavailable to any single entity.
One approach to computational resource allocation not yet considered in
the literature, is that resource markets could be run by multiple competing
marketplaces, with the aim that each marketplace automatically identiﬁes a
market nie that satisﬁes a market segment. Market segmentation is an
economics and marketing concept that describes how a population of market
participants is segmented into diﬀerent groups [89, p. 73]. ese market segments
are oen deﬁned by the preferences and constraints of consumer and providers,
which cause them to demand similar or identical goods. In that respect,
marketplaces aempting to satisfy market segments by providing a market for a
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certain resource types face the same problem as ﬁnancial derivative exchanges:
identifying and satisfying market segments within a complex environment
containing many participants with diﬀerent preferences and constraints over
aributes. How the market-exchange agents running these markets
autonomously identify and satisfy market segments, to aract consumer and
providers to their market, is a research question considered in detail in Chapter 5.
It is hypothesised, however, that their self-interested nature, and thus the
competition over traders, will encourage all market niches within an environment
to be sought out and satisﬁed.
Recently, a small body of related research has appeared, looking at
answering research questions involving satisfaction of market segments via
multiple competing marketplaces. Cai et al. [23], for example, have empirically
investigated the emergence of market segmentation between competing
market-exchanges in a less complex single-aribute resource domain. Using an
empirical agent-based approach, they conclude that the competitive nature of
traders will result in them naturally migrating to their preferred market, ereby
creating separate markets for each segment of the trader population. Both
agent-based approaches to the design of marketplaces, and simulation
frameworks for analysing competition between them, are a major part of the
research carried out in this thesis, and form the topic of the next section.
2.4 Competition Between Marketplaces
is section focusses on the computer science literature that studies competition
between marketplaces. Particular aention is given to the various empirical
approaches that have been suggested as frameworks for the design and analysis
of double auction market-mechanisms both in isolation [31, 135, 136], and in
competition in complex environments [117, 24]. While these approaches are
certainly helpful for analysing the performance of marketplaces competing in
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dynamic environments, there has been less aention given to methods for
analysing the robustness and generalisation of market-mechanisms; this is
discussed in more detail at the end of the section.
In a global economy, stock exchanges compete against each other for
trading business, and, increasingly, against new online markets not tied to
traditional physical exchanges. In such a competitive environment, the precise
rules adopted by a marketplace may have important consequences: in aracting
(or not) traders to their exchange; in favouring (or not) certain trading strategies;
and in facilitating (or not) the matching of shouts and the execution (matching) of
trades in their market. As such, marketplaces oen use a variety of diﬀerent
rules⁴ in an aempt to get a competitive edge. us, a detailed understanding of
the diﬀerent potential rules for double auction markets and their impacts is
important, since a good understanding of the market rules used certainly helps in
the design of improved rules and mechanisms, and may oﬀer clues as to how we
might eventually automate the design of entire market mechanisms.
2.4.1 Approaes to double auction marketplace design
Unfortunately, double auctions are typically poorly understood from a theoretical
perspective, in comparison to their single-sided counterparts [12, 130]. As both
Parsons et al. [130] and Phelps [137] note, while it has been shown that
single-sided mechanisms with one seller can be budget balanced, eﬃcient and
incentive compatible, due to Myerson and Saerthwaite’s [111] impossibility
result, no exchange-based (two-sided) mechanism can achieve all three objectives.
Further, the two-sided nature of the auction means game-theoretic approaches
have only been useful for very small instances, because of the huge state-space
explosion when considering larger numbers of participants and all their possible
actions. us, given the double auction’s current mathematical intractability for
⁴For example, the New York Stock Exchange [113] use a rule known as the the NYSE rule [48, p.
84], which speciﬁes traders must continually beer the market every time they shout an oﬀer
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larger instances, more aention has been given to empirical analysis, particularly
through the use of simulation and agent-based modelling.
Wurman et al. [186] perhaps seeded the empirical approach to marketplace
design, when they set about parametrically specifying common auction
characteristics—rule variations—that covered a large variety of diﬀerent auction
formats. Based on the approach of Wurman et al., Niu et al. [116] developed a rule
framework more speciﬁc to double auction mechanisms, which helps to tackle
design and analysis aspects of the mechanism by deﬁning a set of policies that
constitute a double auction mechanism, and could be used as parts of agent-based
double auction implementations:
• Mating policies specify which of the submied traders’ oﬀers should be
paired to form a transaction between the two agents;
• oting policies specify the current market bid price and ask price. ese
two prices are used by traders to help them determine what oﬀer price they
should submit in the future.
• Shout Accepting policies either accept or reject a trader’s submied shouted
oﬀer price;
• Clearing policies specify under what conditions the market is cleared, i.e.,
all transactions between matched oﬀers are executed.
• Pricing policies determine, given matched bid and ask oﬀers, at what price
the transaction should take place;
• Charging policies specify to traders what types of charges they are
subjected to when, for example, joining the exchange, placing a shout in the
market, or successfully transacting.
Based on these broad but well deﬁned policy areas, researchers have used a
variety of techniques to explore the design space of double auctions. Within the
realm of designing and analysing single market mechanisms in isolation, with the
typical objective of designing more eﬃcient mechanisms, research has focussed
on automating the search across the design space. Cliﬀ [31, 32] applies an
evolutionary approach to coevolve both autonomous ZIP trading agents [34] and
a CDA market-mechanism. Speciﬁcally, Cliﬀ uses a genetic algorithm to evolve
single vectors of real-value parameters describing properties of both the trading
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agent and market-mechanism behaviours. e evolutionary process results in the
ﬁnding of several novel market-mechanism that outperform well-known variants.
Phelps et al. [136] have recently introduced the Evolutionary Meanism Design
approach, wherein the problem of designing auction mechanisms can be treated
as an economic engineering problem [147] that needs to be iteratively solved,
rather than formally proved. To that end, Evolutionary Mechanism Design makes
use of empirical game theory techniques [135], as well as evolutionary
algorithms—particularly Genetic Programming techniques—to explore the design
space of double auction mechanisms [134].
2.4.2 Analysing competing marketplaces
Approaches such as [31, 136] have ostensibly been used to design marketplaces
existing in isolation, that is, in environments where there is no competition
between market mechanisms. In order to promote research into automated
mechanism design, and speciﬁcally to act as a basis for beer understanding how,
in a competitive environment, the rules adopted by marketplaces impact their
performance, a new research tournament was launched in 2007: the Trading Agent
Competition Market Design (or CAT) Tournament [24].
e CAT Tournament comprises a series of artiﬁcial parallel markets,
designed to mirror the competition between global stock markets. ese parallel
markets, called specialists, are created by entrants to the Tournament, and they
compete with one another to aract and retain traders, who are potential buyers
and sellers of some abstract commodity. In the CAT Tournament, traders are
soware agents created and operated by Tournament organisers and the
tournament entrants have to provide trading venues, in the form of specialists—a
speciﬁc name for a type of market-exchange. Each specialist agent runs a double
auction mechanism, whose rules are set within the six broad policy areas deﬁned
by Niu et al. [116] (referred to on Page 40). Along with diﬀerent potential trader
types in the environment, the multi-dimensionality of the specialists’
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performance metric creates challenges for the optimal design of specialists, since
these criteria may conﬂict. e rich environment created by, not only many
traders competing with each other, but also many market mechanisms competing
to aract traders, creates a potentially excellent test-bed for evaluating the eﬀects
of diﬀerent market mechanism rules.
e JCAT [77] soware, which is used to help run the tournaments, is
available freely and allows users to quickly create various environmental
conditions to evaluate specialist agents, and the eﬀects of competition on their
performance. As such, there have been several researchers making use of the
platform to carry out either speciﬁc analyses of the various CAT tournaments
[132, 116, 117, 174, 119], or to analyse competitive marketplaces in other contexts
[158, 159, 154]. Because the entrants to the CAT tournaments do not have to
submit source code, the tournament has created interesting new research
avenues, such as how to reverse engineer market mechanism rules, based only on
observing interactions between market mechanisms and traders [117] in
competition. e CAT tournaments have also highlighted aspects of marketplace
design that are not oen considered when designing isolated mechanisms. Petric
et al. [132] found that their 2007 CAT tournament specialist: CrocodileAgent,
won the initial qualiﬁcation stage of the tournament, but only managed 3rd place
in the ﬁnal because other competitors noticed the strategy and mimicked it
within the ﬁnal stages. In terms of research undertaken outside of the CAT
tournament, but within the context of competing marketplaces, Shi et al. [154]
use an evolutionary game theoretic approach to analyse the migration of traders
in a two-market situation, where the exchanges charge registration fees. Based on
their analysis they ﬁnd that traders will almost always migrate to a single market,
but that sometimes that market might be the one charging the higher fees,
suggesting that some interesting and complex dynamics aﬀect the relationship
between market rules and performance. Similarly, Sohn et al. [159] also consider
competition between two exchanges, and how the fee structures aﬀect market
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share. Sohn et al. assume that for market-selection, traders have a game-theoretic
behaviour model, and will thus make rational market-selection decisions.
Running simulations, they ﬁnd that as an exchange increases its entrance fees,
though extra-marginal⁵ traders are driven away immediately, there are still
several Nash equilibria⁶ where intra-marginal⁷ traders still join the exchange.
2.4.3 Generalisation and robustness issues
Using simulation tools such as JCAT can be an eﬀective way of answering
research questions involving competition between marketplaces, as well as being
an excellent way to empirically test and analyse market mechanism performance
in general. Further, these types of analysis are examples of how rich agent-based
simulations of competing marketplaces can oen reveal results that would
otherwise be unlikely to be found by studying mechanisms in isolation.
However, it may well be the case that the performance of a market
mechanism (or indeed a buyer/seller agent) may depend heavily on the
environmental context it is situated in. For example, given the CAT game
structure, it is easy to see that some specialists may perform beer with traders of
a particular type, and/or against competing specialists using particular policies.
Niu et al. [116], for example, have shown that some of the well-performing 2007
CAT specialists have weaknesses in other situations, and therefore specialists
may be considered brile (or obversely, robust), if their performance greatly
depends (or does not) on the competitive and trader contexts of the environment.
Petric et al. [132] note, for example, that from their investigations, results of the
CAT tournament are very sensitive to the initial distribution of traders
(environmental context) between marketplaces. Because the actual CAT
⁵Extra-marginal traders are those that, at market equilibrium, bid lower or ask higher than the
competitive price, resulting in them being unable to trade.
⁶A Nash equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept in which no player wishes to unilat-
erally change their own strategy, and all players know the equilibrium strategies of all the other
players.
⁷Intra-marginal traders are the group of traders that successfully trade at the market equilib-
rium.
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Tournaments are only conducted over a limited number of games (typically,
three), the performance of a specialist in the Tournament is not necessarily a
good guide to that specialist’s general ability, i.e., with other trader mixes, or in
competition against diﬀerent specialists.
us, there is a need to develop techniques or methodologies for measuring
the general performance of market mechanisms across a variety of environmental
contexts that a mechanism would be expected to operate in. is thesis oﬀers
solutions for that need, and uses the contributed techniques to help design and
analyse market mechanisms. Away from the CAT tournaments, other examples
are available that highlight the potential brileness of trading strategies also.
Sohn et al. [158], for example, report that ZIP traders [34] don’t perform well in
CDA markets with biased pricing rules. LeBaron [91, pp. 37–38] note that the
seings of parameters of economic soware agents oen aﬀects their
performance; this thesis argues that it is also not clear what eﬀect a new
environment will have on an agent, whose parameter seings were previously
successful in others.
In summary, it is very important when designing market mechanisms that
aention is given to measuring as well as possible the general performance across
environments that the mechanism can expect be in; currently, however, there are
gaps in the literature regarding how this can be done for market mechanisms in
complex seings.
2.5 Trust and Reputation Issues in Open Electronic
Markets
Any multi-agent system relies on soware agents interacting with others to
achieve designated tasks. When the multi-agent system is open, dynamic, and
unpredictable, however, it is essential that agents are able to adapt to changes in
the environment, and learn which agents to interact with [168]. Given that
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trading partners are unlikely to repeatedly interact, there is lile fear of
non-normative behaviour being punished, and it is possible that outcomes
between self-interested agents could be unfavourable [37, p. 31]. Further, within a
large market-based environment, the fact that agents are mostly unfamiliar with
each other can lead to sub-optimal trading decisions and potentially reduce the
eﬃciency of allocations.
In economics, the study of information asymmetry concerns itself with
dealing with economic interactions between agents where one agent has beer
knowledge of the underlying details of the exchange. In general, there are two
types of information asymmetry: moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral
hazard occurs when one party decides to not support their part of a contractual
agreement, and instead exploits the other party by, for example, not paying for a
service provided, or not providing a service paid for [27]. It is a special case of
information asymmetry, because rather than one agent having more information
about the subject of the exchange, it has more information about its own future
actions. Adverse selection is a slightly more complex form of information
asymmetry; it can have a very detrimental aﬀect on market performance [74].
Adverse selection was ﬁrst explained by Akerlof [1], and occurs as follows. Given
a market containing variable quality products, but where buyers are unable to
perceive these quality diﬀerences before purchase, buyers will rationally assume
all products are of average quality, lowering mean prices. is then repels sellers
of high quality products, who cannot get high enough prices. e average quality
of products in the market is reduced, and once buyers learn this, average market
prices are also lowered. In the end, market failure occurs, and only the lowest
quality products are traded. In terms of double auction electronic markets,
information asymmetry can present itself in the following ways:
• adverse selection may present itself by:
– sellers altering the quality or aribute-levels of resources, such that
they diﬀer from those expected by buyers within the market;
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– in order to reduce the costs of production and increase their proﬁts, or
market-exchanges may not provide the service expected of traders;
• moral hazard could be exerted if agents feel protected from the risk of
sanctions that non-normative behaviour might otherwise incur:
– buyers or sellers may refuse to pay for, or provide, a resource aer the
other party has completed their part of the transaction;
– a market-exchange could extort money from traders by either not
allocating resources between them, or fabricating fraudulent
transactions to increase proﬁts.
In real-world exchange markets, these types of counterparty risk, are protected
against by regulatory bodies, and ultimately government. Regulation enforces not
just normative behaviour in market participants, but also ensures that
market-mechanisms themselves behave correctly. However, in any open and
dynamic system, regulation by a central authority is impractical, and perhaps
prohibitive to the aim of maintaining a robust distributed system. In that case,
trust and reputation systems have been seen as an approach for facilitating the
self-regulation of multi-agent systems.
2.5.1 Notions of trust and reputation
Hardin deﬁnes trust as:
To say we trust you means we believe you have the right intentions
toward us and that you are competent to do what we trust you to do.
Hardin [70, p. 11]
In that respect, trust is a boolean property—you either trust someone or not.
Further, according to this deﬁnition, trust is contextual: you may trust an entity
to provide you with an Internet connection, but not to manage your ﬁnancial
aﬀairs. Jøsang et al. [83] refers to this type of trust as reliability trust, and while
there are other types of trust considered within the literature [82], they are all
more speciﬁc instantiations of Hardin’s deﬁnition. e decision to trust another
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individual is made by ﬁrst learning—through observation, in the most basic
case—how trustworthy that individual is.
However, in large-scale distributed systems characterised by infrequent
interactions with unfamiliar partners, assessing other individuals’
trustworthiness can be challenging, if not impossible. In this case, reputation can
be used as a mechanism to build trust within these communities, and encourage
cooperative behaviours without the need for costly central enforcement [45].
Within these decentralised networks, reputation is the main tool for measuring
trustworthiness; Jøsang et al. deﬁnes reputation as:
Reputation is what is generally said or believed about a person’s or
thing’s character or standing.
Jøsang et al.[83]
While in distributed communities one may not have interacted with certain
individuals before, and thus be unable to directly measure their trustworthiness,
it is quite likely others have had direct interactions, and there is a general
publicly perceived notion of that individual. erefore, trust and reputation are
diﬀerent concepts, but reputation can be used in large-scale communities to
measure another individual’s trustworthiness in the absence of directly gathered
information. From a system-wide or societal viewpoint, reputation acts in two
fundamental roles:
e primary objective of reputation mechanisms is to enable eﬃcient
transactions in communities where cooperation is compromised by
post-contractual opportunism (moral hazard) or information
asymmetries (adverse selection).
Dellarocas [45]
us, reputation seeks to notify agents of those who are aempting to behave in a
non-normative way, and punish those who do by labelling them as appropriately.
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2.5.2 Trust and reputation approaes in electronic markets
Any trust and reputation approach within a multi-agent system relies upon the
ability of information to spread between agents within the system. In comparison
to real-world communities, online interactions introduce new challenges [44].
Some of these new challenges involve, for example: (i) identity: ensuring agents
and their reputations belong together [46]; (ii) interpretation: understanding in
what context the reputation information applies, e.g., based on the behaviour of
the providing agent [166]; (iii) accuracy: ensuring that reputation information is
honest and correct [85]; and (iv) provision: incentivising agents to provide
reputation information at all [44]. From a mechanism design perspective, for
example, mechanisms have been designed to incentivise the provision of honest
feedback. Miller et al. [106] have shown that a central mechanism using scoring
rules and side payments can elicit honest feedback from agents. With such
information, trust-based meanism design approaches such as [40] could be used
to optimally allocate resources while taking into account the trustworthiness of
agents. Aside from the underlying assumptions on agents, any mechanism that
relies upon a central trusted third-party will not scale well across large-scale
systems and themselves require regulation.
In more practical seings there are perhaps two main approaches for
facilitating agents’ trust or reputation based decisions within electronic markets.
e ﬁrst is to model trustworthiness or reputation from a cognitive perspective,
which involves agents reasoning about their beliefs in other agents’ desires or
abilities in certain contexts. Diﬀerent approaches for achieving this have been
considered for online seings, e.g., using subjective logic [82] or argumentation
approaches [129]. While cognitive approaches are a viable future direction, it is
unclear how well they would currently, for example, accurately model the beliefs
of all agent types that could potentially exist in a large open multi-agent system
[73].
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e second approach is to calculate trustworthiness as degrees of
uncertainty about the expected future behaviour of agents. ese probabilistic
approaches tend oen to be grounded within Bayesian statistics [108, 109, 80, 81],
and involve two methods. e ﬁrst is to consider the trustworthiness of
individuals as processes which can be modelled over continuous distributions.
Oen a distribution such as the Beta distribution is used, because it takes two
shape parameters which can be used to represent positive and negative outcomes
to previous interactions. Typically, an agent considers the expected value and its
conﬁdence to calculate its trustworthiness in another agent. An agent can then
form a reputation of a target agent by combining the trustworthiness they have in
the target, with the trustworthiness others have in the target. Several researchers
have recently extended this approach to consider subjective reputations [165, 97].
In such models, recommendation distributions are maintained by each agent that
weight the opinions of others according to how accurate their opinions have been
in the past. In that case reputations become subjective—the same agent’s
reputation can be considered diﬀerently by various agents. is approach has
been applied to identifying either malicious or noisy opinions within a
multi-agent system, allowing them to be ignored in the calculation of reputations.
Trust and reputation approaes in double auction markets
In terms of reputation approaches for models involving double auction
mechanisms, only a small amount of work exists within the literature. van
Valkenhoef et al. [170] consider a two-stage CDA mechanism whereby buyers
and sellers shout oﬀers as usual, however, whenever the auctioneer matches two
traders, the buyer is given the opportunity to measure the trustworthiness of the
associated seller before commiing to the trade. Trustworthiness represents a
probability of resource delivery on the seller’s part, so when buyers only commit
to trades in which their expected utility is positive, eﬃcient allocations are
achieved. Lu et al. [98] look at a clearing house auction where the auctioneer not
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only determines the set of traders to be matched, but also sorts them by
reputation, such that the most reputable traders get to trade with each other.
Neither of these approaches consider the behaviour or trustworthiness of
the market-mechanism itself and, in an environment containing multiple
competing marketplaces, there may certainly be a need for market-exange
reputations, when one considers them to be self-interested agents within a
distributed and open multi-agent system. Finally, the eﬃciency of markets is
considerably aﬀected by both the volume of traders within them, and also the
type of traders. None of the reputation approaches have studied the impact that
making a large population of traders aware of the general proﬁtability of market
venues will have on the eﬃciency of the market-based system, and aracting the
right and wrong types of traders to markets.
2.6 Summary and Conclusions
To summarise, system-centric approaches to computational resource allocation
are prohibitive and limiting when one considers the expected growth and
demand for resources in the future [63]. e large number of (likely mostly idle
[124]) individual machines across the Internet, makes them potentially a huge
untapped source of computational power, if users can be economically
incentivised to provide their resources. Such a scenario would open up the
possibility of large-scale distributed utility computing environments, where
individual users can consume and provide computational resources, delivered
across the Internet [19]. However, unlike current system-centric models of
computational resource allocation, which assume full knowledge of the supply
side of the market, allocation mechanisms are required that don’t require
knowledge of global supply and demand schedules.
Market-based approaes [63, 22, 35] have been proposed as a way of
achieving this. e continuous double auction (CDA) is an elegant mechanism
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which, when coupled with almost minimally intelligent [33] traders, achieves
highly eﬃcient allocations, unlike more decentralised market mechanisms such as
posted-oﬀer or bargaining models. In contrast to other centralised auction
mechanisms, multiple CDA mechanisms can be distributed throughout an
environment and, as long as traders can migrate between marketplaces, eﬃcient
allocations can be maintained [23]. Unfortunately, because computational
resources are naturally multi-aribute in nature, and multi-aribute double
auction mechanisms require computationally prohibitive algorithms to eﬃciently
allocate resources, a novel approach is required. One approach that has not
received aention is to consider the allocation of multi-aribute resources using
multiple competing marketplaces. Within such an approach, multiple
market-exchanges would compete to aract traders to their resource markets,
where a particular type of computational resource is traded, and traders would
choose to trade in markets that best satisfy their preferences and constraints.
Several research challenges reveal themselves in such a model, for example in the
design of market-exchange mechanisms for choosing the types of resources to be
traded within their markets; approaches for designing and analysing mechanisms
to meet these challenges are needed.
Empirical agent-based approaches, within the paradigm of multi-agent
systems [183], have been proposed as a way to beer design and analyse market
mechanisms. In that vein, simulation frameworks for the speciﬁc study of market
mechanisms in both isolation [76] and in competition [118] have been
implemented, and several international market design tournaments have been
launched [24]. However, neither analytic nor simulation models have been
developed for studying the allocation of multi-aribute computational resources
via competing marketplaces. In terms of designing and analysing competing
market mechanisms in simulation, progress has been made by studying the
results of CAT tournaments. However, while these tournament approaches are
useful for analysing performance within certain environments, the brileness of
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some market mechanisms previously championed has been noted [116], and less
aention has been given to how the general performance of mechanisms might
be beer measured. Finally, within any open multi-agent system there may be
issues involving how to signal the expected behaviour of self-interested
participants, or how to incentivise normative actions. While trust and reputation
mechanisms have been cited as an excellent approach in general to electronic
markets, lile if any aention has been given to how these approaches can be
speciﬁcally applied to selecting between marketplaces, and the impact that
reputation has on the eﬃciency of allocations within those markets.
In conclusion, there is a need to investigate new approaches to
multi-aribute computational resource allocation within distributed and open
environments. Neither traditional system-centric approaches, or fully
decentralised or centralised market-based approaches, are particularly suitable to
the resource allocation scenarios considered. is thesis aims to contribute a
beer understanding of suitable market-based approaches to multi-aribute
computational resource allocation by studying a novel and interesting approach,
which relies on multiple competing marketplaces to provide markets for speciﬁc
types of computational resource.
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e review carried out in Chapter 2 reveals a gap in the literature. ere is no
clear methodology for assessing the generalisation properties of competing
market mechanisms. While economic mechanism design provides tools for
dealing with this generalisation issue, through the design of incentive compatible
mechanisms that generalise across all environments, these theoretical approaches
only allow mechanisms to be designed for very restrictive seings, and
competition between market mechanisms has not been considered. e ﬁrst
research objective of this chapter is to develop a methodology for analysing the
generalisation abilities of competing market mechanisms. Such a methodology is
important for designing and analysing many types of competitive market
mechanism in simulated environments, where the generalisability of results is
very important [100]. In that vein, a methodology of this type will be particularly
useful to support other experimental simulation work later on in the thesis.
As discussed in Chapter 2, launched in 2007, the TAC Market Design
Tournament [24] (CAT Tournament) has been used as a tool to encourage
research into double auction mechanism rules. Entrants to CAT tournaments
provide market mechanism agents called specialists, who must aract as many
traders as possible to their market. Each CAT game consists of potentially
hundreds of diﬀerent trading agents (provided by the organisers), and multiple
competing specialist agents (provided by the entrants). e rich environment
created by, not only many traders competing with each other, but also many
market mechanisms competing to aract traders, creates a potentially excellent
test-bed for evaluating the eﬀects of diﬀerent double auction market mechanism
rules, as used by the specialists. However, within such a complex environment, it
may be the case that specialist performance is dependent on, or correlated with,
some environmental factors. Given this, specialists may therefore be considered
brile (or obversely, robust) if their performance greatly depends (or does not) on
environmental factors. e second research goal within this chapter is to beer
understand the characteristics of the mechanisms used by the specialists,
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particularly in relation to the environmental contexts in which they operate.
us, within this chapter simulation analyses undertaken using the CAT
Tournament platform JCAT¹ are described, using some of the specialists entered
into the 2008 and 2009 CAT tournaments. Importantly, these analyses follow the
novel methodology presented within this chapter.
is chapter makes several main contributions. Firstly, it provides a
methodology for measuring, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the
generalisation ability of specialists within CAT tournaments. Secondly, by using
this methodology, it demonstrates that the specialists in the CAT Tournaments
are not robust against a number of environmental changes. For several of these
environmental factors, a change in them leads to some changes in the tournament
ranks and/or the game scores achieved by the specialists.
e rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 outlines the
main motivation for this work, as well as the research questions that this chapter
aims to answer. In Section 3.2 a summary of the CAT tournament is provided for
the reader, including how the games progress, and the metrics used to measure
specialist performance. Section 3.3 presents an empirical evaluation of the
generalisation abilities of some of the previous specialist market mechanisms
submied to the 2008 and 2009 CAT tournaments, using a novel methodology. e
main research ﬁndings are that the specialists entered into the 2008 and 2009
tournaments are sensitive to a number of environmental factors, and thus can be
said not to generalise well. e chapter ends in Section 3.4 with some conclusions
and proposals for future work.
3.1 Motivation and Researestions
Niu et al. [116] provided the ﬁrst analysis of entrants from the ﬁrst CAT
tournament, which took place in 2007. Based on some insights into the CAT game,
¹hp://jcat.sourceforge.net/
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Niu et al. developed a new specialist called MetroCat. Using all of the entrants
from the 2007 tournament, along with their own MetroCat specialist (which had
not been encountered by the 2007 entrants), Niu et al. found that none of the 2007
entrants, including the winning specialist, performed as well as MetroCat. us,
Niu et al. have shown that the well-performing 2007 CAT specialists can have
weaknesses in other situations. Niu et al. only considered how a new competitor
(MetroCat) impacted on the performance of other specialists. However, there are
other environmental factors that could impact on the performance of a specialist,
including the types of traders in the environment, and how the game is scored.
One motivation for the work within this chapter then, is to assess the impact that
other environmental factors have on the performance of specialists.
Because they are typically entered over the Internet, each simulated day
within a CAT game takes a non-trivial amount of time to complete; this is to
allow participants to receive simulation information, and make potentially
complex decisions. us, CAT games generally take a long time to
complete—usually between 5–8 hours. Because there are several potential
environmental factors of interest, there is a state-space explosion in the number
of potential game conﬁgurations, making it unfeasible to simulate all possible
conﬁgurations. Another motivation for the work in this chapter, then, is to
provide a methodology for assessing the generalisation performance of
specialists, or any other market mechanisms situated in complex environments,
without the need to run all possible simulation conﬁgurations.
Within other trading-based competitions, some methodologies have been
proposed to tackle similar problems. For example, Vetsikas and Selman [172]
described a methodology for deciding on the best bidding strategy that their
trading agent, WhiteBear, should use in the Trading Agent Competition (TAC)
classic game². Given a reduced set of possible initial ‘base-strategies’, Vetsikas
and Selman face the issue of ﬁnding the best combinations to create an overall
²hp://www.sics.se/tac/page.php?id=3
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successful bidding strategy for participating in many simultaneous auctions.
Although this approach is sensible when trying to decide on the best strategy
from an initial set of possible strategies, it is unclear how well such a best
strategy would fare against unseen strategies, i.e., other competitors in the
trading competition. Wellman et al. [176] also explore the idea of using a reduced
strategy space to allow them to evaluate potential strategies taken from their
TAC agent, Walverine. While they acknowledge that a strategy’s performance
does depend on those of its competitors, they hypothesise that an agent’s
performance should be relatively insensitive to the frequency of competitors
using identical strategies. eir methodology consists of eﬃciently searching a
reduced strategy space to ﬁnd beer performing strategies. Both Vetsikas and
Selman’s and Wellman et al.’s approaches are appropriate when considering a
ﬁxed initial space of potential strategies, however neither provide mechanisms to
test the robustness of a strategy in the presence of unseen competitors.
e CAT game is more complicated than the original TAC game because
there are two interacting populations—specialists and traders, both of whom
contain (or could contain) members able to learn and/or evolve, and who are
unknown in advance. us, an approach is needed to deal with domains where
there are coevolving populations of competing agents, to oﬀer insights into the
robustness of the strategies in those populations.
e main research questions answered within this chapter are:
• How can market meanism generalisation performance be assessed
quantitatively and qualitatively in complex simulated environments with
many possible variables or factors?
• What are the generalisation properties of specialists within the CAT
Tournaments? Are all specialists robust to all environmental factors?
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3.2 e TAC Market Design (CAT) Competition
e full organisation and structure of the TAC Market Design (CAT) Tournament
is given in the game documents [24]. In this section, however, the most important
aspects will be provided. A CAT game takes place over a number of simulation
trading days, each of which consists of a number of rounds. Each round lasts a
number of tis, measured in milliseconds. e game uses a client server
architecture, with the CAT server controlling the progression of the game. CAT
clients are either traders (potential buyers or sellers) or specialists, i.e.,
marketplaces. All communication between traders and specialists is via the CAT
server.
In the standard CAT installation, four diﬀerent trader strategies are
provided. Zero Intelligence – Constrained (ZIC) traders [66] shout randomly
generated prices into the market, subject to some constraints. Zero Intelligence
Plus (ZIP) traders [33] were previously discussed in Section 2.3.2. RE traders [52]
use a reinforcement learning algorithm based on a model of human learning, with
the most recent surplus or loss guiding the trader’s shouting strategy one step
ahead. Finally, GD traders [65] use past marketplace history of submissions and
transactions to generate beliefs about the likelihood of any particular bid or ask
being accepted, which is used to guide shouting strategies. ZIC are the least, and
GD are the most, sophisticated of these four types. In addition, all types of traders
in the standard CAT installation use an n-armed bandit strategy [142] for
selecting which specialist to register with on each new trading day³.
As discussed in Section 2.4.1, based on Niu et al.’s [116] rule framework,
specialists have freedom to set market rules in six broad policy areas, covering:
charging; quoting; shout accepting; trader matching; transaction pricing; and
trade clearing. Within the game, competing specialists are not aware of the exact
³An n-armed bandit strategy assumes a ﬁnite set of possible actions and learns reward distri-
butions for each action over time. e desire is to balance exploration in order to more accurately
learn reward distributions, and exploitation of the currently best reward distribution. e general
n-armed approach is discussed in more detail in Section 5.2.1.
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policies or strategies that their competitors are using, through they may aempt
to learn them from observing behaviour. Specialists know that each trader in the
environment is one of the four types, but not the overall proportions of each type
within the trader population. Accordingly, the design of a specialist seeking to
win the game cannot be optimised for only a subset of trading strategies.
In addition, the scoring metric used by the game is multi-dimensional.
Games are scored using an unweighted average of three criteria: the proportion
of traders aracted to the specialist each day (market share); the proportion of
accepted shouts which are matched (transaction success rate); and the share of
proﬁts made by the specialist. A specialist’s tournament score is the sum of its
daily scores for all scoring days; it is important to note that not all trading days
are scoring days, and specialists are unaware which these are in an aempt to
prevent start-game and end-game eﬀects. Specialists are ranked in descending
order of their total scores, with the specialist in rank one declared the winner of
that tournament.
As with trader types, the scoring multi-dimensionality creates challenges
for the optimal design of specialists, since these criteria may conﬂict. A
game-winning strategy may focus on scoring highly on diﬀerent criteria at
diﬀerent times in the life-cycle of a game, or against diﬀerent trader types. As
was discussed in the introduction to this chapter, given this structure it is easy to
see that some specialists may perform beer with traders of a particular type,
and/or against competing specialists using particular policies. Further, each CAT
Tournament is generally only conducted over a limited number of diﬀerent games
(typically, three), thus a specialists performance in a tournament is not
necessarily a good guide to that specialist’s general ability, i.e., with other trader
mixes, or in competition against diﬀerent specialists not included in that
particular tournament.
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3.3 Empirical Evaluation of Entries’ Generalisation
Ability
e generalisation ability of specialists is tested using the following methodology.
Unlike the oﬃcial CAT tournaments, where entrant specialists are evaluated on a
small subset of randomly chosen environments, in this work, specialists are
evaluated on a range of carefully chosen environments, based on three diﬀerent
environmental contexts:
• trader context: the proportions of the four trader types in the trader
population;
• competitor context: the members of the population of competing specialists;
• scoring context: the days over which scoring takes place (deﬁned by length
and start day).
By using diﬀerent combinations of these three contexts, diﬀerent tournament
variations can be generated to evaluate specialists in. Within each context,
because there are so many possible combinations/variations, it is proposed to
reduce this space by focussing on extreme (or boundary) cases. For example,
typical trader contexts might include using all of one type of trader and none of
any others, or using only the most intelligent traders (which would be GD traders
given the four types described in Section 3.2). If is hypothesised that by, for
example, entirely excluding or exclusively including certain environmental
factors, it is more likely to observe any sensitivities within specialists.
To show that some specialists’ performances can be sensitive to a number
of environmental factors, and in some cases generalise poorly, specialist
performance was measured across diﬀerent tournament variations in two ways.
Firstly, by measuring the qualitative impact that tournament variations have on
each specialist’s performance; which was achieved by comparing rankings of
specialists’ mean scores for diﬀerent (comparable) tournament conﬁgurations.
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Secondly, by measuring the quantitative performance impact, i.e., the change that
tournament variations have on each specialist’s score. Since the diﬀerences
introduced between tournament variations, e.g., the proportions of trader types
in the trading population, itself contributes to the performance of the specialists,
one cannot simply compare the mean scores of specialists over tournament
variations and conﬁdently state how the specialists are able to generalise between
the two cases.
is is addressed by deﬁning a new statistic to measure the performance of
one specialist relative to others, across a diversity of tournament variations. e
statistic, which is called the normalised performance delta of a specialist, denoted
δ, provides a metric for analysing how a given tournament conﬁguration aﬀects
the performance of the specialist. To calculate this statistic, for each specialist i,
the normalised mean score μi is ﬁrst calculated:
μi =
μi
mX
j=1
μj
For a single specialist i, given two normalised scoresμxi andμyi from two
tournament variations x and y, the absolute diﬀerence dxyi between the two scores
can be calculated:
dxyi = jμxi  μyi j (3.1)
dxyi provides a measure of how, with respect to other specialists in the tournament,
a specialist i’s performance has changed from one tournament variation to the
next. Finally, for each specialist i the normalised diﬀerence value δi is calculated.
δi =
dxyi
mX
j=1
dxyj
(3.2)
In order to ascertain some statistical signiﬁcance to specialist mean score values
generated from multiple tournament runs, two-tailed paired t-tests of equality of
61
CHAPTER 3. GENERALISATION PROPERTIES OF COMPETING MARKETPLACES
means were performed on certain pairs of specialists, in order to aempt to
identify whether the reported rankings were distinct. In such cases both the
t-value and p-value (using n  1 df.) are reported. e t-test statistical test
assumes normality within the samples provided. Before any t-tests were run on
the reported data, they were ﬁrst subjected to the Lilliefors Test [95], a goodness
of ﬁt test for the Normal distribution. It was found that for all but one sample,
which is highlighted when presented, the null hypothesis that the sample is
normally distributed could not be rejected, with signiﬁcance levels > 0:01 in all
cases. e non-normal sample was not required for direct comparison with any
other, thus t-tests were found to be suitable for all comparisons between samples
within the results reported in this chapter.
3.3.1 General experimental setup
Each  simulation consists of a single tournament that runs for a number of
trading days, with, in these experiments, 10 trading rounds per day, and 500ms
per round. All experiments were carried out with both the  server and all
specialist clients situated on the same local machine. e trading population size
was set at 400 traders, ﬁlled with traders taken from the four types described in
Section 3.2. Buyers and sellers were split as evenly as possible in the diﬀerent
trader sub-populations. In order to achieve more statistically signiﬁcant results
for each tournament variation, each was repeated 15 times, using the same
conﬁguration, but with a diﬀerent random seed. e specialist agents used in the
experiments were downloaded in a pre-compiled form from the  Agent
Repository⁴. Speciﬁcally, only entrants from the 2008 and 2009 competitions were
used, except when this was not possible⁵.
⁴hp://www.sics.se/tac/showagents.php
⁵Any specialist binaries entered into the 2008 or 2009 tournaments but not used in these exper-
iments were either unavailable, or had issues aﬀecting their ability to be used in experiments, such
as execution or library problems.
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3.3.2 Evaluation of the 2008 competition
For the analysis of the 2008 competition, the following specialists were included in
the experiments: CrocodileAgent, DOG, iAmWildCat 2008, Mertacor1, Mertacor2,
PSUCAT, PersianCAT and jackaroo. In the rest of this section they may be referred
to as CR-08, DO-08, IA-08, M1-08, M2-08, PS-08, PC-08 and JA-08 respectively.
Over-ﬁtting to trading population
e following set of results show that some specialists’ performances are
sensitive to diﬀerent mixes of trader types in the trader population. erefore,
some specialists may be over-ﬁed to speciﬁc types or mixes of traders. For this
set of experiments, all eight available specialists were used, and the scoring
period included all 500 trading days. Using the previously described methodology,
eight diﬀerent trader mixes were identiﬁed, based on the notion of trader mixes
consisting entirely of one of the four trader types, or entirely excluding one of the
types.
Overall, it was observed that several of the specialists’ ﬁnal rankings were
aﬀected by trader mix variations, particularly Jackaroo, Mertacor1 and
Mertacor2. Table 3.1 shows the results of two tournament variations, which are
referred to as ‘just-GD’ and ‘no-GD’. e just-GD variation consisted of a trading
population made up of entirely GD traders, with equal buyers and sellers. In the
no-GD variation, the trading population was composed of equal (as possible)
proportions of RE, ZIP, and ZIC traders.
For a typical tournament variation, it was observed that in each of the 15
repetitions, scores, and thus rankings, were quite similar, leading to low σ values.
It is, however, extremely unlikely that scores would ever be identical over all
runs, due to the stochastic nature of the  environment.
Table 3.1 highlights the fact that the overall rankings for the two
tournament variations were diﬀerent, most notably with changes in the middle
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Just GD Traders No GD Traders
Specialist μ σ μ σ Rank δ
PC-08 232.2 5.86 271.1 5.51 1, 1 0.355
M1-08 230.9 6.55 193.9 3.17 2, 4 0.364
JA-08 218.9 6.06 213.5 2.65 3, 3 0.064
M2-08 207.4 5.09 215.7 6.05 4, 2 0.067
IA-08 165.8 1.45 165.1 5.15 5, 6 0.016
DO-08 164.4 2.24 173.7 2.48 6, 5 0.078
CR-08 24.9 17.76 19.1 8.28 7, 7 0.057
PS-08 16.2 0.66 16.3 0.43 8, 8 0.001
Table 3.1: Mean, standard deviation, rank and δ values for a set of tournaments
using the just-GD trader context and a set of tournaments using the no-GD trader
context. First presented in [145]. Onemean, for IA-08 and italicised was found to be
from a non-normally distributed sample. However, it was not necessary to subject
it to a statistical comparison with any other sample for the analysis carried out in
this chapter.
and lower portions. alitatively, of particular interest was the change in rank
between M1-08, M2-08 and JA-08. In simulations using the just-GD trader context,
M1-08 was rank two and M2-08 rank four, while in the no-GD context the ranks
were swapped to four and two respectively. In the just-GD case, a paired t-test of
equality of means showed that the average scores of M1-08 and M2-08 were
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, with a t-value of 9.36 and a p-value < 0:001. e average
scores of M1-08 and M2-08 were 230.9 and 207.4 respectively. In the no-GD case, a
t-test resulted in a t-value of 14.04 and a p-value < 0:001. Mean scores in the
no-GD case were 193.9 for M1-08 and 215.7 for M2-08.
Further, in the just-GD case, it was observed that M1-08 and JA-08 had
ranks of two and three respectively, while in the no-GD case they had ranks of
four and three. In the just-GD case, for M1-08 and JA-08, a t-test of equality of
means resulted in a t-value of 19.09 and a p-value < 0:001, with mean scores of
230.9 for M1-08 and 218.9 for JA-08. In the no-GD case, a t-test reported a t-value
of 4.20 and a p-value < 0:001, with mean scores of 193.9 for M1-08 and 213.5 for
JA-08.
Finally, note that even a simple change of the trading population, i.e., when
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Just ZIC Traders No ZIC Traders
Specialists μ σ μ σ Rank δ
PC-08 276.2 11.47 244.1 4.53 1, 1 0.419
JA-08 218.6 4.71 214.6 2.49 2, 3 0.071
M2-08 213.9 8.20 224.7 5.77 3, 2 0.109
M1-08 192.1 2.72 207.0 3.76 4, 4 0.160
DO-08 170.7 2.62 180.0 2.32 5, 5 0.095
IA-08 161.6 5.15 170.7 4.09 6, 6 0.094
PS-08 16.9 0.46 16.2 0.47 7, 8 0.010
CR-08 16.8 5.07 20.4 7.90 8, 7 0.041
Table 3.2: Mean, standard deviation, rank and δ values for a set of tournament
repetitions using the just-ZIC trader context, and a set of tournaments using the
no-ZIC traders context. First presented in [145].
switching to using the just-GD trader context, can make a previous winner,
PC-08, lose its winning edge. Statistically, PC-08 is not the clear winner in the
just-GD case, though it was in the oﬃcial 2008 CAT Tournament when a diﬀerent
trader mix was used. A t-test of equality of means between PC-08 and M1-08 in
the just-GD case showed a t-value of 0.46 and a p-value of 0.65, with mean scores
of 232.2 for PC-08 and 230.9 for M1-08. A counterpart to this situation is the
no-GD case, where PC-08 clearly outperformed M1-08. Here the t-value was 38.31
and p-value < 0:001, with mean scores of 271.1 for PC-08 and 193.9 for M1-08. is
highlights a situation where either PC-08 or M1-08 are particularly sensitive to the
proportions of GD traders in the population. eδ values for PC-08 (0.355) and
M1-08 (0.364) were considerably larger than those of the other specialists, showing
a disproportionate change in performance over the two cases for both specialists.
In Table 3.2 the results of tournament using two more of the trader contexts,
‘just-ZIC’ and ‘no-ZIC’, are shown. Again, in both tournament conﬁgurations all
specialists and scoring days were used; only the trader populations were varied.
In the just-ZIC context only ZIC traders (equal number of buyers and sellers)
were used, while in the no-ZIC variation, no ZIC traders were used and the
population consisted of equal numbers of GD, RE and ZIP traders.
Running simulations using the just-ZIC and no-ZIC trader contexts
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resulted in further situations where it is not statistically clear that the rankings
between two specialists are the same across the two tournament variations,
indicating that there were generalisation problems. In the no-ZIC case, M2-08
(rank two) outperformed JA-08 (rank three). A paired t-test of equality of means
found the scores statistically diﬀerent, with a t-value of 5.83 and a p-value
< 0:001. e mean scores were 224.7 for M2 and 214.6 for JA. However, in the
just-ZIC case, the mean scores between the two specialists, and thus the rankings,
were not statistically distinct. A paired t-test resulted in a t-value of 1.75 and a
p-value of 0.10. e mean scores were 213.9 for M2-08 and 218.6 for JA-08.
Table 3.2 also highlights a clear example of the performance impact that
changes in the trader population can have on a specialist. e mean score for
PC-08 in the just-ZIC case was 276.2, yet this dropped 8.83% to 244.1 in the no-ZIC
case. While the makeup of the trader population can have a signiﬁcant impact on
the scores of specialists, in these two cases we see that other specialists’ scores
did not vary proportionally as much as PC-08’s. By considering the performances
changes of the other specialists, PC-08’s normalised delta valueδ was 0.419,
which was considerably higher than the others’.
Highlighted in Table 3.3 are other qualitative impacts that diﬀerent trader
contexts had on specialists. In these tournament variations we considered the
contexts ‘just-ZIP’ and ‘no-ZIP’. Again, in both cases all specialists and scoring
days were used in the simulations. e just-ZIP variation consisted of a trading
population with only ZIP traders (equal number of buyers and sellers), while in
the no-ZIP variation equal numbers of GD, RE and ZIC traders were used in the
absence of any ZIP traders.
In the just-ZIP case M1-08 (rank three) outperformed M2-08 (rank four). A
t-test resulted in a t-value of 10.35 and a p-value < 0:001. e mean scores for
M1-08 and M2-08 were 208.0 and 189.0 respectively. However, in the no-ZIP case a
diﬀerent outcome is observed, with the ranks changed to two for M2-08 and four
for M1-08. In this case, a t-test resulted in a t-value of 9.56 and a p-value < 0:001,
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Just ZIP Traders No ZIP Traders
Specialists μ σ μ σ Rank δ
PC-08 255.7 12.18 255.9 5.17 1, 1 0.051
JA-08 231.3 5.02 211.5 4.37 2, 3 0.281
M1-08 208.0 5.86 199.0 4.19 3, 4 0.150
M2-08 189.0 5 221.9 6.94 4, 2 0.347
IA-08 169.7 3.16 173.5 4.34 5, 6 0.008
DO-08 164.1 4.86 179.7 2.4 6, 5 0.147
CR-08 17.0 6.35 16.1 5.04 7, 8 0.014
PS-08 16.2 0.65 16.3 0.4 8, 7 0.003
Table 3.3: Mean, standard deviation, rank and δ values for a set of tournament
repetitions using the just-ZIP trader context, and a set of tournaments repetitions
using the no-ZIP trader context. First presented in [145].
with means of 221.9 for M2-08 and 199.0 for M1-08.
Over-ﬁtting to other specialists
In this set of experiments, the proportions of traders in the trader population
remain ﬁxed, i.e., the same trader context is used throughout. However, by
running simulations using diﬀerent competitor contexts, it is observed that some
specialists’ performances are sensitive to the presence of other specialists in the
marketplace. For this set of experiments, the trader population context contained
an equal mix of GD and ZIC traders. Since ZIC traders are the least, and GD the
most, sophisticated trader types, using this mix may oﬀer the most diverse
trading, and hopefully challenging environment. In these tournaments, as with all
the previously discussed ones, all 500 trading days were counted as scoring days.
In Table 3.4 the reader can see the impact of two diﬀerent competitor
contexts on the performance of some of the specialists. e ﬁrst competitor
context, called ‘All Specialists’, involves allowing all the specialists to take part in
the tournament, while in the second context, called ‘Top ree’, only the three
best performing specialists from the all specialists context are present in the
tournaments. Of note is the eﬀect that lower-ranked specialists had on the
performance of higher ranked JA-08 and M2-08. For example, in the all specialists
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All Specialists Top ree
Specialist μ σ μ σ Rank δ
PC-08 267.3 5.99 299.7 6.96 1, 1 0.361
JA-08 217.4 4.44 243.5 3.51 2, 3 0.293
M2-08 206.9 6.44 256.7 5.82 3, 2 0.347
M1-08 198.3 2.79 – – 4, – –
DO-08 174.4 2.81 – – 5, – –
IA-08 170.5 3.51 – – 6, – –
CR-08 18.8 5.21 – – 7, – –
PS-08 16.0 0.29 – – 8, – –
Table 3.4: Mean, standard deviation, rank and δ values for a set of tournament
repetitions using the all specialists competitor context, and a set of tournaments
using the top three competitor context. e same trader and scoring contexts were
used for each variation, consisting of an equal mix of GD and ZIC traders, and
using all 500 scoring days. First presented in [145].
context, JA-08 outperformed M2-08 (t-value = 4.12, p-value = 0.001). Mean scores
for JA-08 and M2-08 were 217.5 and 206.9 respectively. Alternatively, in the top
three context, when lower ranked specialists are removed, and the remaining
three specialists compete with each other over the same traders, the rankings of
JA-08 and M2-08 switched (t-value = 8.30, p-value < 0:001). Mean scores for JA-08
and M2-08 were 243.5 and 256.72 respectively. Further, in Table 3.4 the reader may
note that the total score, when aggregated across all specialists, is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent between the All Specialists and Top ree variations. e total amount
of ‘score’ available to specialists should not be considered divisible across
arbitrary numbers of specialists as within the JCAT framework due to the scoring
system and trader behaviours.
Alternatively, in Table 3.5 the impact that removing the top three specialists
has on the remaining boom ﬁve becomes clear. For these two variants, the all
specialists context was compared to the ‘boom ﬁve’ context, where the top three
specialists are removed. In a qualitative context, IA-08 did signiﬁcantly beer
than DO-08 when the boom ﬁve context was used, with a t-test revealing a
t-value of 5.80 and a p-value < 0:001. e mean score for IA-08 was 215.0, while
DO-08 scored 208.7. However, when the all specialists context was used, DO-08
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All Specialists Boom Five
Specialist μ σ μ σ Rank δ
PC-08 267.3 5.99 – – 1, – –
JA-08 217.5 4.44 – – 2, – –
M2-08 206.9 6.44 – – 3, – –
M1-08 198.3 2.79 376.3 4.17 4, 1 0.525
DO-08 174.5 2.81 208.7 1.5 5, 3 0.198
IA-08 170.6 3.51 215.0 3.86 6, 2 0.217
CR-08 18.9 5.21 32.9 10.22 7, 4 0.044
PS-08 16.1 0.29 18.2 0.32 8, 5 0.016
Table 3.5: Mean, standard deviation, rank and δ values for a set of tournament
repetitions using the all specialists competitor context, and a set of tournaments
repetitions using the boom ﬁve competitor context. e same trader and scoring
contexts were used for each variation, consisting of an equal mix of GD and ZIC
traders, and using all 500 scoring days. First presented in [145].
ranked higher than IA-08 (t-value = 3.31, p-value = 0.0051). e average score for
IA-08 was 170.6, while DO-08 scored 174.5.
With respect to the performance impact that the two tournament
variations had on specialists, it is clear that the inclusion (or likewise, exclusion)
of the three specialists PC-08, JA-08 and M2-08 clearly aﬀected the performance
of M1-08 more than any of the remaining four. When the top three specialists
were introduced in the all specialists context, all of the other specialists’ scores
were lower, however a high normalised delta value of 0.525 for M1-08 indicated it
was considerably more sensitive to their presence.
Over-ﬁtting to scoring period
In Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.2 a ﬁxed scoring period of 500 days was maintained, and
either diﬀerent competitor contexts or trader contexts were considered. In this
section, examples showing that specialists are also sensitive to scoring contexts
are presented. For the following simulations, the all specialists competitor context
and the just-ZIC trader context were used. e two scoring contexts considered
here were ‘short-early’, which means using trading days 1–100 as scoring days,
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Short-early Medium-middle
(days 1–100) (days 100–300)
Specialist μ σ μ σ Rank δ
PC-08 50.8 1.94 158.6 7.34 1, 1 0.190
M2-08 46.0 1.86 118.8 5.19 2, 3 0.025
JA-08 39.8 0.81 124.4 3.34 3, 2 0.150
M1-08 39.5 1.01 107.7 1.80 4, 4 0.056
IA-08 35.0 1.19 89.1 3.72 5, 6 0.011
DO-08 34.0 1.09 96.4 1.46 6, 5 0.069
PS-08 16.9 0.46 0.00 0.00 7, 8 0.251
CR-08 16.8 5.07 0.00 0.00 8, 7 0.249
Table 3.6: Mean, standard deviation, rank andδ values for a set of tournament rep-
etitions using the short-early scoring context and a set of tournament repetitions
using the medium-middle scoring context. For all these simulations the just-ZIC
trader contexts were used as well as the all specialists competitor context. First
presented in [145].
and ‘medium-middle’, which means using trading days 100–300 as scoring days⁶.
As would be expected, scores were lower when the short-early context was used
because the scoring period (100 days versus 200 days) is smaller.
Table 3.6 shows the eﬀect changing the scoring period had on the
performance of the specialists. Many of the specialists’ ranks changed between
simulations using the two scoring contexts. When the short-early scoring context
was used, JA-08 had a rank of three, while M2-08 had a rank of two (t-value =
10.42, p-value < 0:001); mean scores were 46.0 for M2 and 39.8 for JA.
Alternatively, if the medium-middle scoring context was used, the ranks of M2
and JA switched. Again, scores were statistically distinct, resulting in a t-value of
3.34 and a p-value of 0.004.
3.3.3 Evalutation of the 2009 competition
For the analysis of the 2009 competition, the following specialists were included
in the experiments: Cestlavie (CE-09), Cuny.cs (CU-09), Jackaroo (JA-09),
Mertacor (ME-09), PSUCAT (PS-09), TWBB (TW-09) and iAmWildCat 2009 (IA-09). As
⁶Short andmedium refer to the length of the scoring period, while early andmiddle refer to the
time during tournament when the scoring period is instantiated.
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Just GD Traders No GD Traders
Specialist μ σ μ σ Rank δ
CE-09 248.5 4.32 177.1 4.50 1,4 0.279
CU-09 200.5 6.15 158.6 6.86 2,6 0.171
JA-09 173.2 2.88 234.2 6.97 3,1 0.185
IA-09 168.5 2.84 160.8 3.22 4,5 0.049
ME-09 161.2 5.72 200.0 6.47 5,2 0.111
PS-09 138.6 9.15 178.4 2.52 6,3 0.117
TW-09 118.7 10.30 148.2 9.35 7,7 0.085
Table 3.7: Mean, standard deviation, rank and δ values for a set of tournaments
using entrants to the 2009 CAT Tournament, with an environment containing just
GD and no GD traders. First presented in [146].
with the 2008 entries, the specialists were subjected to a variety of tournament
conﬁgurations using varying trading, competitor and scoring contexts. Overall,
Jackaroo was a worthy 2009 champion, as not only did it win the oﬃcial 2009
CAT Tournament, it won almost 80% of the tournament variants considered,
although there was a considerable lack of generalisation in the other specialists.
However, there were some conﬁgurations that JA-09 was particularly
sensitive to. Along with CE-09, particular sensitivity was shown to GD traders.
Two diﬀerent trader contexts were used here: ‘just-GD’, consisting entirely of GD
traders, and ‘no-GD’, consisting of equal amounts of RE, ZIP and ZIC traders,
with no GD traders used. Table 3.7 clearly shows that JA-09 performs relatively
poorly when a just-GD trader context is used, while it regains its top spot when
the no-GD trader context is used. Paired t-tests of equality of means between
JA-09 and CE-09 reveal t-value = 52.5 for just-GD, t-value = 24.47, and p-values
< 0:0001 in both cases.
3.3.4 Evaluation of best performers and overall progress
In this section, the top three specialists from both 2008 and 2009 are taken, and
compared against each other. Considering previous specialist performance, the
three specialists with the highest mean scores from each of the two years were
used. e specialists chosen from those entered in the 2008 competition were
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Just RE Traders No RE Traders
Specialist μ σ μ σ Rank δ
PC-08 230.1 5.75 153.1 5.72 1,6 0.481
JA-09 215.9 4.69 212.9 5.32 2,1 0.018
CE-09 189.4 3.10 189.5 4.43 3,4 0.001
ME-09 174.3 3.48 202.6 10.09 4,2 0.177
JA-08 169.0 3.25 178.4 3.91 5,5 0.059
ME-08 160.8 5.87 202.5 13.53 6,3 0.261
Table 3.8: Mean, standard deviation, rank and δ values for a set of tournament
repetitions using the just-RE trader context and a set of repetitions using the no-
RE trader context. In these cases, the top three specialists from 2008 and 2009 were
pied against each other. First presented in [146].
Persian Cat, Mertacor and Jackaroo. From the 2009 competition entries,
Cestlavie, Jackaroo (09) and Mertacor (09) were chosen.
Overall, JA-09 was still generally the strongest specialist, though the
performance of all specialists was much closer than when considering only 2008,
or only 2009, specialists. Of particular interest, however, were two trader contexts
involving RE traders. e ﬁrst, ‘just-RE’ consists of using only RE traders, while
the second, ‘no-RE’, consists of using equal numbers of GD, ZIP, and ZIC traders,
with no RE traders used. Table 3.8 show that PE-08 maintained—as it did against
2008 only specialists—its top position when the just-RE trader context was used,
but when the no-RE context was used, its rank, which was still ﬁrst against
2008-only competition, plummeted to sixth. For the just-RE (no-RE) contexts, a
paired t-test of equality of means between PC-08 and JA-09 returned a t-value of
6.34 (47.33) and, in both cases, a p-value < 0:001.
By applying the methodology in Section 3.3, to the evaluation of the
generalisation properties of specialists, it has been discovered within this chapter
that a once winning specialist can over-ﬁt to previously unseen competitors,
which would have been hard to identify without using such a methodology. is
result is of further interest because in the 2009 only experiments, JA-09 won both
the just-RE and no-RE cases, while in this case, an entry from the previous year
outperformed it, suggesting previous competitor strategies had not been
72
3.3. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF ENTRIES’ GENERALISATION ABILITY
Trader Mix 2008 Competition 2009 Competition 2008/9 Best
μ σ μ σ μ σ
Just GD 157.59 2.28 172.74 1.72 187.33 0.56
No GD 158.56 1.32 179.65 2.67 186.43 2.02
Just RE 160.52 2.25 182.00 1.22 189.96 1.98
No RE 158.13 0.66 181.03 2.09 189.87 1.66
Just ZIP 156.37 1.42 167.24 2.64 179.56 2.49
No ZIP 159.21 0.90 181.37 2.08 190.54 1.35
Just ZIC 158.35 0.97 179.72 1.80 188.16 2.11
No ZIC 159.71 1.14 181.18 2.13 189.68 1.59
GD/ZIC 158.75 0.89 180.33 1.79 191.24 1.59
Table 3.9: Mean overall specialist performance from tournaments using various
trader contexts. e highest overall scores for each trader context are emboldened.
Unsurprisingly, in all cases the 2008/09 best competitor context, consisting of the
top three specialists from each year, came out on top. e trader context that re-
sulted in the lowest overall specialist scores has been emphasised. It is of particular
interest that in all three competitor context variations, the just-ZIP trader context
results in the lowest scores. First presented in [146].
considered enough in the design of a new one.
One interesting question to ask is: what kind of overall progress is being
made by specialists in general each year? It can be answered by considering the
all specialists competitor contexts from 2008 and 2009, as well as the competitor
context formed from combining the top three specialist of each year, and then
analysing overall performance of all specialists against various trader contexts.
From Table 3.9 it is clear that specialist performances against any of the trader
contexts were on average higher for the 2009 entries than the 2008 entries, and
that when only the best performers from the two years were evaluated together,
the mean performance was even higher (emboldened in Table 3.9). However, it is
not clear as to whether this performance increase is an indicator of improved
specialist robustness, and thus year-on-year progress, or merely an artefact of the
diﬀering sample sizes between the groups (the 2008 competition results consider
eight specialists, the 2009 seven, and the 2008/09 six).
Perhaps the most interesting ﬁnding, which would not have been visible
without such extensive experimentation, was that in all cases the just-ZIP trader
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context, consisting of a trading population of only ZIP traders, invoked the lowest
mean scores all around. Intuitively, one might expect that GD traders, using a
more sophisticated, and thus intelligent, strategy than ZIP, would be harder to
perform well against. In the 2009 and 2008/09 cases, for example, a paired t-test of
equality of means between the just-ZIP sample and the just-GD sample, returned
a t-value = 6.66 for the 2009 case, t-value = 6.53 for the 2008/09 case, and p-values
< 0:001 in both cases.
3.3.5 Discussion
is chapter has presented a methodology that allows one to evaluate and
compare specialist agents’ generalisation abilities systematically and
quantitatively. It is believed that this approach is the ﬁrst to allow such properties
to be measured—especially in a coevolutionary context. is work is signiﬁcant
because without such an approach, it is hard to know the true performance of
any particular agent strategy, as one cannot see how well a strategy performs
against unknown or previously unseen competing strategies, i.e., how well a
given strategy generalises and thus its robustness. Although some of the
specialists generalise beer than initially thought, this chapter’s results show that
some seemingly strong strategies can have weaknesses when competing with
certain other strategies. is is interesting because it is clear from the literature
that oen ‘best strategies’ or ‘best results’ are published, and without any further
elaboration on their generalisation ability, these results can be very misleading.
Results in this chapter also suggest that a seemingly less intelligent trading
strategy such as ZIP can be harder to perform well against than a more intelligent
one such as RE or GD. is is of particular interest because it suggests that
competing teams may be puing too much emphasis on designing and testing
specialists against only particular trading strategies. us, although it is may
seem obvious that the performance of any given strategy—whether in the CAT
game or some other competitive multi-agent system—will depend on the
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strategies being used by other agents, it is never clear how strong this
dependency is, or the resulting quantitative values such a dependency provides.
To deﬁne what ‘robustness’ of a trading or specialist strategy means is not
straightforward in the coevolutionary environment created by the CAT
tournament, let alone to actually measure such a property in a systematic and
rigorous way. e approach in this chapter, unlike others [172, 176, 116], is the
ﬁrst to look at how well such designed strategies generalise to previously unseen
strategies, using the CAT competition as a case-study. It is hoped that this
approach can be used for analysing the generalisation properties of strategies not
only in other agent-based competitions involving competition between
marketplaces, but also in any agent-based simulation models within a complex
adaptive domain.
3.4 Conclusions
e generalisation ability of specialists (i.e., market mechanisms) has not been
studied previously in the literature. eoretical economic mechanism design
approaches to designing robust incentive-compatible market mechanisms, which
generalise across all trader strategies and types, involves assuming traders are
strictly rational. However, computer soware is always resource-constrained and
bug-prone, thus the designers of computational mechanisms cannot assume that
traders always act rationally or in their own self-interest. Moreover, economic
mechanism design theory has not considered competition between mechanisms,
and so has not explored competitive performance of mechanism features, nor the
generalisability of these features over diﬀerent competitive environments.
e research reported in this chapter has tried to explore the generalisation
properties of market mechanisms, using the 2008 and 2009 CAT Tournament
specialists as the basis. It is unclear whether and how a market mechanism might
(intentionally or unintentionally) favour certain trading strategies, or facilitate or
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inhibit other competing market mechanisms. A specialist which performs well
under one particular tournament setup may not perform well if the setup changes
slightly. erefore, it is essential to study and understand any hidden bias that a
specialist might have built into it. is was achieved by applying a novel
methodology to assess the generalisation properties of the specialist market
mechanisms. Speciﬁcally, many  simulations were run, using a variety of
conﬁgurations, including changing both the trader and specialists populations as
well as changing the period used to generate specialist scores; importantly,
speciﬁc conﬁgurations were used that encompassed representative contexts. is
chapter shows for the ﬁrst time how changes in the competition conﬁguration
can have an impact on specialists’ performances in both a qualitative and
quantitative context.
e results of this experimental work showed that specialists can be
sensitive (and specialised) to a number of factors in the competition, including
trader strategies, other specialists, and the scoring period. Such results indicate
that an appropriate evaluation of such a competition (and other similar ones)
would need a theoretically sound framework, which can measure specialists’
generalisation abilities quantitatively. ey also point out the importance in
analysing the relationship between a winning specialist and the particular
competition setup used, so that insights into what makes a specialist beer/worse
can be gained. Further, results in this chapter have shown that a trading strategy
with less intelligence than others, i.e., ZIP, can be harder to score against,
suggesting current specialists are concentrating on performing well against more
intelligent trading strategies.
e contributions of this chapter are:
• a methodology for qualitatively and quantitatively measuring the
generalisation properties of competing market-mechanisms (specialists) in
coevolutionary trading environments.
• a statistic for measuring the relative performance change in comparable
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CAT tournament variations.
• evidence that many specialists are not robust against changes in various
environmental factors, and thus do not generalise well.
• evidence that current CAT entrants are possibly concentrating on
designing specialists to only perform well against (apparently) more
intelligent trading agents and other competitors.
Some of the materials presented in this chapter appeared as [145, 146]. In this
chapter, three major issues were identiﬁed as having a signiﬁcant impact on
specialists’ performance, from the viewpoint of generalisation. However, there
are other issues to be considered, e.g., the performance (scoring) metric used in
the tournaments. It would be interesting to study the potential trade-oﬀs
between, for example, market share and proﬁt, perhaps using a multi-objective
approach. In terms of a theoretical framework for measuring specialists’
generalisation quantitatively, the possibility of adopting one for measuring
strategies’ generalisation ability [29] will be considered in the future.
Finally, although the CAT Tournament aims speciﬁcally to encourage
research and development of automated design of double auction mechanisms, it
is believed that the methods and techniques here have wider applicability.
Traditional analysis of situations where individuals make strategic decisions that
impact both their own and others’ welfare is traditionally carried out using game
theoretic methods [61]; oen the intention is to deﬁne and study the equilibria
present within the system of interest. Game theoretic analysis oen requires full
knowledge of the possible strategies players may take, along with full knowledge
of the outcomes or payoﬀs of the interactions of these strategies, so that they may
be evaluated in turn and the best strategy chosen. is very high rationality
requirement means that traditional analysis is impractical in many seings due to
the inﬁnitely many preferences that agents may be required to keep within a
complex system.
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One approach to deal with this has been to use Evolutionary Game eory
(EGT) [102] as a framework for more accurately modelling the notion that
less-than-rational individuals tend to adapt strategies over time in response to
those being played by individuals around them, and that the dynamics created by
in such an environment lead to the equilibria within the system. EGT has been
applied with respect to multi agent systems [169] and more speciﬁcally in terms
of analysing agents’ strategies in economic games [133, 173]. While an
improvement over traditional approaches EGT still requires the game being
modelled to be normal-form, i.e., that there is complete information about all of
the possible states of the game and associated payoﬀs. In many interesting games
payoﬀs typically depend upon decisions taken by players previously, and
converting these games to normal-form requires generating huge payoﬀ
matrices—typically impossible with current technologies. One approach to this
problem, applied to the design of market-mechanisms, similar to those studied
within this chapter, was to use Empirical Game eory [137], whereby games with
many strategies and/or stochastic payoﬀs can be analysed by approximating the
payoﬀ matrix in an oﬄine way and then using typical evolutionary game
theoretic approaches, such as replicator dynamics.
However, as discussed in Chapter 2, these game theoretic techniques have
only been applied to analysing market-mechanisms in isolation, and even
empirical game theory approaches can only deal with tens of agents within a
system, while within this chapter multiple competing marketplaces aempting to
aract hundreds of traders, are the subject of analysis. Indeed, many complex,
adaptive domains, such as those in public policy or defence, have large
sub-populations of intelligent entities who co-evolve or change dynamically in
response to each other’s actions, quickly making any analytical mathematical
models intractable. Accordingly, these domains are typically studied using
computer simulation methods, and the issue of generalisability of results then
becomes of great importance [100]. e techniques described in this chapter
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potentially have application to these other domains, and further investigations
will form future work.
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CHAPTER 4
A MODEL FOR COMPUTATIONAL
MULTI-ATTRIBUTE RESOURCE
ALLOCATION
e construction of an economic model, or of any model or theory for
that maer (or the writing of a novel, a short story, or a play) consists of
snating from the enormous and complex mass of facts called reality, a
few simple, easily-managed key points whi, when put together in
some cunning way, become for certain purposes a substitute for reality
itself.
—Evsey Domar
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In this chapter, a model describing a novel approach for allocating distributed
multi-aribute computational resources is presented. As discussed in Chapter 2,
other fully centralised or fully decentralised approaches to multi-aribute
resource allocation suﬀer from a number of issues, e.g., being reliant on a single
mechanism that is non-distributable and complex, or relying on complex
bargaining strategies, respectively.
Within this approach, computational resources are allocated across
distributed, competing double auction marketplaces, which choose the type of
resource to be traded within their market, while traders trade in the resource
markets that most suit their preferences and constraints. While models and
platforms for studying competition between marketplaces exist, e.g., JCAT [118],
they only consider single-aribute resource allocation. us, this chapter is
motivated by the need for a new model of both trader and marketplace behaviour,
which will enable study of the proposed approach, because unlike previous
models: (i) the resources are multi-aribute in nature, and traders have
preferences and constraints over them; and (ii) marketplaces have to speciﬁcally
choose what types of multi-aribute resources can be traded within their market.
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is not possible to say if this approach is generally
beer than any other, because all models aempt to satisfy multiple objectives. As
a result, direct comparisons with existing models would not be possible, although
approaches to potential future comparative studies are discussed in Section 4.6.
While no explicit experimental work is carried out within this chapter, it
forms an essential basis for empirical work carried out throughout the rest of the
thesis, and hopefully for other researchers interested in designing mechanisms
for distributed computational resource allocation. e main contributions of this
chapter therefore are: (i) to propose and describe a novel method for
multi-aribute resource allocation, based upon competing double auction
marketplaces; (ii) to formally deﬁne trader decision-making behaviours, based
upon marketing models grounded in consumer theory; and (iii) to provide a novel
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algorithm for solving an optimisation problem, which presents itself when a
population of traders potentially have diﬀerent preferences and constraints over
multi-aribute resources.
e rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 4.1, multi-aribute
computational resources are formally described, along with the expected method
of their allocation. In Section 4.2, the expected decision-making behaviour of the
agents in the system is deﬁned, using multi-aribute utility functions. In
Section 4.3 and Section 4.4, the meanics of the agents are described, including
the double auction policies, market-selection, and trading strategies. In
Section 4.5 the problem of measuring the allocative eﬃciency within the system
is identiﬁed, and a novel algorithm for measuring the utility of an optimal
allocation is deﬁned. Finally, the chapter is concluded in Section 4.6.
4.1 Computational Resource Allocation
Computational resources are oen speciﬁed to meet both functional and
non-functional requirements [189]. Functional requirements—as well as some
non-functional requirements—can be easily quantiﬁed and commoditised, e.g,
processing power, memory capacity and storage capacity. us, many types of
computational resources could be accurately speciﬁed in terms of a bundle of
aributes. is model considers abstract computational resources, only assuming
that a resource comprises a vector π of n non-price aributes:
π = hπ1; π2; : : : ; πni ; (4.1)
where πi 2 [0; 1] refers to the aribute-level of the i ᵗʰ aribute. Resources can be
diﬀerentiated by their type, which is deﬁned by the levels of each of their
aributes. Two resources can be considered identical iﬀ all of their
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aribute-levels are equal:
π1  π2 () 8j; π1j = π2j
Diﬀerent consumers will have varying minimum resource requirements, which
must be satisﬁed in order that the resource is useful to them. Realistically, these
requirements might fall upon a minimum level of storage or random-access
memory for large data-oriented tasks, or processing power for time-sensitive
tasks. A user can impart these requirements on their trading agent ai using a
vector rai of minimum constraints:
rai =


rai1 ; r
ai
2 ; : : : ; r
ai
n

; (4.2)
where raij is, for example, the minimum level aribute j must meet in order to be
useful to ai.
As well as minimum constraints, consumers might not require certain
aribute to be above speciﬁc thresholds, e.g., because their tasks only require a
certain amount of memory to run. Likewise, providers may have constrained
hardware or capacity, and may only be able to provide certain aribute-levels to
consumers; a user’s laptop-based resource has diﬀerent maximum aribute-levels
to a node on a high-speed computational cluster, for example. Again, these
requirements can be communicated to trading agents via a vector rai of maximum
constraints:
rai =


rai1 ; r
ai
2 ; : : : ; r
ai
n

; (4.3)
where raij is the maximum constraint on aribute j, and 8j; raij  raij . As well as
expressing preferences over diﬀerent resources, multi-aribute decision theory
states that decision-makers might have preferences over the individual aributes
of a resource [84]. For consumers, represented by buying agents, preferences
describe the relative importance of each aribute, in terms of value. For
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providers, represented by selling agents, preferences describe the relative cost of
providing each of the aributes. It is assumed each trader ai maintains a vector
wai of preferences over the aributes of a resource:
wai = hwai1 ;wai2 ; : : : ;wain i ; (4.4)
where 8j;waij > 0 and
Pn
j=1 w
ai
j = 1. If the trader ai does not have preferences
over the diﬀerent aributes, equal weighting is applied to all aributes:
wai =

 1
n ;
1
n ; : : : ;
1
n
.
4.1.1 Trading resources in distributed marketplaces
Within this model, market-exange agents provide markets for trading agents to
buy and sell computational resources. To simplify analysis, a basic assumption
made, is that each market-exchange provides a single instance of a market, in
which resources are allocated using a double auction mechanism.
Market-exchanges, along with trading agents, are considered to be self-interested
expected utility maximisers. Traders’ tasks are to maximise utility by either
buying or selling resources for as lile or as much (respectively), as possible.
Market-exchanges, on the other hand, charge fees to traders in return for access
to their market. Diﬀerent fee structures can have signiﬁcant impacts on aracting,
or not, traders to a market. ree main types are considered within this model:
• registration fees: are charged to traders in exchange for permission to enter
the exchange’s market and shout oﬀers. ey are charged once per trading
day.
• transaction price fees¹: are charged to traders who successfully transact in
the market. e fee is a percentage of the transaction price, payable by both
traders involved.
• spread commission fees: again applicable to traders who successfully
transact, the spread is the diﬀerence between the two trader’s individual
oﬀers. e spread commission fee is a percentage of the diﬀerence between
these two prices.
¹In some parts of the literature this type of fee is known as Ad Valorem—“according to value”.
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A variety of charging structures could have been implemented; the three chosen
are inspired by the CAT [24] tournament model: JCAT [77]. It is believed that by
covering market entry, and transaction-based fees, a realistic charging structure
has been used. As discussed in Chapter 2, rather than allocating resources via a
single centralised mechanism, segments of the market could be satisﬁed by
distributed marketplaces, each oﬀering a market for trading a particular type of
resource. Dependent on their preferences and constraints, traders migrate to the
marketplaces that most suit them. us, within the model, market-exchanges
must—aside from running an auction mechanism—decide each trading day the
type of resource to be traded within its market. Given the charging structure
above, market-exchanges have an incentive to aract traders to their market, as
well as ensuring that as many traders as possible can trade the resource speciﬁed
by the market-exchange. Given this, resource type selection, achieved through
aribute-level selection, is vital.
e trading process
Market-based systems are oen complex, containing many economic agents
adapting and/or learning over time. Within the current model, it is assumed there
exists a set of trading agents T and a set of market-exchange agentsM. e
trading agents are assumed to consist of sets of buyers B  T and sellers S  T .
roughout this thesis, traders are generally referred to as ai 2 T , however, in
some cases a buyer may be explicitly deﬁned bi, or a seller sj. e market-based
system progresses each trading day via a number of stages, as follows:
1. Aribute-level selection stage: at the beginning of the trading day, each
market-exchange deﬁnes the type of resource to be traded in its market, by
selecting, and then broadcasting, the aribute-levels of that resource.
2. Daily market selection stage: next, traders decide which of the
market-exchanges they wish to join; traders may only join at most one
exchange per trading day.
3. Trading and trader learning stage: the trading day is split into a number of
trading rounds—opportunities to shout oﬀers into the market.
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4. Venue learning stage: at the end of the trading day traders and
market-exchanges calculate their daily proﬁt. is is used as a signal to the
decision mechanisms that dictate behaviour on the next trading day.
Each transaction θ executed by a market-exchange, can be represented as an
ordered 7-tuple that speciﬁes: the buyer θb and seller θs involved in the
transaction; the market-exchange θm executing the transaction; the matching bid
θbid and ask θask oﬀers; the transaction price θτ; and the type of resource
exchanged θπ .
θ = (θb 2 B; θs 2 S; θm 2M; θbid; θask; θτ; θπ) (4.5)
4.2 Decision Making Models for Agents
As discussed in Chapter 2, soware agents need to be able to reason over many
states, in order that they can make decisions appropriate to completing their task.
us, within this market-based system, buyers and sellers need to have a
decision-making model that allows them to state their preferences over various
multiple-aribute computational resources. An agent’s preferences over the types
of resources deﬁned in Section 4.1 can be formally deﬁned using a multi-aribute
utility function, which allows a decision maker to get a conjoint utility measure
for a multi-aribute resource, based upon each of the individual aribute utilities,
by combining them according to relative importance.
4.2.1 Trader multi-attribute utility functions
Recently, other agent-based computational resource allocation models, e.g.,
[11, 13, 93], have proposed that agents make use of the additive multi-aribute
utility function introduced by Keeney and Raiﬀa [84], which, using their notation,
is of the form:
u(x) =
nX
i=1
kiui(xi); (4.6)
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where u and ui are the utility functions for the entire resource x = hx1; x2; : : : ; xni
and each individual aribute xi respectively. e utility of each aribute is
weighted according to its preferences or importance to the decision maker; the
weight of aribute i is represented by ki. However, additive functions of this type,
while combining aribute utilities according to relative importance, fail to
consider one important computational resource assumption, viz. that worthless
resources, with aributes failing to satisfy minimum constraints, should provide
zero utility. It is clear from Equation 4.6 that no maer what the utility of
individual aributes, it is not possible for one aribute xi to determine the entire
resource utility, because the utility function is purely additive.
In order that computational resource consumers’ constraints on minimum
aribute levels can be realistically modelled, a richer utility function is now
introduced that enforces the assumptions about buyers’ preferences over
resources with aributes that fail to meet these constraints. Formally, a buyer bi’s
valuation of a resource π is determined according to the following multi-aribute
valuation function υbi(π):
υbi(π) = λbi
24 nX
j=1
wbij ubi(πj)
35 nY
j=1
H(πj) (4.7)
Equation 4.7 has two main parts. e ﬁrst part of the equation is an additive
multi-aribute utility function of the type deﬁned in Equation 4.6, which
determines the contribution of each of the aributes of π, weighted by their
importance according to wbij . Because it is assumed that all aribute-levels lie on
the range [0; 1], and thatPw2wbi w = 1, the conjoint utility of a resource π is
naturally scaled between zero and one. It is assumed the utility of a resource to a
buyer monotonically increases with the level of its aributes, implying that the
weighted aribute utilities of the most desirable resource sums to one. It is also
assumed that a buyer would be indiﬀerent between an amount of money equal to
its budget constraint, λbi , and the most desirable resource. us, by scaling the
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utility of a resource by λbi , a buyer can state its valuation in terms of money.
e second part of Equation 4.7 ensures that a resource π’s utility collapses
to zero if any aributes fail to satisfy minimum constraints, regardless of the
other aribute utilities. is is achieved by checking every aribute satisﬁes its
minimum constraint using a Heaviside step function:
Hbi(πj) =
8>><>>:
1 if πj  rbij
0 otherwise;
(4.8)
where rbij is buyer bi’s minimum constraint for the jᵗʰ aribute. e utility
contribution of each individual aribute is calculated according to bi’s aribute
utility function ubi(πj).
ubi(πj) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
πj if rbij  πj  rbij
rbij if πj > rbij
0 if πj < rbij
(4.9)
rbij refers to bi’s minimum constraint for aribute j, and rbij refers to the maximum
constraint. ubi(πj) ensures that if an aribute has a level in excess of a bi’s
maximum constraint, it contributes no more utility than if πj = rbij .
Sellers, being resource providers rather than consumers, are modelled
slightly diﬀerently to buyers. Each resource type π involves a cost of production,
deﬁned by a seller’s cost function:
csj(π) = λsj
nX
i=1
wsji usj(πi); (4.10)
where usj(πi) is the cost contribution of each of the aributes of π, weighted by
their relative costs according to wsji ; given two aributes x and y, if wsjx > wsjy then
it costs more to produce a given increase in aribute x than it does in aribute y.
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e aribute cost function usj(πi) is deﬁned as follows:
usj(πi) =
8>><>>:
1 if πi > rsji
πi otherwise
(4.11)
us, a seller is unable to provide a resource with aributes that exceed its
maximum production constraint. In all other cases, the cost of production
increases linearly with the aribute level.
Transaction payoﬀs
Within a double auction environment, the proﬁt or payoﬀ a buyer or seller gains
from a transaction is dependent on the type of resource π exchanged, the amount
of money τ exchanged (transaction price), and any associated market-exchange
costs determined by the market-exchange, which will be communicated to each
trader as a vector of costs c. When a transaction takes place, the buyer bi’s payoﬀ
Pbi is:
Pbi(π; τ; c) = υbi(π)  τ  
X
c2c
c; (4.12)
while for a seller sj:
Psj(π; τ; c) = τ   csj(π) 
X
c2c
c (4.13)
In both cases, because agents are assumed to be able to express all their
preferences via money, the size of the payoﬀ is equivalent to an equally sized
increase in utility.
4.2.2 Market-exange payoﬀ function
Market-exchanges, as with trading agents, are considered utility-maximisers
within this model. A market-exchange’s utility is measured according to the
revenue generated from charging fees to traders, which, as discussed in
Section 4.1.1, potentially include registration-based fees and transaction-based
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fees. Each market-exchange mk maintains an exange member set Emk  T ,
containing the traders that have joined its market at the beginning of that trading
day. During each trading day, mk also stores all of the transactions θ that it
executes, maintaining a transaction set Θmk , containing all the transactions that
took place that day. An exchange’s daily proﬁt Pmk is determined both by the
amount of traders that entered the market, and the transactions that the exchange
executed:
Pmk(Emk ;Θmk) = jEmk j  ζmkreg +
X
θ2Θmk
2  θτ  ζmktra + [θbid   θask]  ζmkcom; (4.14)
where ζmkreg 2 R0, ζmktra 2 [0; 1] and ζmkcom 2 [0; 1] refer to mk’s registration fee,
transaction price fee and spread commission fee levels respectively. Registration
fee revenue depends on the number of traders that joined mk’s market that day.
Both the buyer and seller pay a transaction price fee to mk, based upon the
transaction price θτ . Finally, the spread commission fee is based on the diﬀerence
between the buyer’s bid θbid, and the seller’s ask θask. From Equation 4.14 the
reader will note that there are no costs associated with running a market. is is
an intentional choice to simplify analysis in future chapters; costs could be added
to Equation 4.14 to rectify this in future work.
4.2.3 Resource allocation payoﬀ examples
In this section, several visualisations are provided to help the reader understand
the impact that traders’ preferences and constraints have upon the outcomes of
transactions, in terms of buyer valuations, seller costs, and the total utility over
both traders. e main purpose of this section is to emphasise that a trader’s
optimal trading partner (from their perspective and from a social welfare
perspective) depends not only on price, but also on the aribute-levels of the
resource being traded—a pair of traders could trade many diﬀerent resource types
with each other. Given the multi-aribute nature of the resources deﬁned in
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Section 4.1, maximising utility over both a buyer and seller involves consideration
of the optimal levels for each resource aribute. For these examples, it is assumed
resources have two aributes, which allows visualisation of the eﬀect of changes
to their levels.
e simplest of interactions
In the simplest of cases there exists a buyer bi and a seller sj who don’t have
preferences over the two aributes:
wbi = h0:5; 0:5i
wsj = h0:5; 0:5i ;
that is, the buyer values no aribute higher than any other, and the each aribute
is equally expensive to produce more of for the seller. Sellers are assumed to have
no minimum constraints on production. Let us assume that the buyer is interested
in all but the lowest quality of resource; both vectors of minimum constraints are
therefore:
rbi = h0:2; 0:2i
rsj = h0; 0i
Next, assume that neither trader have maximum constraints on the aributes:
rbi = h1:0; 1:0i
rsj = h1:0; 1:0i
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Finally, the traders need a budget constraint, in the form of a limit price λ:
λbi = 20:0
λsj = 10:0;
where the seller’s limit price, which reﬂects its production cost for a given
resource, is less than the buyer’s. Because the traders have no preferences over
aributes, they are able to trade with each other under two conditions: (i) the
buyer’s budget is bigger than the seller’s, i.e., λbi  λsj ; and (ii) the resource
aributes all have levels that exceed the buyer’s minimum constraints. By
running various resource types π through both the buyer’s valuation function
υbi(π), and the seller’s cost function csj(π), it is possible, as shown in Figure 4.1, to
visualise how valuations and costs change for diﬀerent resource types. Further, as
shown in Figure 4.1c, it is possible see the total utility surplus ubi;sj(π) of any
given transaction over a particular resource. e total utility measure is
determined as follows:
ubi;sj(π) = υbi(π)  τ + τ   υsj(π)
= υbi(π)  υsj(π) (4.15)
For the sake of simplicity at this stage, potential market-exchanges fees are
ignored. In this example, Figure 4.1c shows that the total utility of a transaction
would be maximised if the two traders exchanged a resource π = h1:0; 1:0i.
Further, feasible exchange is entirely dependent on the limit prices of the traders;
if the limit price of the seller is greater than that of the buyer, no trade could take
place over any type of resource.
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Figure 4.1: Each diﬀerent point on the on the x and y axis describes a resource
π = hx; yi with the respective aribute-levels. (a) e z axis describes the buyer’s
valuation of the resource described by the two aributes; note that for resources
with levels less than the buyer’s minimum constraint, the resource has zero value.
(b) e seller has no minimum production constraints so the cost of producing
the resource increases as the levels of the aributes do. (c) e total utility of a
transaction between the buyer and seller. Any point that has a non-zero utility
would be a mutually beneﬁcial trade; the trade with the highest utility would be
for a resource π = h1:0; 1:0i. e exact utility each trader received would depend
on the transaction price, which would lie between the buyer’s valuation and the
seller’s cost.
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Buyers with maximum constraints
In this example, a buyer with maximum aribute constraints lower than those of
the seller is considered. Again, consider that neither trader has preferences over
the two aributes:
wbi = h0:5; 0:5i
wsj = h0:5; 0:5i ;
Further, let us assume that the traders have the same minimum constraints as the
last example:
rbi = h0:2; 0:2i
rsj = h0:0; 0:0i
Also, let us assume that while the seller is able to produce resources with
aributes up to the maximum level, the buyer only requires a resource with a
constrained aribute level, e.g.:
rbi = h0:5; 0:5i
rsj = h1:0; 1:0i
Finally, let us again assume the following budget constraints:
λbi = 20:0
λsj = 10:0
Having constraints on the maximum desirable aribute levels for a resource has a
considerable impact of the buyer’s valuation, as shown in Figure 4.2. Because the
seller used in the previous example is also used here, the seller’s cost function is
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Figure 4.2: Each diﬀerent point on the on the x and y axis describes a resource
π = hx; yiwith the respective aribute-levels. In this example the seller is identical
to that in Figure 4.1b. (a) e z axis describes the valuation of the diﬀerent resource
types for a buyerwithmaximum constraints rbi = h0:5; 0:5i. Due to thesemaximum
constraints, the buyer’s valuation does not increase for resourceswith aribute lev-
els beyond its maximum constraints. (b) e total utility of a transaction between
the buyer and the seller shown in Figure 4.1b. Any point that has a non-zero utility
would be a mutually beneﬁcial trade. While any resource with aribute-levels be-
yond the buyer’s maximum constraints would not be valued higher, it would cost
more for the seller to produce. erefore, the trade that maximises the total utility
is for a resource π = h0:5; 0:5i.
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the same as that shown in Figure 4.1b. e immediate diﬀerence between this and
the previous simpler case, where the buyer had no maximum constraints, is that
the resource that maximises the total utility over the trade is no longer the one
with maximum values for aributes; instead, the resource type maximising utility
is π = h0:5; 0:5i, which in this case aligns with the buyers maximum constraints.
Of course, a marketplace trying to decide on the type of resource to be traded
within its market would be unaware of these constraints a priori.
Traders with preferences over attributes
e ﬁnal example to be shown involves looking at a buyer and seller that have
preferences over the two resource aributes:
wbi = h0:9; 0:1i
wsj = h0:1; 0:9i
In this case, the buyer strongly prefers aribute one to aribute two, meaning
that it is willing to apportion more of its budget to that resource than than the
other. e seller can produce a given increase of aribute one for less than it can
produce the same increase in aribute two, i.e., aribute one is more expensive
for the seller to produce. Let us maintain the same minimum constraints on the
traders as the previous examples:
rbi = h0:2; 0:2i
rsj = h0; 0i
To simplify this analysis, let us remove the previous buyer’s maximum constraint:
rbi = h1:0; 1:0i
rsj = h1:0; 1:0i
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Finally, in order to highlight the impact that preferences have on feasible trades,
let us again assume the following budget constraints:
λbi = 20:0
λsj = 25:0;
that is to say, the seller’s budget constraint is bigger than the buyer’s. In the
absence of preferences, if λsj > λbi then a trade can never take place, because the
seller’s costs will always be larger than the buyer’s valuations. However, as
shown in Figure 4.3, when a buyer values some aributes more than others, and a
seller is able to produce some aributes cheaper than others, it is possible for
mutually beneﬁcial trades to take place over some resource types.
By following these examples, and considering large populations of traders
with potentially diﬀerent preferences and constraints, it should become clear that
the market-exchanges’ task of choosing the resource type to be traded within
their markets is non-trivial, given that underlying trader preferences and
constraints can’t be known a priori; strategies for tackling this challenge are the
subject of Chapter 5.
4.3 Market-exange Agent Meanics
Market-exchange agents operating within this resource allocation approach
involve two main mechanisms: (i) a double action mechanism, which allows the
agent to run a double auction for allocating resources between buyers and sellers;
and (ii) a mechanism for deciding what type of resource will be traded within its
market each trading day. Section 4.2.2 described how market-exchanges are
assumed to be self-interested agents, aempting to maximise revenue generated
from charges and fees levied on traders within their market. e type of resource
traded within their market will aﬀect the market-exchange’s proﬁtability, and as
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Figure 4.3: Each diﬀerent point on the on the x and y axis describes a resource
π = hx; yi with the respective aribute-levels. (a) the buyer’s valuation increases
linearly as the aribute levels of the resource increase, however, a strong pref-
erence for aribute one has rotated the valuation landscape, such that valuation
increases more dramatically for an increase in aribute one. (b) the seller’s cost in-
creases more slowly with an increase in aribute one than with aribute two. (c)
Total utility of a transaction between the buyer and seller. Because of a higher seller
budget constraint the seller’s cost csj(h1:0; 1:0i) = 25 is bigger than the buyer’s val-
uation υbi(h1:0; 1:0i) = 20. However, a mutually beneﬁcial trade can take place over
resources with certain aributes; the total utility is maximised for the resource type
π = h1:0; 0:2i.
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the previous section has demonstrated, selecting the aribute levels that optimise
the total utility over a transaction—which should in turn optimise the potential
revenue from such a transaction—is not always straightforward.
e method by which a market-exchange decides on the aribute-levels of
the type of resource to be traded within its market is determined by its
aribute-level selection strategy, and based upon the previous section it should be
clear that this is a challenging problem. Chapter 5 will be dealing with the design
and analysis of appropriate aribute-level selection strategies for the allocation
of multi-aribute computational resources.
4.3.1 Double auction policies
is thesis does not concern itself with the design and analysis of policies or rules
pertaining to the running of a double auction per se. As such, several previously
well-deﬁned double auction policies are used to run market-exchange’s double
auction mechanisms throughout this thesis. e various double auction policies
used by market-exchanges are as follows.
Charging policy
At the beginning of this chapter the main assumed types of charges were outlined.
A double auction charging policy essentially outlines these charges, and speciﬁes
under what conditions traders are subjected to them. Within this thesis, it is
assumed that these charges remain stationary for the duration of a simulation,
i.e., they do not dynamically change over time in response to any environmental
conditions. Exploration of the relative merits for using dynamic charging policies
when allocating these types of multi-aribute resources is saved for future work.
Clearing policy
As discussed in Chapter 2, a continuous double auction auction mechanism might
be more appropriate than a clearing house variant for scenarios where supply
100
4.3. MARKET-EXCHANGE AGENT MECHANICS
and demand could shi rapidly, or where it might not be practical for traders to
wait for the market to clear. As such, all market-exchanges within this model use
continuous double auction (CDA) mechanisms. From an implementation point of
view, each market-exchange uses the 4-Heap algorithm [185] to maintain
uncleared bids and asks in their market, using appropriate data structures.
Mating policy
e matching policy perhaps most commonly used in double auction
environments is the market equilibrium matching policy [104]. Within a clearing
house auction, market equilibrium involves clearing the market at the reported
supply and demand levels [117], yet these are not available in a CDA auction, so
traders are simply matched as soon as a bid and ask are compatible; if there are
multiple compatible oﬀers they are prioritised according to time of submission.
Pricing policy
e pricing policy speciﬁes the transaction price at which a trade takes place,
given a matching bid and ask. A discriminatory k-pricing policy [150, 8] calculates
the transaction price using a parameter κ 2 [0; 1]. For a transaction θ, containing
the bid and ask prices θbid and θask, market-exchange mk determines the
transaction price θτ as follows:
θτ = θbid  κmk + θask  (1  κmk) (4.16)
e seing of κmk determines how favourable the transaction price is to the buyer
and seller: when κmk = 0 (κmk = 1) the transaction price is unilaterally set
according to the value of the ask (bid). e value of κmk can aﬀect how aractive
the market is to either buyers or sellers , thus is it typical to set κmk = 0:5 when it
is desirable not to bias transaction prices towards buyers or sellers. Within this
thesis, all market-exchanges use κmk = 0:5.
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oting policy
e quoting policy determines what information is given to traders in terms of
the current prices within the market. All market-exchanges within this model use
two-sided quoting [117], which publicly states the current highest unmatched bid
and lowest unmatched ask to all traders within the market; these prices are
updated dynamically as new oﬀers enter the market, or trades executed.
Shout accepting policy
e shout accepting policy speciﬁes under what conditions oﬀers shouted by
traders are accepted into the market, by the market-exchange agent. In the most
basic conﬁguration, any shout is accepted into the market; however, it is oen
more appropriate for a market-exchange to impose some limits on the shouts
accepted, to encourage a more eﬃcient market, and reduce excess computational
work. One shout accepting policy that encourages convergence towards the
competitive market equilibrium is the beat the quote shout accepting policy [186].
Also known as the NYSE rule, due its use on the New York Stock Exchange [113],
the policy states that only shouts that improve upon the current quote prices, i.e.,
bids (asks) that are  () than the highest (lowest) unmatched bid (ask), are
accepted into the market.
4.4 Trading Agent Meanics
In this section, the main mechanisms used by the trading agents within this
model are deﬁned and discussed. Trading-agents are composed of two main parts
[23]: (i) a trading strategy that dictates at what price the buyer or seller shouts
oﬀers into the market; and (ii) a market-selection strategy that dictates at which
market to enter each trading day. e rest of this section outlines the strategies
used, and how they are adapted for use in this multi-market approach to resource
allocation.
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4.4.1 e Zero-Intelligence Plus trading strategy
roughout this thesis, it is assumed that all trading agents will be using Cli’s
[34] Zero Intelligence Plus (ZIP) trading strategy. e two main reasons for this
choice are: (i) the ZIP strategy has been extensively analysed in double auction
seings [34, 39, 17], and ZIP traders have been shown capable of achieving
eﬃcient allocations [34]; and (ii) the ZIP trading strategy is relatively simple
computationally, and thus scales well for use in many large-scale experiments.
As discussed in Section 2.3.2 on Page 30, ZIP agents possess the minimal
intelligence for converging, under a wide range of supply and demand schedules,
on a market’s competitive equilibrium price.
e ZIP algorithm has two main parts. e ﬁrst is a deterministic algorithm
that decides which direction (if at all) the agent should adjust its current shout
price. e second part is a machine learning technique that decides by what
amount to change their shout price; the machine learning technique works as
follows. Importantly, a ZIP trader, being rational, will never shout an oﬀer into
the market that exceeds its valuation (if a buyer) or cost (if a seller) of the type of
resource being traded in the market. us, each trading period t a ZIP trader ai
calculates its shout price ρtai by scaling its valuation vai by a proﬁt-margin μtai :
ρtai = vai 
1+ μtai ; (4.17)
where,
vai =
8>><>>:
υbi(π) if ai 2 B
csi(π) if ai 2 S
Depending on whether the trader is a buyer or seller, vai is set as the valuation or
cost of the resource being traded within the market. Given buyers and sellers
make more proﬁt when their transaction prices are lower and higher respectively,
a buyer’s proﬁt margin is increased when it decreases μtai and a seller’s when it
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increases μtai . Margins must be non-negative for sellers, i.e., 8ai 2S ; μtai 2 [0;1],
demonstrating that it is possible for sellers to ask any amount for their resource,
but cannot go below their valuation vai . Buyers’ margins must lie within the
range 8ai 2B; μtai 2 [ 1; 0]; they cannot shout more than their valuation, but they
clearly can’t shout a negative price either.
When an oﬀer is shouted, it may be accepted by the market-exchange, and
may result in a transaction. ese outcomes inﬂuence how the proﬁt margin, and
thus shout price, is adapted for the next trading period. Using the Widrow-Hoﬀ
Delta Rule [179], the proﬁt margin μt+1ai is set by rearranging Equation 4.17 in
terms of μai and then applying an update value Δtai , known as theWidrow-Hoﬀ
delta value:
μtai + 1 =
ρtai + Δ
t
ai
vai   1
(4.18)
e Widrow-Hoﬀ delta value Δtai aims to move a trader’s shout price towards a
target price Τai , which is determined every trading day, and depends upon
information the trader has gleaned from the market.
Δtai = βai 

τtai   ρtai

; (4.19)
where βai is trader ai’s learning rate, which dictates how quickly ρai converges
towards the target Τai . e target price Τai is an elegant feature of the ZIP
algorithm. Cliﬀ realised that while intuitively it would make sense to set Τtai to
last price shouted in the market qt, if ρtai ' qt there would be lile change in a
trader’s shout, and that “…there is a need for the agents to be constantly testing
the market, always pushing for higher margins.” [33, p. 44.]. erefore, Τtai is set by
randomly perturbing the last shouted price in the market (perhaps representative
of the real-world diﬀerences that traders have in their pricing strategies).
Τtai = U
t
ai  qt + bUtai (4.20)
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Parameter Raise Price Lower Price
Umin;ai 1 1  uai
Umax;ai 1+ uai 1bUmin;ai 0  buaibUmax;ai buai 0
Table 4.1: In the ZIP algorithm, the bounds for uniform distributions are adjusted
according to whether the algorithm wishes to raise or lower its shout price. uai 2
[0; 1] and buai 2 [0; 1] are free parameters that agent ai would need to set.
Two types of perturbations are applied to qt: the ﬁrst, Utai 2 [Umin;ai ;Umax;ai ],
scales qt across a uniform distribution; the second, bUtai 2 [bUmin;ai ; bUmax;ai ], is an
absolute perturbation.
Finally, ZIP uses momentum [69, p. 71] to dampen noise in Δtai , which may
arise due to the dynamic nature of shouts in the market, and thus target prices.
Rather than using Δtai directly, a momentum coeﬃcient γai is applied, and a new
update rule Γai is used instead of the Δai deﬁned in Equation 4.19.
Γt+1ai = γai Γ
t
ai +
1  γai Δtai (4.21)
Because Γai is used instead of Δai , Equation 4.18 is replaced by Equation 4.22.
μt+1ai =
ρtai + Γ
t
ai
vai   1
(4.22)
at concludes the machine learning techniques used to adapt a ZIP agent’s shout
price. In Algorithm 4.1, the deterministic rules that dictate the direction in which
a ZIP agent adjusts its shout price, is shown. In order to know which direction to
adjust its price in, a ZIP trader needs only to know the last shouted price q in the
market, whether that shout was accepted in to the market, and whether the shout
was a bid or an oﬀer. Based upon that information, a ZIP trader either raises or
lowers its shout price, by adjusting the bounds of the uniform distributions that
Utai and bUtai are drawn from in Equation 4.20. How these bounds are adjusted for
trader ai are shown in Table 4.1. For all simulation studies within this thesis,
parameters for traders using the ZIP algorithm were set similarly to Cliﬀ and
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Algorithm 4.1e ZIP algorithm
1: if ai 2 S then {Trader is a seller.}
2: if last shout in market accepted at price q then
3: if ρai(t)  q(t) then
4: increase proﬁt margin (raise price).
5: end if
6: if last shout in market was a bid and ρai  q and active then
7: decrease proﬁt margin (lower price).
8: end if
9: else
10: if last shout was an oﬀer and ρai  q and active then
11: decrease proﬁt margin (lower price).
12: end if
13: end if
14: else {Trader is a buyer.}
15: if last shout in market accepted at price q then
16: if ρai  q then
17: increase proﬁt margin (lower price).
18: end if
19: if last shout in market was a oﬀer and ρai  q and active then
20: decrease proﬁt margin (raise price).
21: end if
22: else
23: if last shout was a bid and ρai  q and active then
24: decrease proﬁt margin (raise price).
25: end if
26: end if
27: end if
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Bruten’s [34] original simulation studies. Speciﬁcally:
8ai2T βai 2 [0:1; 0:2]
γai 2 [0:05; 0:35]
uai = 0:05
buai = 0:05
and additionally:
8ai2B μ0ai 2 [ 0:35; 0:05]
8ai2S μ0ai 2 [0:05; 0:35] (4.23)
where for all parameter ranges, the value is drawn from a Uniform distribution
bounded by the range at the beginning of the simulation; μ0ai refers only to the
initial proﬁt margin at time t = 0.
4.4.2 Integrating market fees
Recall that traders using the ZIP algorithm never shout oﬀers in excess of their
valuations (buyers) or costs (sellers) of the resource type being traded in the
market. However, given that, as described in Section 4.1.1, there are several
possible charges for joining and trading within a market, it is possible that a
trader may still trade at a loss, even if their oﬀer does not exceed their valuation
or cost. Typically, in the literature referring to deploying ZIP in a single market
situation, charges are not normally of importance in the research being carried
out, thus they are not explicitly considered. However, in a multi-market situation,
charges aﬀect traders’ preferences over market-selection, thus they need to be
factored into ZIP’s shouting algorithm. us, market-exchange charges are
integrated into a trader’s valuation. In the case of a trader that is a buyer, i.e.,
ai 2 B, rather than the ZIP algorithm using vai = υbi(π), it uses vai = bυbi(π),
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where:
bυbi(π) = υbi(π)  ζregmk 1+ ζ tramk 1 (4.24)
First the buyer decreases its resource valuation υbi(π) by market-exchange mk’s
registration fee ζregmk . Secondly, it considers the transaction price fee it would have
to pay if it traded at its discounted valuation, and adjusts for it by using the
multiplicative inverse of 1+ ζ tramk . us, if the buyer were to transact at bυbi , then
the price the buyer paid, including all applicable charges would be equal to its
initial valuation υbi(π). For a seller aj 2 S using the ZIP algorithm, vaj = csj(π)
becomes vj = bcsj ; sellers need to increase their costs rather than discount them:
bυsj = υsj(π) + ζregmk 1  ζtramk 1 (4.25)
ese mechanisms ensure that, as long as traders trade resources with the
aribute-level speciﬁed by the market-exchange mk, they will never make a loss
from successfully transacting within a market-exchange.
4.4.3 Market-selection strategy
Market-exchanges have the ability to dynamically set and vary the
aribute-levels of the resource types to be traded within their markets.
Section 4.2.3 demonstrated that trader preferences and constraints aﬀect the
desirability of diﬀerent resource types. erefore, an important aspect of a
trading agent is the mechanism by which itooses which market-exchange, and
thus resource market, to join each trading day.
A consumer theoretic approa to market selection
Modern consumer theory supposes that resource-constrained consumers, being
rational and time-constrained (and processing-power-constrained and
memory-constrained), only consider a subset of all options available [143, 88].
Some options are immediately rejected without detailed consideration, because
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they have below-threshold values on essential aributes (so-called inept or
unacceptable options [112]). Only the contents of these subsets, termed
consideration sets [144], are then carefully deliberated over, before ultimately one
option is chosen. e options that do not score highly enough to be chosen in this
evaluation are called inert options [112].
In the same spirit, the decision-making models used by traders within this
model take a consumer marketing model approach [94]. A trader’s
market-selection strategy is designed such that it only considers a subset of
available markets each trading day, by forming a consideration set C of
market-exchanges. Market-exchanges are excluded from a trader’s consideration
set if the resource type being traded within its market is considered inept by the
trader. Buyers consider resources to be inept if one of the aribute-levels fails to
meet its minimum constraint, while sellers consider resources inept if one of the
aribute-levels is beyond their production ability, i.e., maximum constraints.
us, for a buyer bi:
Cbi = fmk 2M : (8πj 2 π)(πj  rbij )g (4.26)
where rbij is bi’s minimum constraint for the jᵗʰ aribute of the resource π
speciﬁed by market exchange mk. And, for a seller sj, its consideration set, Csj , is
formed as follows:
Csj = fmk 2M : (8πj 2 π)(πj  rsjj)g (4.27)
Equations 4.26–4.27 ensure no buyer enters a market where the resources on oﬀer
do not satisfy its minimum constraints, and that no seller will enter an exchange
where it would have to produce resources beyond its production capabilities.
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Market selection
Once a consideration set is formed, more careful evaluation can be made for
market-selection. It is possible for a trader to successfully trade over every
resource type deﬁned by each of the market-exchanges within the consideration
set, however: (i) each market-exchange will potentially have diﬀerent charges and
fees; and (ii) each market will have diﬀering numbers of traders within it, and
diﬀerent supply and demand schedules. us, the problem a trader faces in the
presence of competing market-exchanges is that of exploitation versus
exploration. Choosing markets from the consideration set is a similar problem to
that faced by traders in other domains, e.g, traders within the CAT tournament
must choose between all competitions’ entrants. Leveraging those strategies
[118], the problem of market-selection within the consideration set is treated as
an n-armed bandit problem. One of the simplest n-armed strategies, the ε-greedy
strategy [164], is used by traders in the CAT tournaments [24]. Each trader ai
using the strategy maintains a vector of reward values Rai :
Rai =
D
Raim1 ;R
ai
m2 ; : : : ;R
ai
mjMj
E
(4.28)
us, each market-exchange mk 2M has a reward Raimk associated with it;
initially at time t = 0, 8mk ; Raimk(t) = 0. If during a trading day t, a trader ai joins a
market-exchange mk, then at the end of the trading day, it updates its reward
value associated with mk according to:
Raimk(t+ 1) = Raimk(t) + δai  [P tai   Raimk(t)]; (4.29)
where P tai refers to ai’s proﬁt for trading day t, and δai to a discounting factor that
ai uses to ensure that more recent proﬁts contribute further towards Raimk , i.e., Raimk
becomes an exponential moving average. In all the simulations within this thesis,
δai = 0:1, which ensures that older observations are not too aggressively
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forgoen.
e ε-greedy strategy selects the market-exchange with the highest reward
according with probability ε, while a random market-exchange is chosen with
probability 1  ε times. us, ε represents the probability of exploitation (joining
the historically best market-exchange), while 1  ε represents the probability of
exploration. If no single market-exchange has the highest unique reward, then ai
chooses randomly between all market-exchanges with the join highest rewards. It
is quite common for ε = 0:1 to empirically yield the best balance between
exploration and exploitation [164, pp. 29] in terms of overall performance, and
ε = 0:1 is the seing used for all traders in simulation within this thesis.
4.5 An Algorithm for Measuring Allocative
Eﬃciency
One of the metrics of interest when designing and analysing resource allocation
mechanisms is the resulting allocative eﬃciency. e market-based system
proposed in this chapter considers multiple competing marketplaces hopefully
self-organising into market niches that satisfy market segments in a population of
traders. While the allocative eﬃciency within each market is expected to be
comparable to that empirically observed by other researchers working with
double auctions and ZIP agents [33], the eﬃciency across the entire system of
market-exchanges is of particular interest, because it will give an indication of
their abilities to carve out market niches and aract traders. As such, of primary
interest is the overall allocative eﬃciency of the entire system.
Recall from Chapter 2 that an allocation, i.e., a set of agents each
possessing—in this case—either some cash or a resource, is said to be eﬃcient iﬀ
the total utility of all agents is maximised. In practice, double-auction allocations
are oen not eﬃcient; therefore, allocative eﬃciency (AE) is typically deﬁned as a
measure of how close the total utility of an allocation is to the utility that an
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eﬃcient allocation would otherwise generate:
AE = U(Θ)U(Θ) ; (4.30)
where U(Θ) indicates the utility gained from an allocation Θ, and U(Θ) refers to
the utility gained from an eﬃcient allocation Θ, which is, in that sense optimal.
4.5.1 Calculating an allocation’s utility
e total utility U(Θ) gained from an allocation Θ, is simply the sum of all
individual transaction utilities within each market:
U(Θ) =
X
θ2Θ
U(θ) (4.31)
For each transaction θ, its utility u(θ) is dependent only on the total gain in
utility from the buyer and seller trading with each other. While both the buyer
and seller may incur registration, transaction or commission fees, which must be
paid to the exchange that generated the transaction, the total utility of all agents
involved in a transaction is only dependent on the private valuation of the buyer
and cost to the seller involved.
u(θ) = Pbi(θπ; θτ; cbi) + Psj(θπ; θτ; csj) +
X
c2cbi+csj
c
= υbi(θπ)  θτ  
X
c2cbi
c+ θτ   csj(θπ) 
X
c2csj
c+
X
c2cbi+csj
c
= υbi(θπ)  csj(θπ); (4.32)
where:
bi = θb
sj = θs
mk = θm;
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andPc2cbi+csj c is the total revenue the market-exchange would receive from the
transaction in charges and fees levied on the two traders. Because the overall
transaction utility considers both the traders and the exchange, the utility
measure reduces down to the diﬀerence between the buyer’s valuation for the
transacted resource θπ , and the seller’s production cost. Measuring the total
utility U(Θ) of an allocation is straightforward, but calculating U(Θ) requires
knowledge of an eﬃcient allocation Θ, which involves solving the following
optimisation problem to ﬁnd the set of optimal transactions θ 2 Θ.
argmax
(Θ)
X
θ2Θ
υbi(θπ)  csj(θπ); (4.33)
where,
bi = θb
sj = θs
In terms of single-aribute fungible resources, which are resources where only
price inﬂuences preferences over them, as Phelps [137, pp. 17–19] notes, the
problem is simple to solve. One only need know the private values of both the
buyers and sellers in the auction, since there is only one type of resource that
could be exchanged between each buyer and seller; thus a trader’s valuation or
cost is always equivalent to its limit price.
υbi = λbi
csj = λsj
Brieﬂy, to ﬁnd the optimal allocation for a single-aribute resource case, buyer
valuations are ﬁrst sorted in descending order. Let Λb = fλb1 ; λb2 ; : : : ; λbng be the
multi-set of all buyer valuations where:
8ij i < j =) λbi  λbj
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Sorting the set of seller valuations in ascending order, let Λs = fλs1 ; λs2 ; : : : ; λsng
be the multi-set of all seller valuations where:
8ij i < j =) λsi  λsj
Finally, by iterating through Λb and Λs, each of the transactions that belong in
the optimal transaction set can be indicated by λbi  λsi . However, the model
developed within this chapter is for complex multi-aribute resources, where
optimally allocating a resource from a provider to a consumer involves working
out the optimal type of resource, as well as assessing cost and value. us, the
method above deﬁned for solving the optimisation problem in Equation 4.33,
cannot be used to ﬁnd the optimal allocation for an instance of this resource
allocation model.
4.5.2 e Hungarian Algorithm for assignment problems
e Hungarian Algorithm [90, 110] is a remarkable algorithm for ﬁnding
solutions to what are classically known as assignment problems. According to
Burkard et al., assignment problems “: : :deal with the question of how to assign n
items (jobs, students) to n other items (machines, task).” [21, p. 1], such that some
overall payoﬀ (cost) metric is maximised (or minimised), and traditionally were of
interest to operations researchers looking to improve the eﬃciencies or
performance of various systems. Assigning members from two sets to each other
in an optimal way is identical to the problem faced when determining an optimal
allocation of resources between a set of buyers and sellers; more formally:
Deﬁnition 4.1. (Optimal Allocation Problem): Let U be a B-by-S utility matrix,
and let uij = u(θ) be the total utility from a transaction θ between buyer i 2 B
and seller j 2 S , over some resource π. A set of elements (transactions) in the
utility matrix U are said to be independent if no two of them lie on the same row
or column. e problem is to choose a set of n independent transactions from U,
so that the sum of their utilities are maximum.
114
4.5. AN ALGORITHM FOR MEASURING ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
Informally, buyers and sellers can only take part in at most one transaction, and
the aim is to ﬁnd the set of transactions, i.e., the transaction set Θ, for which
total utility U(Θ) is maximised. e original Hungarian Algorithm usually
expected the matrix size to be m-by-m, but Munkres [110] provides an
implementation of the algorithm for non-square matrices. e algorithm itself is
strongly polynomial, with a worst case complexity of Ο(n3), where
n = max(jBj; jSj). Gerkey [64] (originally Winston [182]) provides a particularly
succinct explanation of how the algorithm progresses:
Algorithm 4.2e Hungarian Algorithm
(1) Construct the reduced cost matrix by subtracting from each element the min-
imum element in its row and the minimum element in its column.
(2) Find the minimum number of horizontal and vertical lines required to cover
all the zeros in the reduced cost matrix. If n lines are required, then an optimal
assignment is available in the covered zeros. If fewer than n lines are required,
go to Step 3.
(3) Find the smallest nonzero uncovered element in the reduced cost matrix.
Subtract that value from each uncovered element of the reduced cost matrix
and add it to each twice-covered element in the reduced cost matrix. Go to Step
2.
Gerkey [64, pp. 20–21]
A more formal and precise description of the Hungarian Algorithm can be found
in Munkres [110].
4.5.3 Multi-attribute resource assignment problems
e Hungarian Algorithm ﬁnds a bijection of two sets that maximises (minimises)
the overall sum of payoﬀs (costs) for the matrix formed from the two sets. For
solving the Optimal Allocation Problem the utility matrix U needs to be populated
with transaction utilities uij = υbi(π)  csj(π). However, this is non-trivial because
of the multi-aribute nature of both the buyer and seller’s valuation and cost
functions. As observed from the trader payoﬀ examples in Section 4.2.3, each
115
CHAPTER 4. A MODEL FOR COMPUTATIONAL MULTI-ATTRIBUTE RESOURCE
ALLOCATION
resource type can provide diﬀerent levels of overall utility when exchanged. us,
given a population of traders, in order to populate U and calculate the optimal
allocation, the aribute-levels of the optimum resource that could be traded
between each buyer and seller must be determined.
Deﬁnition 4.2. (Optimal Attribute-levels for a Traded Resource Problem):
Given a buyer bi 2 B and a seller sj 2 S , ﬁnd the vector of aribute-levels that
describe the resource π, that when exchanged between bi and sj maximises the
total utility over bi and sj.
is problem is equivalent to the following optimisation problem:
ubi;sj = argmax
π
fυbi(π)  csj(π)g; (4.34)
where π is the optimal type of resource that could be exchanged.
Optimal allocation problem solution
Other multi-aribute or combinatorial optimisation problems [125, 13], which
oen have complex non-linear dependencies between item aributes from
diﬀerent traders, or over bundles of diﬀerent items, thus making the problems
NP . However, because it is assumed agents within this model only have linear
dependencies between aribute-levels and valuations (costs), and also that the
aributes are utility independent of each other, it is possible to use a greedy
method to calculate a solution to the optimal aribute-levels for a traded resource
problem. Recall from Equation 4.1, a resource π is made up of a vector of n
aributes:
π = hπ1; π2; : : : ; πni ;
where πl 2 [0; 1] is the aribute-level of the l ᵗʰ aribute. Further, recall a buyer’s
multi-aribute valuation function from Equation 4.7 is deﬁned as:
υbi(π) = λbi
" nX
l=1
wbil ubi(πl)
#

nY
l=1
δ(πl):
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Let us assume, in a simple case, that the buyer has no minimum or maximum
constraints: 8l; rbil = 0:0; rbil = 1:0; the ubi and δ(πl) terms become unity, and the
valuation function reduces to:
υbi(π) = λbi
nX
l=1
wbij πl (4.35)
Assuming the same logic for a seller’s cost function csj(π) (Equation 4.10), the
overall utility of a transaction between the buyer and seller becomes:
ubi;sj = λbi
" nX
l=1
wbil πl
#
  λsj
" nX
l=1
wsjl πj
#
=
nX
l=1
λbi  wbil  πl   λsj  wsjl  πl (4.36)
Based on this analysis, and knowing that 8l, λbiwbil  0 and λSjwsjl  0, solving the
optimisation problem in Equation 4.34 is merely a maer of either maximising or
minimising each aribute-level πl 2 π, depending on the limit prices and
preferences in Equation 4.36. Importantly though, trader aribute constraints
should be respected:
8πl2π; πl 2 [rbil ;min(rbil ; r
sj
l)]
at is, the aribute-level cannot be below the buyer’s minimum constraints or
above the seller’s maximum constraints, and there is no value in exceeding the
buyer’s maximum constraints. Given these constraints, it is possible to ﬁnd π by
ﬁnding the optimal level πl of each aribute:
8πl 2π ; πl =
8>><>>:
min(rbil ; r
sj
l) if (λbiwbia )  (λsjw
sj
a)  0
rbil otherwise.
(4.37)
Intuitively, if the buyer gets more value out of a given increase in an
aribute-level than it costs the seller to produce said increase, maximise the
aribute within constraints. If the cost to the seller is larger than the increase in
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buyer value, then minimise the aribute level. Finally, the OMRA algorithm, for
ﬁnding the total utility U(Θ) of the optimal allocation Θ, within our
multi-aribute market-based system is presented in Algorithm 4.3.
Algorithm 4.3 Optimal Multi-aribute Resource Allocation (OMRA) Algorithm
1: Create a utility matrix U of size B-by-S .
2:
3: for all bi 2 B do
4: for all sj 2 S do
5: for all πl 2 π do {ﬁnd optimal resource π  π for bi and sj}
6: πl  π {set the aribute to the optimal level}
7: end for
8: ubi;sj  max(υbi(π)  csj(π); 0) {ensure ubi;sj non-negative}
9: end for
10: end for
11:
12: Run Hungarian Algorithm on utility matrix U.
4.6 Conclusions and Discussion
is chapter has introduced a novel model for allocating multi-aribute
computational resources via competing marketplaces. Traders choose to trade in
the markets for resources that most satisfy their preferences and constraints,
while marketplaces choose what type of resource should be traded within their
markets. is model of resource allocation is novel because it is the ﬁrst to
explicitly consider the allocation of multi-aribute resources via multiple double
auction marketplaces. Developing such a model required developing several new
behaviour models and algorithms not considered within the literature;
speciﬁcally:
• Previous approaches to modelling how traders value multi-aribute
resources [11, 163] oen consider only additive value functions [47], where
the utility of an aribute cannot aﬀect any other. is is not representative
of the type of preferences and constraints computational consumers might
have, thus new decision-making behaviours were developed in this chapter
inspired by marketing models grounded in consumer theory.
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• As well as being able to value multi-aribute computational resources,
traders are also able to integrate charges and fees into their bidding
strategies.
• Given the multi-aribute resource trader valuation models, there are no
previous approaches for explicitly calculating the optimal allocation of
resources between traders. is chapter provided such an algorithm.
Within this chapter, by considering two-aribute computational resources,
visualisations of buyer valuation, seller cost, and total transaction surplus, for
diﬀerent types of resource, demonstrated that outcomes of interactions between
traders can be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the resource traded. is highlights the
most immediate challenge that needs to be tackled in order for this approach to
be feasible, and demonstrable:
• In order for eﬃcient allocations to be achieved using this approach, traders
must be able to trade the resources that most match their preferences and
constraints, thus market-exchanges require strategies that allow them to
autonomously locate the market nies in the aribute-level space that most
satisfy traders. is challenge is tackled in Chapter 5.
Overall, the contributions of this chapter are:
• A model of resource allocation for multi-aribute computational resources
via competing double-auction marketplaces;
• Decision-making models for buyers and sellers based on multi-aribute
utility functions and grounded in modern consumer theory;
• Visualisations highlighting the impact that trader preferences and
constraints have on the transaction outcomes of diﬀerent resource types;
• An extension to previous market-selection strategies [118, 24] using
consideration sets, which allow traders to avoid inept resources, and select
the most appropriate market to join;
• An algorithm for calculating the total utility of a system of traders with
potentially diﬀerent preferences and constraints, which can be used in
future chapters to measure the allocative eﬃciency of the approach.
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Finally, it is not within the scope of this thesis to directly compare this model
with other approaches to multi-aribute resource allocation. is is because the
usefulness of resource allocation approaches depends on the the objectives the
system designer is trying to meet, e.g., eﬃciency, robustness, scaleability. us, it
is hard to compare this approach to, say, a single centralised multi-aribute
auction approach [13] or a fully decentralised CATALAXY approach [3]; however,
future work will consider multi-objective methods for at least identifying
approaches that may empirically dominate others on all considered objectives.
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In Chapter 4, a model of multi-aribute resource allocation via competing
marketplaces was proposed and formally developed. e approach proposed is,
rather than allocating complex computational multi-aribute resources via a
single centralised mechanism (computationally complex, and potentially brile)
or using fully decentralised approaches (oen requiring complex negotiating
strategies), resources could be allocated via distributed markets, using
double-auction mechanisms run by market-exchange agents. is chapter
considers, for the ﬁrst time, the automatic market niing problem, where
market-exchanges must autonomously select the types of resources that should be
traded within their market in the presence of other competing and coadapting
competitors aempting to do the same. Using two reinforcement learning
approaches, several algorithms, called aribute-level selection (ALS) strategies, are
considered for dealing with the problem. Encouraged by the results from the
application of the methodology presented in Chapter 3, which suggested market
mechanisms can be brile, or obversely robust, to diﬀerent environmental
factors, by applying the same methodology, the performance of the aribute-level
selection strategies are empirically assessed in a variety of representative
marketplace environmental contexts in a bid to learn more about their general
ability.
e main contributions of this chapter are: (i) to provide the ﬁrst clear
description of the automatic market niching problem, and propose several
candidate aribute-level selection strategies for tackling it, based on n-armed
bandit and evolutionary optimisation approaches; (ii) to identify, via a
comprehensive computational study involving some 18,300 separate simulations,
which environmental factors inﬂuence the performance of diﬀerent
aribute-level selection strategies on the automatic market niching problem; and
(iii) to demonstrate that in bilateral simulations, competing market-exchanges can
self-organise and cover all market-niches within an environment, leading to
desirable resource allocations. Although this chapter does not fully answer the
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question of which is the best aribute-level selection strategy in general, it makes
a signiﬁcant step forwards towards understanding how the performance of
diﬀerent aribute-level selection strategies are aﬀected by various environmental
factors, which enables the suitability of reinforcement learning approaches to be
clearly studied, in this newly formulated problem.
e outline of the rest of this chapter is as follows. In Section 5.1, the
speciﬁc work undertaken within this chapter is more clearly motivated, the
automatic market niing problem is formulated, and speciﬁc research questions
are posed. In Section 5.2 two approaches for tackling the automatic market
niching problem are proposed, and six candidate aribute-level selection strategies
are deﬁned. Applying the methodology developed in Chapter 3, representative
environmental contexts are deﬁned in Section 5.3, by considering representative
trader preferences and constraints as well as market-exchange charging schemes.
In Section 5.4 the ability of aribute-level selection strategies to ﬁnd market
niches is empirically assessed, while work in Section 5.5 focusses on emergent
properties of the niching process between competing marketplaces in multi-niche
environments. Finally, the chapter is concluded and a brief discussion is provided
in Section 5.6.
5.1 Motivation
e model in Chapter 4 proposes that market-exchanges can specify which type
of resource should be traded within their market, and resources can be allocated
in each market using a computationally eﬃcient continuous double auction
mechanism. A signiﬁcant question le unanswered from Chapter 4 is how
market-exchange agents should best select which types of resources should be
traded within their markets. e strategy used to make those decisions—an
aribute-level selection strategy—will signiﬁcantly aﬀect the utility, i.e., proﬁts, of
the market-exchange agents, which are a function of volume of traders joining
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and trading within their markets.
Real-world decisions over which multi-aribute resources to provide a
market for, e.g., in Options and Futures market, or virtual machines instances in
Amazon’sWeb Services portal [2], are made by experienced human experts, who
are usually fully aware of, or able to accurately estimate, supply and demand
schedules. However, market-exchange agents must make these decisions
autonomously, without human intervention. us, a detailed understanding of the
diﬀerent potential aribute-level selection strategies is important, particularly if
one seeks to eventually automate the design of complete market mechanisms for
this type of resource allocation.
5.1.1 Automatic market niing
In essence, the automatic market niing problem can be summarised as follows.
At the beginning of each trading day, a market-exchange must deﬁne the type of
multi-aribute resource that can be traded within its single market. Recall, a
resource π is described over a vector of n individual aributes:
π = hπ1; π2; : : : ; πni
where πj 2 R0 is the level of the j ᵗʰ aribute. Market-exchanges deﬁne the
resource to be traded in their market by seing each of the aribute-levels using
an aribute-level selection strategy; their decision is then made available to all
traders in the environment.
Traders, being expected utility maximisers, prefer markets where the
resources being traded, i.e., the aribute-levels of the chosen resource, best align
with their preferences and constraints. A reasonable assumption is that while
traders’ preferences and constraints can be unique, cohorts of traders exist within
market segments [89, p. 73]. Diﬀerent market segments prefer to trade diﬀerent
resources, and a natural consequence of competitive traders is that they will
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migrate to markets that satisfy their segment. Market-exchanges, also being
expected utility maximisers, therefore need to identify resource types i.e., vectors
of aribute-levels, that satisfy market segments. e process of discovering these
segments is called market niing, and the product or service that satisﬁes a
market segment is called a market nie. us, the automatic market niching
problem is one of ﬁnding market niches via searching the aribute-level space for
vectors of aributes that form resource which satisfy a market segment.
e main research challenge is to take this problem of ﬁnding
market-niches, frame it in a way that allows market-exchange agents to tackle it,
and develop suitable aribute-level selection strategies. However, this is
challenging for a number of reasons:
1. In realistic scenarios, trader preferences and constraints, and thus market
niches, are unknown a priori; they must be learnt over time, but they are
also a moving target, because they can change;
2. At any time, one can associate each point in the aribute-level space with
an expected reward, yet the mapping between a point in the aribute-level
space and a daily proﬁt, i.e., the ﬁtness function, changes over time:
(a) because the traders’ preferences and constraints may change over
time;
(b) because competing market-exchanges may advertise diﬀerent or
identical aribute-levels, which may change the number and type of
trader an exchange could aract with its current aribute-levels;
3. ere is an exploration versus exploitation problem between trying new
points in aribute-level space and selecting the best found so far
[99, 72, 164];
4. Depending on how the environment—the trader population, other
competing market-exchanges, and how the traders are charged—changes,
some mechanisms that do well in one environment may not generalise well
to other unknown environments.
It is very unlikely that a single algorithm, in the form of an aribute-level
selection strategy, would be best over all environments, because the environment
is complex, adaptive, and coevolving. us, in reality there are two learning
processes going on: a population of exchanges competing and learning which
125
CHAPTER 5. MECHANISMS FOR MARKET NICHING
types of resources to oﬀer in their markets, and a population of traders competing
over resource by learning which markets to join. However, progress can be made
on this problem by identifying what impacts diﬀerent environmental factors have
on market niching algorithms, and speciﬁcally what approaches work well and
why.
5.1.2 Resear questions
On such a novel problem, with a solution needing to satisfy many clear
challenges, it is not possible to initially tackle the ultimate problem of what is the
best algorithm to solve the market niching problem. Aer all, it encompasses
many aspects of decision theory [138], agent-based computational economics
[167, 91], and online machine learning [178], all with many open questions. is
chapter makes an initial start on this novel problem by working towards
answering the following research questions:
• How are candidate aribute-level selection strategies’ performance properties
aﬀected across diﬀerent environmental situations, and can any be seen to
generalise across all the environments?
• What impact do diﬀerent environmental situations have on competing
aribute-level strategies’ abilities to ﬁnd market nies in multi-nie
environments?
5.2 Attribute-level Selection Strategies
Aribute-level selection strategies provide market-exchange agents with a
mechanism for automatically selecting the levels of the aributes of the resources
that are traded in their markets. Diﬀerent levels of resources, i.e., diﬀerent points
in the aribute-level space, will aﬀect how aractive an exchange’s market is to
traders, and thus the exchange’s ability to generate revenue from charges and
fees.
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Assuming a population of traders with potentially diﬀerent preferences and
constraints over resource aributes, it is likely that certain points in the
aribute-space will correlate with market nies. at is, diﬀerent segments of the
trading population would prefer to trade diﬀerent types of resources. Satisfying
these market niches by providing markets for trading the most desired resources
will increase the allocative eﬃciency of the system, indicating overall higher
proﬁts for traders, which in turn means more revenue for market-exchanges.
Similarly to traders having to make decisions over joining multiple
market-exchanges, market-exchanges face a tradeoﬀ between exploration and
exploitation. ey must balance exploring the aribute-level space, by regularly
changing the type of resource they oﬀer in their market, with exploiting the best
resource type found so far.
Given the environment is dynamic and coevolving—because of other
market-exchanges’ decisions, and trading agents’ learning—the typical revenue
generated from tradersanges over time, and market-exchanges must constantly
explore the aribute-level space to identify the most lucrative types of resource
to be traded in their markets. With that in mind, it is proposed that in general,
aribute-level selection strategies follow Algorithm 5.1. In essence,
Algorithm 5.1e general aribute-level selection strategy algorithm
1: Choose appropriate evaluation period length `.
2: for all trading days t do
3: if t mod ` == 0 then {end of evaluation period η}
4: Qπi  br ηπi=` {record mean evaluation period reward.}
5: πi  πj {select new resource type πj (according to strategy).}
6: η η + 1 {next evaluation period.}
7: else
8: br η  br η + rt {update evaluation period reward with daily reward.}
9: end if
10: end for
aribute-level selection strategies evaluate a resource type for a number of days,
called an evaluation period. Once the evaluation period is ﬁnished, the reward in
terms of the mean daily market proﬁt over the period, is recorded, and a new
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resource type chosen through the selection of new aribute-levels. us, the
evaluation period is used to dampen any oscillations in daily market proﬁts due
to the dynamic nature of the environment. In all simulations within this chapter
` = 10, though values between 5–15 seemed to work equally well.
5.2.1 Attribute-level selection as a bandit problem
e problem of choosing optimal aribute-levels for two aribute resources can
be framed as a multi-armed bandit problem (MAB) [9]. A MAB models a world
where an agent chooses from a ﬁnite set of possible actions (levers on a bandit
slot machine), and executing each action results in a reward for the agent
(winnings from pulling the lever). In the MAB problem formulation, rewards for
actions are distributed according to real probability distributions [164], and each
action has a distribution associated with it.
In the simplest MAB problem, the distributions associated with each lever
do not change over time [142], while some versions of the problem allow the
distribution associated with an action to change when that action is chosen, or
even allow new actions to become available over time [177]; in such a case, the
environmental state the agent ﬁnds itself in, changes. However, what sets the
aribute-level selection problem apart from these situations is that not only can
the reward distributions of chosen actions change every time an action is
executed, but the reward distributions of unosen actions can, too. is means,
for example, that an action with seemingly poor rewards over some time horizon
may in fact turn out to have excellent rewards during some future time horizon.
In the literature, bandit problems such as these are oen referred to as Restless
Bandit Problems [178].
Framing the aribute-level selection problem in this way assumes each of
the resource aributes have n discrete levels, which is not a strong assumption
given current real-world utility computing providers, such as Amazon Web
Services [2], only provide a relatively small selection of the most popular
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computational resource types. For this model, it is assumed each resource
aribute πj can take n = 5 distinct levels:
8πj2π πj 2 f0:2; 0:4; 0:6; 0:8; 1:0g (5.1)
A non-zero minimum level is chosen because in reality, most if not all
computational resources need at least some level of each aribute to be desirable.
Given q aributes, there are nq = 25 possible two-aribute resource types. Each
market-exchange mk’s aribute-level selection strategy maintains an action set Π
of all possible actions,
Π = fπ1; π2; : : : ; πqng (5.2)
us, each action represents a type of resource, which is a vector of
aribute-levels, and therefore a single point in the aribute-level space. Each
market-exchange mk’s ALS strategy maintains a reward set Qmk :
Qmk =
D
Qmkπ1 ;Q
mk
π1 ; : : : ;Q
mk
πqn
E
(5.3)
where Qmkπi would be the historical reward associated with action πi. Next, some
MAB-based aribute-level selection strategies are discussed to help choose
between actions.
ε-greedy strategy
ε-greedy is one of the most widely studied and earliest used bandit strategies [164,
p. 28]. It is called a semi-uniform strategy because it explores all actions with
equal probability. ε-greedy is one of the simplest bandit strategies, and uses a
single parameter, ε 2 [0; 1:0], to represent the probability of choosing a random
action, i.e., exploring. e strategy behaves in an exploitative way, and chooses
the action with the best historical reward, with probability 1  ε.
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ε-decreasing strategy
While ε-greedy has a static ε, i.e., one that does not change while the strategy is in
use, the ε-decreasing [164] strategy adjusts its value for ε over time according to a
predetermined schedule, based on a parameter δ 2 [0;+1). For a time t, ε is
determined by:
εt = min(δt ; 1) (5.4)
ε-decreasing is also a semi-uniform strategy. Typically, δ is set such that the
resulting εt from Equation 5.4 is initially large, resulting in very explorative
behaviour, but eventually very exploitative behaviour.
Somax strategy
Semi-uniform strategies, when exploring, choose actions with historically bad
rewards as oen as any other. is can be detrimental when the worst actions are
very bad. e Somax [164, p. 30] bandit strategy aempts to avoid these very bad
actions by choosing all actions with probability proportional to their historical
rewards. Typically, Gibbs or Boltzmann distributions [62, p. 3] are used for
probability distributions. An action πi is selected with probability ψπi , where:
ψπi =
eQ
mkπi =τ
jQjX
j=1
eQ
mkπj =τ
; (5.5)
where Qmkπi refers to the mk’s historical reward for action πi. Probabilities are
normalised across the entire reward set Q. e temperature τ shapes the
distribution; when a relatively high temperature is chosen, all actions are chosen
with approximately equal probability, while a low temperature causes a greater
gap in the probabilities of choosing diﬀerent actions. At the limit τ ! 0, Somax
becomes a purely greedy strategy [164, p. 30.].
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Rank-based strategy
e Rank-based strategy is a novel strategy inspired by the rank selection genetic
operator oen used to maintain diversity in genetic algorithms [107, pp. 169–170].
Like Somax, the probability of choosing an action is proportional to its historical
rewards, however, the probability of choosing it is independent of the
quantitative value of the historical reward, only its performance rank, relative to
the others. us, in the case of action πi, the probability ψi of it being chosen is:
ψi =
rank(πi)ς
nX
j=1
rank(πj)ς
; (5.6)
where ς, the selection pressure, again controls the tradeoﬀ between exploration
and exploitation. e function rank(πi) outputs the rank of action πi based upon
its historical reward Qmkπi ; the action with the best historical reward is ranked jQj,
while the action with the lowest ranked 1.
Rewards in non-static environments
e aribute-level selection problem is a non-stationary problem, because many
agents, through interactions over time, are learning and adapting their behaviour.
erefore, it is important that the rewards Q 2 Q associated with the resource
types π 2 Π, i.e., the actions, are updated appropriately. Using the same approach
traders take when updating their market-selection signals, a market-exchange mk
can update the reward Qmkπi for action πi in the next time-step t+ 1, can be done
as follows:
Qmkπi (t+ 1) = Qmkπi (t)  δ

rtπi   Qmkπi (t)
 (5.7)
where rtπi is instantaneous reward that the action returned in time-step t; in this
model, that equates to the proﬁt the market-exchange made on trading day t.
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5.2.2 Attribute-level selection as an optimisation problem
Reducing the number of possible resources an ALS strategy can choose from,
through discretising the aribute-level space, can be useful for eﬀective
exploration. However, a possible disadvantage to this discretisation process is
that if there is a relationship between points in the aribute-level space, and the
rewards that those points provide, bandit strategies cannot leverage this, because
they do not consider the relationship between actions in the aribute-level space.
Evolutionary optimisation algorithms [187] work on the principle that
improving solutions are oen found close by, so algorithms tend to search in and
around neighbouring points in the space; this is oen appropriate if the ﬁtness
function being optimised is continuous. However, the more discrete the ﬁtness
landscape is, the more chance there is of encountering local optima, in which case
meta-heuristic algorithms can get stuck [42].
Recall the two-aribute resource visualisations in Section 4.2.3 on Page 91.
Within these visualisation there is certainly a relationship between some
neighbouring points in the aribute-level space and the total utility of the
transactions over the resource described by those aributes-levels. us, the
aribute-level selection problem can be framed as an optimisation problem by
re-deﬁning the set Π of possible resource types to be vectors of real-value
aribute-levels.
Π = fπ : 8πj2π; πj 2 R0g (5.8)
erefore, resource types can be treated as potential solutions, proposed by a
evolutionary optimisation algorithm. In terms of the general aribute-level
selection strategy algorithm (Algorithm 5.1), the evaluation period η’s rewardbr ηπi ,
for selecting resource πi, becomes the ﬁtness assigned to the solution πi.
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1+1 ES
e 1+1 ES, or 1+1 Evolutionary Strategy [10], is a very simple evolutionary
algorithm, which harnesses the ideas of adaptation and evolution. It has a
population size of two, consisting of the current best individual (the parent), and
a candidate next solution (the oﬀspring). Each individual represents a resource
type π in the form of a vector of two aribute-levels where, maintaining the same
range as for the bandit approach, 8πj2π; πj 2 [0:2; 1:0]. When this aribute-level
selection strategy is used, a new oﬀspring individual πo is generated each
evaluation period using a mutated copy of the the parent πp. Mutation is carried
out through perturbing each aribute-level πj 2 πp by a value drawn from the
Gaussian distribution N(πj; σ), where σ is the standard deviation. e oﬀspring is
used as the resource type for the exchange’s market during the next evaluation
period, and if its ﬁtness is larger than the parent’s, it becomes the new parent:
πp  πo () br ηπo > br η 1πp (5.9)
wherebr ηπo is the reward, or ﬁtness, that the oﬀspring resource πo got in evaluation
period η, andbr η 1πp is the ﬁtness of the parent resource πp as of the previous
evaluation period η   1.
Evolutionary Algorithm (EA)
An EA, or Evolutionary Algorithm is a broad term for a family of population-based
evolutionary optimisation algorithms. Unlike the the 1+1 ES, it is assumed the EA
algorithm maintains a population size of greater than two individuals at all times.
e most popular type of population based evolutionary algorithm, the genetic
algorithm, can use a variety of diﬀerent genetic operators to control how the
algorithm evaluates, selects, and reproduces individuals.
Within this chapter, tournament selection [105] is used to decide which
members of the population are combined to form new oﬀspring solutions. e
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selection technique is steady-state because the algorithm can search the solution
space without having to evaluate the entire population before proceeding. For
this strategy, k = 3 individuals are randomly selected from the population, and
evaluated over three consecutive evaluation periods η; η + 1; η + 2, by deploying
them as the resource type for the exchange’s market. From the k individuals, the
two with the highest evaluation period rewards, i.e., ﬁtness, are recombined using
mutation and cross-over genetic operators [42, p. 300] to create two new oﬀspring
solutions. e weakest of the k individuals is replaced by one of the oﬀspring
individuals (selected with uniform probability).
5.3 Deﬁning Environmental Contexts
e results of Chapter 3 showed that in general, the performance of market
mechanisms can be sensitive to a number of environmental factors, and thus
market mechanisms can be seen to be robust (or obversely, brile) to diﬀerent
environments. Chapter 3’s results were aained by using a methodology for
empirically assessing the generalisation properties of the market mechanisms, via
simulations using a curated set of environmental contexts. e principal
approach of the methodology is to identify the main building blocks of the
environment—the notions that deﬁne the environment—and generate a set of
representative environments, from these.
Within this chapter, the same methodology is applied so that the
performance and impact of various aribute-level selection strategies can be
empirically analysed. e model of resource allocation considered within this
thesis assumes an environment deﬁned in three ways: (i) by the general makeup
of the trading population, particularly in terms of their preferences and
constraints over resources; (ii) by the charging schemes used by the
market-exchanges, which aﬀects the behaviour of traders within the trading
population; and (iii) both the presence of, and the strategies in use by, competing
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market-exchanges. Each of these individual contexts aﬀect and change the overall
environmental context.
5.3.1 Representative trader contexts
Within this section several trader contexts are proposed, which are deﬁned by a
population of traders, each with potentially diﬀerent preferences and constraints
over the aributes of multi-aribute resources. ere are clearly many possible
ways of conﬁguring the parameters of a population of trading agents, so it is
sensible to consider a reduced but representative set for simulations. e
methodology from Chapter 3 proposed a sensible way of reducing the number of
possible contexts by only considering boundary or extreme variations; for
example, trader mixes were typically deﬁned by the presence or absence of only
one type of trading strategy, rather than medial mixes of diﬀerent strategies.
Because this is an initial study into the performance and impact of
aribute-level selection strategies, aention is restricted to trader contexts that
have well-deﬁned niches, due to them being easier to ﬁnd. As discussed in
Section 5.1.1, a market niche is well-deﬁned when there exists a signiﬁcant
proportion of traders that all share similar preferences and constraints, and thus
prefer to trade within the same market. Further, in order to beer understand the
impact that constraints and preferences have on the performance of
aribute-level selection strategies, they are separated into diﬀerent contexts. e
proposed representative niches are now described.
‘Unconstrained single nie’ trader context
e unconstrained single nie trader context is deﬁned by the simplest possible
population of traders, held in the set T US. Each trader ai 2 T US has the following
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preferences and constraints:
8ai 2 T US;
wai= h0:5; 0:5i
rai = h1:0; 1:0i
8ai 2 B \ T US;
rai = h0:2; 0:2i
8ai 2 S \ T US;
rai = h0:0; 0:0i (5.10)
us, neither buyers or sellers have any maximum constraints over aributes, and
buyers only have minimal minimum constraints. Figure 5.1 shows a visualisation
of the maximum theoretical utility (in terms of total daily proﬁt) for a random
instance of this trader context, calculated by using the optimal multi-aribute
resource allocation algorithm, ﬁrst presented in Chapter 4. Because there is only a
single well-deﬁned market niche, in a two market-exchange environment both
exchanges would most likely have to compete over it for traders. Cai et al. [23], for
example, have observed in other domains, that competitive traders will migrate in
groups to the most proﬁtable markets. In this system, given two identical markets
sharing a single niche, it is likely the traders will all eventually migrate to a single
market, because the increased liquidity from all being in one market increases
expected proﬁts. us, it is likely that aribute-level selection strategies that can
quickly locate the niche may end up performing beer in bilateral simulations.
‘Constrained single nie’ trader context
e constrained single nie trader context is deﬁned by a population of traders,
held in the set T CS. Each trader ai 2 T CS has the following preferences and
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Figure 5.1: Maximum theoretical daily total trader proﬁt for a randomly generated
unconstrained single nie trader context. Given the lack of preferences and max-
imum constraints, each trader ai 2 T US would prefer to trade in a market where
π = h1:0; 1:0i is the type of resource being traded. us, there is a single well-
deﬁned market niche within the aribute-space, at point h1:0; 1:0i.
constraints:
8ai 2 T CS;
wai= h0:5; 0:5i
8ai 2 B \ T CS;
rai = h0:2; 0:2i
rai = h0:6; 0:6i
8ai 2 S \ T CS;
rai = h0:0; 0:0i
rai = h1:0; 1:0i (5.11)
As shown in Figure 5.2, the trader context also has a single market niche, but the
buyers within the population have maximum constraints resource aributes.
us, while buyers can trade with sellers for resources comprising aribute above
their maximum constraints, the total utility decreases more as constraints are
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Figure 5.2: Maximum theoretical daily total trader proﬁt for a randomly generated
constrained single nie trader context. Each buyer ai 2 B \ T CS would prefer to
trade in a market where π = h 0:6; 0:6i is the type of resource being traded. Be-
cause sellers’ production costs increase with aribute-levels, the total utility from
a transaction typically decreases as the aribute-levels increase. us, total trader
utility (in terms of proﬁt) is maximised at the single point when resources being
traded are of the type π = h0:6; 0:6i, indicated the presence of a well-deﬁned niche
at that point.
exceeded, because the buyers receive no extra value and the sellers’ costs
increase. erefore, a single well-deﬁned market niche exists at a point where
buyers are happiest and sellers’ costs are minimised, which in this example is at
the point π = h0:6; 0:6i. In contrast to the unconstrained single niche context,
where traders’ abilities to trade with each other are only aﬀected by their budgets,
traders within this context may ﬁnd that, depending on the type of resource
being traded, their constraints make it harder to successfully trade in the market.
‘Constraint-induced nies’ trader context
e constraint-induced nies trader context is deﬁned by a trading population
T CI that contains two sub-populations of traders, T CI1 and T CI2 . Each trader ai is a
member of exactly one of the sub-populations, thus:
T CI = fai : (ai 2 T CI1 ) (ai 2 T CI2 )g (5.12)
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e two sub-populations are deﬁned as follows. e ﬁrst sub-population, T CI1 ,
contains buyers with preferences and constraints equivalent to those in the
constrained single nie trader context, previously deﬁned in Equation 5.11:
ai 2 B \ T CI1 () ai 2 B \ T CS (5.13)
while the sellers have the following:
8ai 2 S \ T CI1 ;
wai= h0:5; 0:5i
rai = h0:0; 0:0i
rai = h1:0; 1:0i (5.14)
e second sub-population, T CI2 , contains traders with the following preferences
and constraints:
8ai 2 T CI2 ;
wai= h0:5; 0:5i
8ai 2 B \ T CI2 ;
rai = h0:8; 0:8i
rai = h1:0; 1:0i
8ai 2 S \ T CI2 ;
rai = h0:0; 0:0i
rai = h1:0; 1:0i
Within this trader context, the ideal interactions between agents within the two
trader sub-populations, leads to two well-deﬁned market niches. e reader
should note that the relative height of the peaks does not impact on the number
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Figure 5.3: Maximum theoretical daily total trader proﬁt for a randomly generated
constraint-induced nies trader context. Some buyers, ai 2 B \ T CI1 , would prefer
to trade in a market where π = h 0:6; 0:6i is the type of resource being traded.
Other buyers, ai 2 B\T CI2 , would prefer π = h1:0; 1:0i, and would be unwilling to
accept any resource where π = h< 0:8; < 0:8i. Further, some sellers, ai 2 S \ T CI1 ,
can only produce resources where π = h 0:6; 0:6i. is results in a situation
where total trader proﬁts are maximised when the two populations traded within
separate markets: one market for the resource type π = h0:6; 0:6i, and the other
market for the resource type π = h1:0; 1:0i. erefore, there are two well-deﬁned
market niches that market-exchanges could satisfy.
of niches in the environments. For example, suppose that the taller of the two
niches in Figure 5.3 was more than twice the height of the lower niche. Initially
one might expect two market-exchanges to share the taller niche, because half of
the total utility available there is more than that at the lower niche. However,
because traders are able to migrate easily between markets, and a larger single
market is typically more eﬃcient than two separate markets, all the traders will
inevitably migrate to the same exchange. In such a case, the exchange that loses
the traders will be forced to move down to the second lower niche. us, to
satisfy the traders within this trader context requires multiple market-exchanges,
which must provide separate markets for each market niche. While some traders
could feasibly trade resources described by any point in the aribute-space, some
points in the space will be infeasible to many traders.
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‘Preference-induced nies’ trader context
e preference-induced nies trader context is deﬁned by a trading population
T PI that also contains two sub-populations of traders, T PI1 and T PI2 . Again, each
trader ai is a member of exactly one of the sub-populations, thus:
T PI = fai : (ai 2 T PI1 ) (ai 2 T PI2 )g (5.15)
All traders have the following constraints:
8ai 2 T PI; rai = h1:0; 1:0i
8ai 2 B \ T PI; rai = h0:2; 0:2i
8ai 2 S \ T PI; rai = h0:0; 0:0i (5.16)
though both the buyers and sellers of the two sub-populations have diﬀerent
preferences:
8ai 2 T PI1 ; wai= h0:7; 0:3i
8ai 2 T PI2 ; wai= h0:3; 0:7i (5.17)
With a lack of trader constraints within both populations, all resource types
could be considered within traders’ consideration sets. Preferences over the two
resource aributes will mean that, in general, a buyer ai 2 B \ T PI1 would prefer
to trade with a seller ai 2 S \ T PI2 , and vice versa, because the respective sellers
can produce more of the aributes buyers’ prefer, for less cost. e magnitude of
preference weights only aﬀects the height of the niches, rather than their
position, thus the aributes’ values are not as important as their inequality.
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Figure 5.4: Maximum theoretical daily total trader proﬁt for a randomly generated
preference-induced nies trader context. ere are two well-deﬁned niches within
the landscape. At one niche, buyers from sub-population T PI1 , i.e., those who pre-
fer aribute one to aribute two, prefer to trade with sellers from sub-population
T PI2 , because they can provide aribute one for a lower cost than aribute two.e
preferred resource type at this niche is π = h1:0; 0:2i. A second niche exists where
the preferred resource type is π = h0:2; 1:0i. Within this niche, buyers from the
second sub-population T PI2 prefer the second resource aribute, and sellers from
sub-population T PI2 can produce it for less than resource aribute one. Overall
trader proﬁt is maximised when two separate markets exist for the two resource
types speciﬁed. us, the two market niches require at least two market-exchanges
to provide markets.
5.3.2 Possible arging contexts
Market-exchanges are unaware of the market niches a priori, because they do not
have access to the global supply and demand schedules, or the preferences and
constraints of traders. Markets for resource types preferred by market niches are
likely to be more aractive to traders, and lead to larger volumes of trades. us,
while technically an assumption and not guaranteed, satisfying a market niche is
likely to result in increased revenue for market-exchanges. Information
asymmetries between exchanges and traders seed the diﬃculties that
market-exchanges face when aempting to maximise proﬁts through the
selection of the aribute-levels of their market’s resource type.
While an exchange searches for market niches by sampling the
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aribute-level space with its ALS strategy, the revenue received from sampling a
point is inﬂuenced not only by that point’s location, but also by the charging
scheme used to generate that revenue. Further, Figures 5.1–5.4 show total trader
proﬁts at each point, which is private information, and market-exchanges can
only glean that information by learning, using their proﬁt signals. erefore, the
exact charging scheme and fee structure used by an exchange is important, and so
three diﬀerentarging contexts, based on the charging structures deﬁned in
Section 4.1.1 (Page 85), are considered. Rather than using combinations of
diﬀerent charges, which may confound the impact each of the fee types has, they
are isolated.
‘Registration fee’ arging context
e registration fee charging context involves market-exchanges applying only
registration fees to traders who join their markets. Recall that a registration fee is
a ﬂat-fee, i.e., the same level applies to all traders, and it is applied at the
beginning of each trading day. When this charging context is used traders may
end a trading day with a net loss if they are unable to successfully trade. One
potential problem with discovering market niches when this charging context is
in use, is that the maximum revenue available at each point in the aribute-level
space is determined only how many traders would be willing to trade the
resource type at that point. us, revenue from points near market niches may be
the same as revenue from market niches themselves, even though traders would
prefer the market niche rather than points near it.
‘Transaction price fee’ arging context
Unlike the registration fee charging context, when the transaction price fee
charging context is in use, exchanges do not charge traders to join their market.
However, for each trade executed by the market exchange, both traders involved
pay a ﬁxed portion of the transaction price of their trade. erefore, the revenue a
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market-exchange receives when using this context monotonically increases with
the number of trades it is able to execute in its market. Because, in comparison to
other points in the aribute-space, markets occupying market niches are expected
to have a high volume of trades, it is hypothesised that exchanges using this
charging context will be beer able to discover market niches.
‘Bid/Ask spread commission’ arging context
e ﬁnal charging context consider is the bid/ask spread commission charging
context. When this context is in use by exchanges, traders are free to join markets
without cost, however, a portion of the diﬀerence between the trader’s oﬀer into
the market, and the resulting transaction price, is charged by the exchange. e
diﬀerence between a matching buyer and seller’s bid and ask price is known as
the spread. For example, given a bid ρb = 20 and an ask ρa = 10, a
market-exchange, using the k = 0:5 k-pricing policy [150] would set the resulting
transaction price τ = 15. Each trader would then be charged a proportion of the
diﬀerence between their bid: ρb   τ, or ask: τ   ρa.
Typically, the revenue generated from this charging scheme is beer at
points in the aribute-level space where more trades can occur, however, revenue
is also aﬀected by the trading strategy in use by the traders. e more eﬃcient
the traders are in converging on the competitive equilibrium price, the tighter the
spread gets. In a completely eﬃcient market, where all traders were shouting the
equilibrium price, the bid/ask spread commission charging context would generate
no revenue, regardless of whether a market niche was being occupied, because all
oﬀers shouted would be equivalent to the transaction prices.
5.4 Attribute-level Selection Strategy Performance
Within this section, the performance of the aribute-level selection (ALS)
strategies discussed in Section 5.2 is empirically analysed, via simulations using
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instantiations of the environmental contexts proposed in the previous section.
Performance is measured in two ways: (i) a quantitative measure of performance,
based upon the overall proﬁt that a market-exchange can generate using each
ALS strategy; and (ii) a qualitative measure of relative performance, based upon
bilateral rankings. e main overarching research question addressed within this
section is:
How are candidate aribute-level selection strategies’ performance properties
aﬀected across diﬀerent environmental situations, and can any be seen to
generalise across all the environments?
In order to make a step towards answering this question, the most basic of
scenarios that still allowed for meaningful analysis was considered. Speciﬁcally,
by only considering bilateral simulations, where two market-exchanges compete
against each other, it is possible to exhaustively evaluate all representative
environmental contexts, where, from the perspective of a market-exchange using
an ALS strategy, an environmental context consists of: (i) a competing ALS
strategy being used by another market-exchange (competitor context); (ii) a
representative trading context; and (iii) a representative charging context. is
methodology follows in the spirit of the novel methodology ﬁrst presented
Chapter 3 for measuring the generalisation ability of market-mechanisms.
Further, it is noted that bilateral simulation of similar double-auction mechanisms
has been used an approach by other researchers, e.g., Niu et al. [116], to analyse
the sensitivity of each mechanism to the presence of another. Within the analysis
carried out in the rest of this section, speciﬁc aention is given to the following:
• e presence of competing strategies on the performance of ALS strategies;
• e impact of charging context on the performance of ALS strategies;
• e impact of trader context on the performance of ALS strategies.
which will hopefully allow the following hypotheses to be addressed:
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Hypothesis 5.1. It is likely that the performance of ALS strategies will be sensitive
to at least some environmental contexts, because of the complex, adaptive nature of
the system. erefore no strategies will generalise well over all contexts.
Hypothesis 5.2. Ea simulation uses a speciﬁc static environmental context, with
well-deﬁned trader nies and non-adaptive arging semes in place. erefore,
out of the bandit strategies, ε-decreasing should perform the best.
5.4.1 Experimental setup
In order to answer the research questions and hypotheses posed, the following
general experimental setup is used. Firstly, while all ALS strategies (competitor
contexts) and charging contexts are considered, only simulations involving the
unconstrained single nie and constrained single nie trader contexts, are used.
Justiﬁcations for this are as follows: (i) reducing the environmental dynamics
allows for a clearer understanding of how environmental factors impact ALS
strategies; (ii) enforcing competition over a single nie—thus excluding
cooperative equilibria outcomes—makes it clearer to see which ALS strategies can
ﬁnd niches faster and hold on to them. Given this, self-play simulations, where
both exchanges use the same ALS strategy are excluded because, in these cases,
expected performance is identical. e trading population used in each trading
context comprises 300 ZIP traders, as described in Section 4.4.1 (Page 103), and is
composed of an equal number of buyers and sellers. e charging context used is
applied to both market-exchanges and remains in use for all of the simulation,
which allows the impact of both competing ALS strategies and charging context
to be analysed independently of each other.
Each simulation lasts for 5000 trading days. At the beginning of each
trading day both the market-exchanges, in accordance with their ALS strategies,
set the aribute-levels of the resource to be traded within their respective
markets. Traders then join a market and begin to trade. Based upon the charging
scheme in use, each market-exchange generates some revenue, or proﬁt, for that
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trading day, which is used by their ALS strategies to help select the resource type
to be traded the next trading day.
antitative performance measure
Market-exchange mk’s proﬁt is generated at the end of each trading day t
according to Equation 4.2.2 on Page 90. As a measure of performance over an
entire simulation (5000 days), the market-exange simulation proﬁt is used,
which is simply the mean proﬁt generated over all days.
P simmk =
1
n
nX
t=1
rtmk ; (5.18)
where P simmk is mk’s simulation proﬁt for simulation sim, which lasted n trading
days. rtmk refers to the proﬁt mk received on day t.
alitative performance measure
As discussed in Chapter 3, comparing only quantitative performance across
diﬀerent environmental contexts is not always useful, because environmental
changes can unfairly alter aainable proﬁts. One approach to this issue might be
to use a normalised measure of proﬁt, such as the proﬁt share. However,
statistical analysis becomes diﬃcult, as normalising performance in this way
confounds the results. For example, if one strategy is particularly negatively
inﬂuenced by a change in environment, that would automatically inﬂate the score
of any of its opponents, even if they themselves do not strictly perform beer in
the changed environment. Instead, so that the relative performance of ALS
strategies between contexts can be qualitatively compared, the number of
simulation wins is recorded for market-exchanges using each strategy. For
example, given two market-exchanges using diﬀerent ALS strategies, m1 and m2,
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as well as a simulation sim, a ‘win’ is awarded to m1 accordingly:
win(m1;m2; sim) =
8>><>>:
1 if P simm1  P simm2
0 if P simm1 < P simm2 ;
(5.19)
m1 is awarded the win in the event of a draw, but given results are in the form of
real-valued numbers, few is any draws were observed.
5.4.2 Results and analysis
e simulation methodology for the following experiments is as follows. Each
simulation is repeated 50 times, so the mean of the 50 market-exchange
simulation proﬁt values (Equation 5.18) are reported, along with standard
deviation values. A large number of simulation repetitions provides good sample
sizes for running appropriate statistical tests.
e market-based model within this thesis leads to complex interactions
between agents, and it is unwise to assume that data samples will be normally
distributed. To overcome this assumption rigorous statistical analysis is used. To
test for normality, all data samples are subjected to the Lilliefors Test [95], a
goodness of ﬁt test for the Normal distribution. If the null hypothesis of this test
(that the data is normally distributed) is rejected, then all reported test statistics
for that sample are provided by the non-parametricWilcoxon Signed-rank Test
[180]. In the case of normality, equality of sample means is tested using the paired
sample T-Test.
Each simulation used the default parameters in Table 5.1. For each of the 50
simulation repetitions, budget constraints were randomly generated for all
traders, along with a new random seed for the simulation. Given the six ALS
strategies, three charging contexts, and two trader contexts, the next two sections
report and analyse results from some (6  1)2  3 2 = 150 diﬀerent
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Agent Description Parameter Details
Traders
Budget Constraint λai = N(6; 0:7)
Market-Selection Strategy Page 108
Trading Strategy ZIP algorithm details: Page 103
Market-exchanges
Double-Auction Seings Page 100
Charges & Fees (Page 85)
Registration fee, ζregmk = 0:01Transaction tax fee, ζ tramk = 1%Bid/Ask fee, ζcommk = 100%
ε-greedy ALS ε = 0:1
ε-decreasing ALS δ = 15
Somax ALS τ = 0:3
Rank-based ALS ς = 30
1+1 ES ALS σ = 0:12
EA ALS
σ = 0:12
p = 10
Table 5.1: Default parameters used in all simulations unless otherwise stated within
the text. All parameters remain ﬁxed for the duration of each simulation. All pa-
rameters, with the exception of budget constraints remain constant over all simula-
tions. Every simulation, all budget constraints are randomly distributed according
to the Normal distribution speciﬁed, but are bounded within the range λai 2 [2; 10].
Speciﬁc parameter seings were justiﬁed as follows: ε = 0:1 is a common choice,
and empirically found to be near-optimal for generally short numbers of plays [164,
p. 29]; δ = 15 was chosen as it gives ε-decreasing about 1/3 of the simulation’s time
to explore, before almost surely behaving greedily; τ = 0:3 was selected based upon
initial testing using various simulations; ς = 30 was chosen because, based on there
being 25 possible action ranks, it would behave greedily only 75% of the time, but
choose from the best three actions with 95% probability; σ = 0:12 was chosen
for 1+1 ES ALS and EA ALS because it equates to their being 10% of mutating
an aribute by at least much as a bandit strategy changing action does, i.e., 10% of
mutations would be equivalent to a bandit strategy choosing a new action. For the
EA ALS, a population size of 10 was chosen, which gave the best results from some
initial exploratory simulations.
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ε-dec ε-gre EA 1+1 ES Rank Somax
ε-dec 0:346 0.499 0.511 0.466 0.488(316.0) (8:7) (209.0) (5:9) (44:1)
ε-gre 0.447 0.501 0.525 0.496 0.466
(3:5) (12:4) (147.0) (7:2) (38:8)
EA 0.305 0.269 0.350 0.287 0.345(85.0) (54.0) 0:41 (0:8) (33.0) (5:2)
1+1 ES 0.312 0.292 0.312 0.313 0.239(209.0) (147.0) 0.29 (506) 0:02 (2:5) 0:01 (2:7)
Rank 0.372 0.365 0.490 0.215 0.475
( 5:9) ( 7:2) (12:3) 0.03 (413) (11:2)
Somax 0.203 0.177 0.261 0.171 0.293
( 44:1) ( 38:8) ( 5:2) 0:01 ( 2:7) ( 11:2)
Table 5.2: Mean simulation proﬁt over 50 simulation repetitions for market-
exchanges using various ALS strategies, when the environmental context com-
prises the bid/ask spread commission charging and unconstrained single nie trader,
contexts. e top value in each cell are the mean simulation proﬁts for the ALS
strategy in the respective row against the ALS strategy in the respective column.
Emboldened proﬁts indicate they are greater than their competitor’s and they come
from statistically distinct samples. T-values are shown in parentheses under each
proﬁt value; an emphasised t-value indicated the samples were tested using the
non-parametric statistical test. P-values  0:005 are omied, otherwise they are
shown to the le of t-values.
environmental contexts¹.
Unconstrained single nie performance
All simulations within this section involved the unconstrained single nie trader
context. In each simulation, the market-exchanges were competing over a single
population of traders who preferred to trade resources π = h1:0; 1:0i, viz, there
was a single market niche (Figure 5.1). Results are sectioned into three tables
(Tables 5.2–5.4), with each table representing a separate charging context. Values
in each table indicate the mean market-exchange simulation proﬁt from 50
repetitions of the simulation in that cell. Table 5.2 displays results for simulations
that took place when the bid/ask spread commission charging context was used by
¹In order to repeat each simulation 50 times, some 7,500 simulation instances were executed.
Each simulation took between 20–45 minutes of wall-clock time, running on a single core of aad
Core Xeon CPU (2.33Ghz, 8Mb L2 cache) located on a computational grid infrastructure.
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the market-exchanges. Immediately of note is that within this environmental
context, ε-greedy, arguably the simplest of all the aribute-level selection
strategies, outperforms all others. is claim is supported with p-values  0:005
for each statistical test involving ε-greedy. ε-decreasing also performs very well,
signiﬁcantly outperforming all of the other except ε-greedy.
Figure 5.5 provides a closer look at the distribution of proﬁts made by
ε-greedy and ε-decreasing, for all of their simulations against each other. Both
strategies have non-zero lower bounds on their proﬁt, indicating they both
always found proﬁtable parts of the aribute-level space, however, ε-decreasing
ends up closer to the lower bound in the majority of the simulations.
On examination of the market-share—a measure of how many traders were
aracted on average to each market—that each market-exchange using the
strategies achieved over a simulation, the following results are discovered.
ε-greedy achieved a mean market-share of 61:2% 15:3 in all simulations against
ε-decreasing, which only achieved 38:8% 15:3; a paired t-test of equality of
means returns a p-value<0.005. us, while ε-decreasing ﬁnds the same proﬁtable
parts of the space as ε-greedy, its early exploration lead it to lose market-share for
the rest of the simulation. Figure 5.5 also provides an example of how data within
the model can be non-normally distributed, thus only running tests relying on
that assumption would be inappropriate.². In Table 5.3, displays results for
simulations that took place when the registration fee charging context was used
by the market-exchanges. Contrary to when the bid/ask spread commission
charging context is place, ε-greedy fails to statistically outperform ε-decreasing.
While ε-greedy signiﬁcantly outperforms all others, the p-values for a paired
T-Test of equality of means between the ε-greedy and ε-decreasing samples, results
in a t-value of 0:35—too large to be considered signiﬁcant. erefore, performance
is equitable. At this point, it is clear strategies other than ε-greedy or ε-decreasing
don’t appear to be performing to the same standard, within the two charging
²In this case, Lilliefors’ composite goodness-of-ﬁt test reports a p-value  0:001 and a k-value
of 0:185 for ε-decreasing’s sample distribution in Figure 5.5
151
CHAPTER 5. MECHANISMS FOR MARKET NICHING
0 0.5 1
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
ε−greedy
Simulation Profit
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 0.5 1
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
ε−decreasing
Simulation Profit
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Figure 5.5: Simulation proﬁt distributions for market-exchanges using the ε-greedy
ALS strategy (le) or the ε-decreasing strategy (right), when in competition, and
using the bid/ask spread commission charging context. While proﬁts are normally
distributed when using ε-greedy, they are not when using ε-decreasing.
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Figure 5.6: Typical behaviour of Somax (le) and 1+1 ES (right) aribute-level
selection strategies when involved in simulations using the Unconstrained Single
Nie trader and Market Registration Fee charging, contexts, against each other.
Each point represents a trading day: the x and y axes indicate the aribute-levels
chosen for that day, and the z axis indicates the proﬁt aained for that aribute-
level choice. e Somax strategy appears to be choosing points with almost uni-
form probability, indicating its temperature τ seing is too high for this particular
environmental context. 1+1 ES performs beer in this case, but it is likely evenmore
proﬁt could be achieved if its aribute-level choice focussed around π = h1:0; 1:0i.
500 sequential data points are shown from a randomly chosen section of a typical
simulation.
context considered so far. For example, it appears that because the rewards, i.e.,
proﬁts, are relatively equal for diﬀerent points in the aribute-level space the
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ε-dec ε-gre EA 1+1 ES Rank Somax
ε-dec 0.834 1.297 1.117 1.010 1.3410:35 ( 1:0) (26.0) (262.0) (8:5) (67:8)
ε-gre 0.894 1.298 1.117 1.067 1.3720:35 (1:0) (15:6) (282.0) (9:7) (47:1)
EA 0.453 0.424 0.658 0.618 1.149(26.0) ( 15:6) (331.5) ( 6:8) (35.0)
1+1 ES 0.618 0.607 1.049 0.754 1.181(262.0) (282.0) (331.5) 0.21 (506) (216.0)
Rank 0.702 0.665 1.123 0.934 1.154
( 8:5) ( 9:7) (6:8) 0.21 (506) (8:6)
Somax 0.386 0.363 0.596 0.522 0.583
( 67:8) ( 47:1) (35.0) (216.0) (79.0)
Table 5.3: Mean simulation proﬁt over 50 simulation repetitions for market-
exchanges using various ALS strategies, when the environmental context com-
prises the registration fee charging and unconstrained single nie trader, contexts.
For assistance in interpreting the results, see the caption for Table 5.2
Somax ALS strategy, as show in Figure 5.6, will select between all points with
almost equal probability, highlighting the sensitivity of its temperature seing τ
to the environmental context. While the 1+1 ES ALS strategy signiﬁcantly
outperforms the Somax ALS strategy, because, as shown in Figure 5.6, it is able
to converge on a proﬁtable parts of the aribute-level space, it is unable to
compete with ε-greedy or ε-decreasing. Again, based upon simulation data this
appear to be due to it being too slow to ﬁnd the optimal point in the
aribute-level space, and thus being unable to aract traders away from its
competitor. Table 5.4 displays the results for simulations that took place when the
transaction fee charging context was in place. As with the previous two charging
contexts, ε-greedy failed to be convincingly outperformed by any of the other
aribute-level selection strategies. However, it does not dominate all strategies;
for example, it does not statistically outperform Somax or 1+1 ES, indicating
either an improvement in the performance of those two strategies within this
charging context, or a decline in ε-greedy. Figure 5.7 supports the argument that
Somax and 1+1 ES actually improve in this charging context, rather than
ε-greedy declining. Notice that, unlike the registration fee context (Figure 5.6),
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both Somax and 1+1 ES ﬁnd the most proﬁtable part of the space. Overall
ε-dec ε-gre EA 1+1 ES Rank Somax
ε-dec 3.568 5.579 2.920 4.895 3.6040:42 ( 0:8) (15:8) 0.12 (476) (18:0) 0.54 (574)
ε-gre 3.766 5.413 3.814 5.015 3.9700:42 (0:8) (11:7) 0.76 (605) (12:8) 0.73 (601)
EA 1.328 1.484 1.945 2.769 0.638(1.0) ( 11:7) (191.0) ( 2:9) (0.0)
1+1 ES 4.657 3.464 4.994 4.387 2.2150.12 (476) 0.75 (605) (191.0) 0.55 (575) 0.22 (510)
Rank 2.367 2.188 3.640 3.335 3.415
( 18:0) ( 12:8) (2:9) 0.55 (575) 0.28 (525)
Somax 3.843 3.460 5.892 4.464 2.9630.54 (574) 0.73 (601) (25:6) 0.22 (510) 0:16 (-1.4)
Table 5.4: Mean simulation proﬁt over 50 simulation repetitions for market-
exchanges using various ALS strategies, when the environmental context com-
prises the transaction fee charging and unconstrained single nie trader, contexts.
For assistance in interpreting the results, see the caption for Table 5.2
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Figure 5.7: Typical behaviour of Somax (le) and 1+1 ES (right) aribute-level
selection strategies when involved in simulations using the unconstrained Single
Nie trader and transaction fee charging, contexts, against each other. Each point
represents a trading day: the x and y axes indicate the aribute-levels chosen for
that day, and the z axis indicates the proﬁt aained for that aribute-level choice.
In contrast with simulations using the registration fee charging context (Figure 5.6),
the Somax strategy performs much beer, focussing on several good points in the
space, indicating its temperature seing is more appropriate for this environment.
Of further interest is that 1+1 ES also performs beer, converging correctly on the
most proﬁtable part of the aribute-level space, π = h1:0; 1:0i. 500 sequential data
points are shown from a random section of a typical simulation.
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performance results for ALS strategies are more equitable within the transaction
fee charging context. And, supported by data such as that provided in Figure 5.7,
many of ALS strategies can locate the most proﬁtable part of the aribute-level
space, which is also the market niche, indicating the transaction fee charging
context may be best for ﬁnding the market niche within this trader context.
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Figure 5.8: e number of wins managed by each of the aribute-level selection
strategies for the unconstrained single nie trader context. (a) Wins are separated
according to charging context. Each strategy plays the ﬁve others 50 times, there-
fore a maximum score for a charging context would be 250. (b) All wins aggregated
across the three charging contexts. Note that the more dynamic bandit strategy, ε-
greedy outperforms ε-decreasing.
Finally for the unconstrained single nie trader context, ALS strategies are
analysed across all charging and competitor contexts, using the qualitative
performance metric outlined in Section 5.4.1. Using the win metric (Equation 5.19)
the number of wins for each ALS strategy are aggregated and presented in
Figure 5.8. Two representations of the number of are visualised. In Figure 5.8a,
which separates the wins by charging context, it becomes clear just how much of
an impact the charging context has on the performance of strategies. For
example, Somax, whose temperature was chosen experimentally via a
simulation where the transaction fee context was in place, has a serious
sensitivity to other charging contexts, due in part to its success being reliant on
155
CHAPTER 5. MECHANISMS FOR MARKET NICHING
the absolute proﬁts an action returns, rather than the relative diﬀerences between
actions’ proﬁts. Total wins over all contexts are shown in Figure 5.8b.
Constrained single nie performance
is part of the section follows an identical methodology to the previous section,
with the exception that the constrained single nie trader context is used for all
simulations. Recall that buyers in the constrained single nie trader context
population have maximum constraints on aribute-levels, and thus the market
niches exists at a point other than π = h1:0; 1:0i . It is certainly true that the
unconstrained single nie and constrained single nie trader contexts are similar
in that they both have a single niche, and no traders have preferences. However,
the subtle diﬀerence of buyers having maximum constraints may make
signiﬁcantly impact the performance of some ALS strategies because signiﬁcant
parts of the aribute-level space are going to be undesirable to buyers. Apart
from using the constrained single nie trader context, simulation detail are
identical to the previous set.
Results for the bid/ask spread commission charging context are shown in
Table 5.5. While general performance for the ALS strategies is similar in most
cases, there are some interesting observations. Firstly, in comparison to the
unconstrained single nie simulations, reported in Table 5.2 on Page 150, ε-greedy
is no longer statistically beer than ε-decreasing. An intuitive explanation for this
may lie in this trader context having more unforgiving points in the
aribute-level space, where, if chosen, will result in buyers being unable to
trade—thus lower market-exchange proﬁts—because buyers’ valuations don’t
meet sellers’ costs for that resource type. e fact that ε-decreasing’s total mean
proﬁt only reduced by 40.3% between the two trader contexts, while ε-greedy’s
reduced by 49.2% supports this hypothesis. In Table 5.6, results of simulations
involving the registration fee trader context are presented. While maximum
constraints hinder a buyer’s ability to trade resource types above its constraints
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ε-dec ε-gre EA 1+1 ES Rank Somax
ε-dec 0.206 0.302 0.259 0.309 0.3030:99 (0:0) (26:4) (8:7) (34) (62)
ε-gre 0.205 0.255 0.220 0.283 0.2730.82 (590) (16:0) (6:4) (15) (34)
EA 0.056 0.049 0.060 0.099 0.101(0.0) (0.0) 0:02 (-2.4) ( 3:4) 0:07 (1:8)
1+1 ES 0.090 0.098 0.107 0.089 0.128(69.0) (135) 0.04 (422) 0.9 (404) (215)
Rank 0.151 0.141 0.146 0.094 0.124
( 34:3) ( 15:9) (325) 0.9 (404) (291)
Somax 0.036 0.025 0.079 0.042 0.084
( 62:4) ( 34:3) 0:07 (-1.8) ( 4:9) ( 3:6)
Table 5.5: Mean simulation proﬁt over 50 simulation repetitions for market-
exchanges using various ALS strategies, when the environmental context com-
prises the bid/ask spread commission charging and constrained single nie trader,
contexts. Results are similar the same set of simulations using the unconstrained
single nie trader context in Table 5.2, however, ε-greedy has lost its statistically
signiﬁcant winning edge against ε-decreasing. Further, Somax is particularly sen-
sitive to this trader context versus the unconstrained single nie context—its over-
all mean proﬁt (summed across its row) reduced by 75.9%, in comparison to the best
strategy (ε-greedy), whose equivalent proﬁts only reduced by 49.2%. For assistance
in interpreting the results, see the caption for Table 5.2 on Page 150.
(where its valuation doesn’t meet a sellers increased costs), it is not prevented
from joining said market; it will just have a hard time trading. It is therefore
interesting to note that unlike the previous bid/ask spread commission charging
context, where ε-greedy now statistically outperforms ε-decreasing—there are
fewer unforgiving parts of the aribute-level space when you only need traders to
join your market, rather than successfully trade in it. In Table 5.7, results of
simulations involving the transaction price fee trader context are shown, and
further interesting results emerge. For example, it is the ﬁrst case where ε-greedy
loses to any strategy (Somax) other than ε-decreasing; indeed even ε-decreasing
is unable to statistically beat Somax, suggesting that Somax’s conﬁguration is
suited to this particular environment.
Finally, in Figure 5.9 the number of simulation wins is shown for each
strategy. Overall ε-decreasing performs best in this context. Given that this trader
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ε-dec ε-gre EA 1+1 ES Rank Somax
ε-dec 0.704 1.329 1.120 1.096 1.3100:01 (-2.7) (0.0) (7:4) (14:7) (67:5)
ε-gre 0.916 1.361 1.029 1.125 1.3720:01 (2:7) (35:9) (274) (12:7) (40:0)
EA 0.232 0.201 0.523 0.421 0.625(0.0) ( 35:9) 0.07 (451) ( 11:5) (3:1)
1+1 ES 0.461 0.543 0.753 0.764 0.962(109) (274) 0.07 (451) 0.36 (543) (136)
Rank 0.496 0.496 1.006 0.668 1.089
( 14:7) ( 12:7) (11:5) 0.36 (543) (12:4)
Somax 0.260 0.197 0.438 0.287 0.345
( 67:5) ( 40:0) ( 3:1) (136.0) ( 12:4)
Table 5.6: Mean simulation proﬁt over 50 simulation repetitions for market-
exchanges using various ALS strategies, when the environmental context com-
prises the registration fee charging and constrained single nie trader, contexts.
Results are in general similar the same set of simulations using the unconstrained
single nie trader context in Table 5.3, however, in this trader context ε-greedy
statistically outperforms ε-decreasing. For assistance in interpreting the results, see
the caption for Table 5.2, on Page 150.
ε-dec ε-gre EA 1+1 ES Rank Somax
ε-dec 2.477 3.585 3.157 3.527 1.878
(4:4) (36:3) (114.0) (26:1) 0.02 (400)
ε-gre 1.720 3.449 3.111 3.256 1.529
( 4:4) (22:3) (104) (16:9) (322)
EA 0.292 0.252 0.449 0.642 0.053(0.0) (0.0) (177.0) (335.0) (0.0)
1+1 ES 1.027 0.831 2.358 1.932 0.645(114.0) (104.0) (177.0) 0.2 (331) (102.0)
Rank 0.444 0.435 1.239 1.365 1.326(0.0) (3.0) (335.0) 0.2 (331) (298.0)
Somax 2.586 2.722 3.634 3.442 0.6370.02 (400) (3:4) (33:9) (102.0) (298.0)
Table 5.7: Mean simulation proﬁt over 50 simulation repetitions for market-
exchanges using various ALS strategies, when the environmental context com-
prises the transaction fee charging and constrained single nie trader, contexts.
Results diﬀer somewhat from the unconstrained single nie trader context results
in Table 5.4. Both ε-decreasing and Somax see signiﬁcant improvements over the
unconstrained single nie case. For assistance in interpreting the results, see the
caption for Table 5.2, on Page 150.
context contains buyer maximum constraints, there are more points in the
aribute-level space that result in lower numbers of feasible transactions, which
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(a) Number of wins by charging contexts.
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(b) Total number of wins aggregated across
charging contexts.
Figure 5.9: e number of wins managed by each of the aribute-level selection
strategies for the constrained single nie trader context. (a) Wins are separated
according to charging context. Each strategy plays the ﬁve others 50 times, there-
fore a maximum score for a charging context would be 250. (b) All wins aggregated
across the three charging contexts. Compared to the equivalent data for the uncon-
strained single nie (Figure 5.8) ε-decreasing outperforms ε-greedy.
aﬀects strategies such as ε-greedy, that uniformly explore. is is further
evidenced by the improvements seen in the Somax and Rank-based ALS
strategies—both of which proportionally explore, rather than uniformly.
Summary
In this section, six aribute-level strategies were studied via bilateral simulations
across a variety of representative environmental contexts. Overall, results from
some 7,500 simulations were reported. e main results of this signiﬁcant
empirical evaluation are:
• Based upon all the empirical data, Hypothesis 5.1 is accepted. While two
strategies—ε-greedy and ε-decreasing—performed the best, both were
sensitive to certain environmental contexts, and neither dominated.
• Hypothesis 5.2, however, is rejected. Even though the environmental
contexts were static, interactions between traders and marketplaces led to
emergent dynamics, which favoured ε-greedy in many cases, thus
ε-decreasing did not dominate as hypothesised.
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• In general, strategies that depend on absolute reward values, e.g., Somax,
can be sensitive to a large number of environmental contexts because the
absolute levels of rewards change between environments.
• e only diﬀerence between EA and 1+1 ES is the size of the population.
1+1 ES generally outperformed EA, suggesting the advantages of a larger
population might be outweighed by the increased costs of evaluating it, in
the environmental contexts considered.
• Charging contexts have a signiﬁcant impact on the performance of ALS
strategies, and not all strategies perform beer in certain charging contexts.
• When the environment contains traders with constraints, there is a clear
advantage, in some cases, to using ALS strategies that
proportionally—rather than uniformly—explore the aribute-level space.
us, in terms of answering the overarching research question, the performance
of aribute-level selection strategies can be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by many
factors, including competing strategies, and the charging and trader contexts
comprising the environment. Further, while ε-greedy’s performance is in general
quite robust to environmental changes, no ALS strategy can be said to dominate
all others, and thus generalise perfectly across all environmental contexts.
5.5 Market Niing in Multi-nie Environments
In this section, bilateral simulations using the constraint-induced nies and
preference-induced nies trader contexts are considered. Because these trader
contexts contain multiple market nies, outcomes involving the occupation of
each market niche by a market-exchange, are possible. However, while results in
previous section shed light on the ability of ALS strategies to compete over a
single niche, typical outcomes in environments containing multiple market niches
are unclear. As such, the overarching research question that this section takes a
step towards answering is:
What impact do diﬀerent environmental contexts have on the abilities of
competing candidate aribute-level strategies to ﬁnd market nies in
multi-nie environments?
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To make progress on this question, further simulation studies are carried out,
across all of the previously considered charging contexts and multi-niche trader
contexts, so that the following questions can be speciﬁcally answered:
• Which of the charging contexts facilitate the most eﬃcient resource
allocations, and thus provide the best means for locating market niches
within these multi-niche trader contexts?
• What impact does the presence of each of the ALS strategies have on
resource allocations within the system?
• What impact does the trader context, and thus preferences and constraints,
have on the market niching process?
Experimental setup
An experimental methodology, similar to that in Section 5.4.1 is carried out
throughout this section, but with some diﬀerences. Firstly, simulated
environmental contexts include either the constraint-induced nies or
preference-induced nies, trader contexts. Secondly, rather than measuring
market-exchange proﬁt, these results focus on the eﬃciency of the resource
allocations over the entire system, by using the allocative eﬃciency metric for
multi-aribute resource allocations, deﬁned in Section 4.5, on Page 111.
e higher the allocative eﬃciency in the system, the larger the total utility
of all agents. e allocative eﬃciency of a perfectly eﬃcient resource allocation is
1; however because traders always have an element of exploration in their
market-selection, completely eﬃcient allocations are realistically unaainable.
While meaningful comparisons between eﬃciency of competing
market-exchanges using diﬀerent ALS strategies can be made, the numbers on
there own say lile about the actual niing behaviour of the exchanges.
erefore, throughout this section, visualisations of daily selected aribute-levels
are provided, in the form of heat maps. Finally, self-play simulations are
considered within these results, because how a strategy interacts with itself does
aﬀect the global eﬃciency of the system.
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5.5.1 ‘Constraint-induced nies’ environments
is set of experiments considers environmental contexts involving the
constraint-induced nies trader context. Recall that while traders within this
context have no preferences over aributes, two separate populations of buyers
exist, each with diﬀerent minimum and maximum constraints. is leads to an
environment where there are two market niches in these simulations, when the
resource types π = h0:6; 0:6i and π = h1:0; 1:0i are speciﬁed. is environment
presents considerable challenges to ALS strategies. For example, because many
buyers and sellers are restricted in the types of resource they can trade, ALS
strategies that move between desirable and undesirable points in the space are
likely to repel many traders.
System-wide allocative eﬃciency
Table 5.8 highlights the impact that each of the aribute-level selection strategies
have on the allocative eﬃciency of the system, when they are present within a
simulation. Values in rows 3–8 represent the system-wide mean daily allocative
eﬃciency for all simulations involving that strategy. For example, values in row
three are arrived at by taking mean system-wide allocative eﬃciency measures of
the simulations where ε-decreasing competed against: ε-greedy; EA; 1+1 ES;
Rank-Based; Somax; and itself. In line with the previous ALS strategy
performance results, ε-decreasing and ε-greedy perform equally well. A T-Test of
equality of means fails to reject the null hypothesis that the means are identical at
signiﬁcance level α = 0:005; this is not surprising given previous results.
Secondly, when ε-greedy or ε-decreasing are involved in simulations, allocations
are on average signiﬁcantly more eﬃcient, those that don’t include them.
Statistical tests, against the third best strategy support this for each charging
context. In the bid/ask spread commission context, aWilcoxon Signed-Rank test
comparing the ε-greedy Rank-based strategies reports a p-value of < 0:005 and a
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Allocative Eﬃciency
Strategy Bid/Ask Spread Registration Fee Transaction Price Feecharging context charging context charging context
ε-decreasing 0.602  0.081 0.566  0.109 0.716  0.068
ε-greedy 0.626  0.089 0.556  0.123 0.704  0.080
EA 0.395  0.133 0.365  0.114 0.490  0.119
1+1 ES 0.439  0.134 0.429  0.112 0.591  0.148
Rank 0.553  0.113 0.502  0.098 0.591  0.092
Somax 0.367  0.152 0.305  0.122 0.695  0.114
Mean (all) 0.497  0.163 0.452  0.157 0.627  0.140
Table 5.8: For each strategy, each data point provides the measure of system-wide
mean daily allocative eﬃciency, over all simulations involving each strategy and
its competitors. us, it captures the impact that the presence of that strategy typ-
ically has on resource allocations within the system. Results are separated into
the three diﬀerent charging contexts, thus each value is the mean from a sample
of data points with size: 6 competitor variations  50 simulation repetitions. A
value of 1.0 would indicate a 100% eﬃcient allocation for every day of every re-
ported simulation. Emboldened values indicate highest reported eﬃciency across
the three charging contexts, involving the strategy within that row. Emphasised
values indicate the highest reported eﬃciency for any strategy involved within
that single context.
signed rank of 8,368; the same test within the registration fee context reports a
p-value of < 0:005 and a signed rank of 11,850; and in the transaction price fee
context, ε-greedy versus Somax resulted in no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
samples at a signiﬁcance level α = 0:005. Finally, in all cases, resource allocations
are improved when the transaction price fee charging context is in use. Even
though a higher fee is charged for executing a trade on resource π = h1:0; 1:0i
than, π = h0:6; 0:6i, with this charging context, the overall proﬁt from selecting
niche π = h0:6; 0:6i is clearly greater than sharing the proﬁts at niche
π = h1:0; 1:0i.
Market-exange niing
While the reported eﬃciency values in Table 5.8 provide clues as to which of the
ALS strategies lead to the most eﬃcient allocations in diﬀerent charging contexts,
it is unclear exactly what these numbers mean in terms of actual niing
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behaviour. To beer understand ALS strategies’ niching behaviour, visualisations
are provided using data extracted from some of the simulations reported in
Table 5.8. Within the simulated constraint-induced nies trader context there
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(c) EA’s aribute-level selections.
Figure 5.10: Heat maps showing the niching ability of various strategies for sim-
ulations involving the transaction price fee charging and constraint-induced nies
trader, contexts. Each location on the x and y axes is a point in aribute-level space,
and thus a resource type. Each daily aribute-level selection is ploed over all
simulations involving the respective strategy. us, the visualisations provide a
general overview of the strategy’s niching behaviour. Lighter areas chose the as-
sociated aribute-levels more oen. For bandit strategies, choices were always in
the discrete set of points f0:2; 0:4; 0:6; 0:8; 1:0g, however, using interpolation tech-
niques these reduced choices are mapped onto the real-space so that they can be
compared to the real-value strategy, i.e., Figure 5.10c. e resource types indicat-
ing the market niches that satisfy the market segments are π = h0:6; 0:6i and
π = h1:0; 1:0i.
exist two market niches, at the points h0:6; 0:6i and h1:0; 1:0i in the aribute-level
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space. To get a beer understanding of the general niching behaviour of some of
the ALS strategies, heat maps were created, which allow aribute-level selection
choices to be visualised easily. A heat map is created by ploing a 2D visualisation
of aribute-level space, and colouring each point in the space according to the
frequency it was chosen by an ALS strategy. For example, each heat map in
Figure 5.10 shows all—some 1.5 million data points—daily aribute-level
selections for each of the ALS strategies in its caption, across simulations against
all competing strategies in the transaction price fee charging context.
In general, ε-greedy (Figure 5.10a) and Somax (Figure 5.10b) are able to
locate both the niches successfully, regardless of the competing strategies in the
environment. Note, Somax has a beer concentration or focus on the two niches
than ε-greedy, because it selects aribute-levels proportional to its rewards.
Further, note that Somax spends more time satisfying the market niche for
resource π = h0:6; 0:6i, rather than π = h1:0; 1:0i; this is because, despite rewards
being based on transaction prices (which would be higher at π = h1:0; 1:0i), more
traders can trade π = h0:6; 0:6i because no sellers have minimum constraints,
thus the volume of transactions increases the proﬁtability for the exchange.
e EA strategy (Figure 5.10c) does not perform well in this trader context.
While it regularly ﬁnds areas close to the niche π = h1:0; 1:0i, it rarely ﬁnds the
niche at π = h1:0; 1:0i. Recalling Figure 5.3 on Page 5.3, it is possible that the EA
strategy has trouble ﬁnding the smaller niche. Figure 5.11 shows the typical
niching behaviour for some ALS strategies in individual simulations. By running
self-play simulations, where both exchanges use the same ALS strategy, it
becomes possible to see if the behaviour of the strategies in Figure 5.10 is due to
their own strategy, or the presence of others. For example, Somax is
exceptionally well suited to this environment. Because it explores proportionally,
i.e., based on reward values, each exchange sticks to its own niche, resulting in a
stable outcome, and the highest allocative eﬃciency. When exchanges both use
ε-greedy, however, they encroa on each other’s niche, due to uniformly random
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(a) Typical niching behaviour of two market-exchanges using ε-greedy strate-
gies; mean allocative eﬃciency—76%.
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(b) Typical niching behaviour of two market-exchanges using Somax strate-
gies; mean allocative eﬃciency—78%.
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(c) Typical niching behaviour of two market-exchanges using EA strategies;
mean allocative eﬃciency—31%.
Figure 5.11: Typical niching behaviour of several aribute-level strategies when
in competition with themselves, during single simulations using the transaction
price fee charging and constraint-induced nies trader, contexts. Two niches exist:
π = h0:6; 0:6i and π = h1:0; 1:0i. Somax (b) works well in self-play because each
Somax strategy sticks to its niche, while ε-greedy (a) strategies encroach on each
other; neither EA strategies (c) locate the second niche. See Figure 5.10 for help
reading the heat maps.
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exploration; inevitably both niches wont be satisﬁed at all times. Finally, as
Figure 5.11c highlights, neither exchange using the EA strategy is able to locate
the π = h1:0; 1:0i niche. is is possibly because neither strategy is able to
generate mutations that take it to the smaller second peak and thus both are
trapped in competition over a single niche, resulting in half of the buyers being
unable to trade at all.
5.5.2 ‘Preference-induced nies’ environments
Finally, the preference-induced nies environment is considered. Again, there are
two market niches, but due to trader preferences, these are located at points
corresponding to resource types π = h0:2; 1:0i and π = h1:0; 0:2i. A further
diﬀerence in this trader context is that there are no infeasible parts of the
aribute-level space; all traders can potentially trade any resource type.
System-wide allocative eﬃciency
Based upon Table 5.9, the preference-induced nies trader context increases the
diﬃculty in ﬁnding market niches, resulting in overall less eﬃcient allocations
compared to the constraint-induced nies context (Table 5.8). While relative
performance between strategies is similar to the constraint-induced nies trader
context, all allocation eﬃciencies are generally lower, indicating preferences
signiﬁcantly aﬀect all the strategies’ niching ability. Of particular interest is the
observation that the most eﬃcient allocations no longer arise when exchanges
charge according to the transaction price fee charging context. Rather, the bid/ask
spread commission charging context provides a beer indication of market niches,
though not with statistical signiﬁcance. However, it suggests the transaction price
fee charging context does not correlate well with the positions of
preference-induced niches.
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Allocative Eﬃciency
Strategy Bid/Ask Spread Registration Fee Transaction Price Feecharging context charging context charging context
ε-decreasing 0.5660.107 0.4200.054 0.4950.033
ε-greedy 0.5640.090 0.4210.061 0.5070.039
EA 0.4030.087 0.3180.053 0.3990.046
1+1 ES 0.4730.087 0.3510.046 0.4760.046
Rank 0.4980.042 0.3710.055 0.4330.046
Somax 0.3750.079 0.3060.033 0.4800.058
Mean (all) 0.4800.118 0.3650.070 0.4630.060
Table 5.9: For each strategy, each data point provides the measure of system-wide
mean daily allocative eﬃciency, over all simulations involving each strategy and
its competitors. Results are separated into the three diﬀerent charging contexts,
thus each value is the mean from a sample of data points with size: 6 competitor
variations 50 simulation repetitions. All simulations used the preference-induced
nies trader context. A value of 1.0 would indicate a 100% eﬃcient allocation for
every day of every reported simulation. Emboldened values indicate highest re-
ported eﬃciency across the three charging contexts, involving the strategy within
that row. Emphasised values indicate the highest reported eﬃciency for any strat-
egy involved within a single charging context.
Market-exange niing
Using the bid/ask spread commission charging context, general aribute-level
selection performance of three of the ALS strategies is provided in Figure 5.12.
Unlike similar visualisations with the constraint-induced nies trader context in
place (Figure 5.10), Somax appears to struggle to locate the niches, further
evidence for its sensitivity to the charging context. e EA strategy seems unable
to locate either of the niches, and aggregated over the many simulation runs, it
has no tendency to focus on any particular point in aribute-level space. Because
1+1 ES works in the same way, but without a population, it could be argued that
the cost of evaluating a—likely poor—population, drives away traders to the other
exchange, so no maer where EA moves to its proﬁt does not improve, which
would explain the generally uniform coverage of the aribute-level space in
Figure 5.12c.
Finally, in Figure 5.13 typical market-niching behaviours in self-play
simulations are examined, to beer understand how well typical strategies locate
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(a) ε-greedy’s aribute-level selections.
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(b) Somax’s aribute-level selections.
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(c) EA’s aribute-level selections.
Figure 5.12: Heat maps showing the niching ability of various strategies for sim-
ulations involving the bid/ask spread commission charging and preference-induced
nies trader, contexts. Each location on the x and y axes is a point in aribute-level
space, and thus a resource type. Each daily aribute-level selection is ploed over
all simulations involving the respective strategy. us, the visualisations provide
a general overview of the strategy’s niching behaviour. Lighter areas correspond
to more frequently chosen aribute-levels. e resource types indicating the mar-
ket niches that satisfy the market segments are π = h0:2; 1:0i and π = h1:0; 0:2i.
ε-greedy is able to locate either of the market niches in simulations it takes part in.
Somax, already shown to be sensitive to the bid/ask spread commission charging
context, is unable to locate the market niches, and is perhaps aracted to a very
unusual part of the space because bid/ask spreads, and thus its proﬁts, can increase
in very ineﬃcient markets, such as ones around π = h0:2; 0:2i. EA has no general
tendency to regularly focus on any point in the space suggesting that its proﬁts
are typically ﬂat for all points, which may in part be due to driving traders away
during the evaluation of its solution population.
market niches in the preference-induced nies trader context, and thus the impact
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that preferences and constraints have upon the market niching problem. Based
upon these individual simulations, it is clear that the preference-induced nies
trader context signiﬁcantly worsens the niching ability of the ALS strategies; in
all cases allocative eﬃciency was worse than the equivalent simulations in
Figure 5.11. At this point, it is important to remember that the exchanges are
aempting to maximise proﬁt, and not social welfare (which is a desired emergent
behaviour). Recall that the bid/ask spread commission charging context speciﬁes
exchanges charge the diﬀerence between traders’ bid and ask oﬀers, which in a
competitive market equilibrium would be zero. When market niches are satisﬁed,
competitive market equilibrium can be more closely approached, which reduces,
in this charging context, market-exchange proﬁts. us, as seen by the ε-greedy
results (Figure 5.13a), some ALS strategies are focussing on points in the space
that purposely lead to less ineﬃcient allocations than could otherwise be
achieved, in order to boost proﬁts.
5.5.3 Summary
In terms of the overarching research question for this section, within multi-niche
environments, several factors aﬀect ALS strategies’ abilities to ﬁnd market niches.
Based upon the simulation results in this section:
• No single charging context facilitates the most eﬃcient resource
allocations. While the transaction price fee charging context helps locate
niches in the constraint-induces nies trader context, in the
preference-induced nies the most ideal charging context (bid/ask spread
commission) rewards exchanges to maintain a slightly ineﬃcient market
(Figure 5.13a), indicating further work is needed in this area;
• e presence of the ε-greedy, ε-decreasing, and in some cases, Somax
strategies in the environment tend to improve the eﬃciency of allocations,
indicating their success in tackling the automatic market niching problem;
• e EA strategy signiﬁcantly under-performed, likely due to premature
convergence, indicating diversity mechanisms such as ﬁtness-sharing
semes [149] may improve the evolutionary optimisation approach to the
market niching problem;
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(a) Typical niching behaviour of two market-exchanges using ε-greedy strate-
gies; mean allocative eﬃciency—64%
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(b) Typical niching behaviour of two market-exchanges using Somax strate-
gies; mean allocative eﬃciency—36%
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(c) Typical niching behaviour of two market-exchanges using EA strategies;
mean allocative eﬃciency—39%
Figure 5.13: Typical niching behaviour of several aribute-level strategies when
in competition with themselves, during single simulations using the bid/ask spread
commission charging and preference-induced nies trader, contexts. Two niches ex-
ist: π = h0:2; 1:0i and π = h1:0; 0:2i. Unlike similar visualisations for simulations
involving the constraint-induced nies trader and transaction price fee trader, con-
texts (Figure 5.11), all three strategies seem unable to locate market niches to the
same accuracy, because the charging context rewards market ineﬃciency. See Fig-
ure 5.10 for help reading the heat maps.
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• Preferences have a signiﬁcant impact on the ability of ALS strategies to ﬁnd
niches.
5.6 Conclusions and Discussion
is chapter introduced the newly formulated automatic niing problem. e
automatic niching problem describes the challenge that a market-exchange agent
faces when specifying which resource type should be traded within its market.
is problem is particularly challenging because the environment is complex,
dynamic, and coevolving. Two approaches were considered for tackling the
resulting reinforcement learning problem: an n-armed bandit approach and an
evolutionary optimisation approach. Based upon these approaches, the
performance of several candidate aribute-level selection (ALS) strategies was
empirically assessed, in representative environmental contexts.
Results from this chapter showed that all candidate strategies are sensitive
to at least some environmental factors, and thus none can be seen to generalise
across all contexts, but in most environmental contexts, at least one of the
strategies performs very well, identifying the market niches in the environment.
Cai et al. [23] ﬁnd that in single-aribute market environments, traders within
the same cohort migrate to similar markets, which improves eﬃciency. Results
within this chapter show, for a more complex multi-aribute resource allocation
domain, that not only do traders within the same cohort migrate to similar
markets, but competing market-exchanges, using ALS strategies, are able to
automatically ﬁnd market niches, and in some cases self-organise to satisfy all
environmental niches, leading to the desirable allocations of complex resources.
e main contributions of this chapter are:
• e ﬁrst clear formulation of the automatic market niching problem;
• e proposal of two general approaches to tackle the automatic market
niching problem;
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• A comprehensive computational study of the two approaches, instantiated
as six aribute-level selection strategies, in representative environments
that market exchanges might expect to ﬁnd themselves in;
• Rigorous statistical analysis, discussion, and visualisation of the impact that
the representative environmental contexts have on the performance of the
aribute-level selection strategies. Particularly:
– how environmental contexts aﬀect the proﬁtability of aribute-level
selection strategies;
– how environmental contexts aﬀect the niching ability of competing
aribute-level selection strategies in multi-niche environments.
Although this chapter has not fully answered the question of which is the best
aribute-level selection strategy in general, it has made a signiﬁcant step towards
understanding how the performance of diﬀerent aribute-level selection
strategies are impacted by various environmental factors, which has facilitated a
clear study of the suitability of two reinforcement learning approaches to this
newly formulated problem.
Within the environmental contexts considered, the ε-greedy and
ε-decreasing n-armed bandit ALS strategies performed the strongest of the
candidates, but the proportional nature of Somax’s strategy exhibited extremely
promising behaviour when the environmental context suited its parametric
seing. Future work will look at how useful features of these strategies can
inspire novel strategies that perform beer, and aren’t sensitive to parameter
seings. Out of the two approaches considered, the evolutionary optimisation
approach did not seem to perform as well. Being restricted to exploring
neighbourhood search space appears to be a disadvantage for the automatic
market niching problem. In many cases it appeared that the expense of having to
evaluate a population of solutions drove traders away, and even if useful
solutions were evaluated, the ﬁtness landscape had been shied by traders
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selecting competing marketplaces. However, the ability for evolutionary
approaches to explore any part of the search space is certainly advantageous in
general, e.g, when niches aren’t well-deﬁned, or don’t exist in points that are
represented in an ALS strategy’s action set. us, future work will consider how
the performance of evolutionary algorithms can be improved, perhaps using
ﬁtness-sharing semes [149] to more eﬃciently explore the space.
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Within this thesis, trading agents have been assumed to use only private
information, in the form of historical trading proﬁts, to form the basis of their
market-selection decisions. Further, it has been assumed that traders have been
present for the entire duration of simulations, and thus have been able to learn
appropriate market-selection signals over time, in order to identify the most
proﬁtable markets to join. However, in real-world open marketplaces,
traders—and on longer time scales, market-exchanges—join and leave the system
at diﬀerent times. Further, the recent empirical analysis of aribute-level selection
strategies in Chapter 5 has shown that over time autonomous market-exchanges’
behaviour can change, in terms of the market-niche that they satisfy, and how
aractive they are to traders, which may change traders’ preferences over them
as time progresses.
is chapter considers, for the ﬁrst time, the application of a reputation
approach to the problem of facilitating market-selection in the domain of
multi-aribute resource allocation via competing marketplaces. e chapter
demonstrates via simulation studies that reputation-based market-selection
strategies can lead to more eﬃcient resource allocations in a variety of dynamic
environments, and provides evidence to suggest that a subjective reputation
approach is very important for facilitating eﬃcient allocations in multi-aribute
resource allocation systems. Speciﬁcally, the main contributions of this chapter
are: (i) the ﬁrst application of a reputation approach to the problem of
market-selection in a multi-aribute market-based system containing competing
marketplaces; (ii) consideration of both strategic and non-strategic reputation
manipulation models, and the proposal of a novel trader behaviour model for
strategically manipulating supply and demand, in a bid to subvert marketplace
reputations; (iii) to demonstrate, via simulation studies, the applicability of both
objective and subjective reputation approaches to facilitating beer
market-selection decisions over competing marketplaces, in a variety of dynamic
and uncertain environmental seings. e rest of this chapter is organised as
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follows. First, in Section 6.1, the proposal of applying a reputation approach to
the problem of market-selection is further discussed, and speciﬁc research
questions formulated. In Section 6.2, a Bayesian statistics approach, which has
been found to be successful at predicting agent behaviour in other e-market
applications is formally introduced, and it is demonstrated how this approach can
be integrated into the market-based approach introduced in this thesis. A
Bayesian approach to reputation formation relies on accurate evidential
information, in the form of accurate reports from agents. Section 6.3 considers
diﬀerent forms of information manipulation and proposes two behaviour models,
which could aﬀect traders’ reputation-based market-selection decisions.
Section 6.4 demonstrates how a Bayesian reputation approach can be made
subjective by learning how information from diﬀerent sources should be
weighted. Finally, in Section 6.5 a thorough empirical analysis is undertaken to
test several hypotheses involving the ability of both objective and subjective
reputation approaches to facilitate trader market-selection in a variety of
dynamic environments. e chapter is concluded in Section 6.6.
6.1 Motivation
One of the themes within this thesis is that of generalisation and robustness of
mechanisms within complex, adaptive market-based systems. e previous
chapter analysed mechanisms for automatically identifying and satisfying market
niches, in an eﬀort to improve market-exchanges ability to generalise over
diﬀerent trader contexts. In the same spirit, the motivation for the work in this
chapter is to improve traders’ market-selection decisions when trading in
dynamic and uncertain market environments, which also takes a step towards the
design of more robust resource allocation systems in general. On a speciﬁc level
pertaining to the market-based system studied in this thesis, the work in this
chapter is motivated by the following observations: (i) so far, the same traders
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have been assumed to exist within the system at all times, while in real-world
open marketplaces traders—and on longer time scales, market-exchanges—join
and leave the system at diﬀerent times; (ii) recent empirical analysis of
aribute-level selection strategies in Chapter 5 has shown that over time,
autonomous market-exchanges’ behaviour can change, both in terms of their
market-niching, and how aractive they are to traders; and (iii) traders have to
learn over time, using only private historical proﬁt information, based upon
direct interactions with market-exchanges, which market is best to join.
ese observations lead to questions about the expense traders incur
learning these market-selection signals, in terms of the time taken exploring
possible markets, and ultimately the cost in terms of proﬁts sacriﬁced from
potentially sub-optimal decisions taken during the learning process. While for a
single static population of traders, the eventual beneﬁts of learning accurate
market-selection signals will outweigh the initial costs aer suﬃcient time in the
environment, for a population underurn this may not be the case, if for
example agents leave the system before they have recovered the costs of learning
the signals. In terms of the overall impact on the system, which is always of
interest from a designer’s point of view, these dynamics can signiﬁcantly hinder
eﬃciency of resource allocations in the system. Accurate market-selection signals
are particularly important if traders have preferences and constraints over
multi-aribute resources, and these are allocated via autonomous competing
marketplaces, because system eﬃciency is maximised when cohorts of traders
within the same market segment trade within the market occupying that market
niche.
As discussed in Chapter 2, reputation can act in a signalling role [141, 87],
providing publicly generated signals describing the expected behaviour of other
agents. Because reputations are leveraged from the aggregated direct experiences
of agents, they can be used by an agent to predict behaviour of another it has not
yet directly interacted with. And while private, direct observations are likely to
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be more accurate, agents joining a system may beneﬁt more from less accurate
publicly generated signals than private ones that are expensive to learn. A small
amount of previous work has looked at the issue of trust and reputation within
continuous double-auction seings, concentrating on how the average quality of
resources sold by sellers can be signalled to buyers within the market [98, 170].
However, it uses objective measures for trust and reputation and does not
consider strategic reporting of agents. Probabilistic reputation approaches have
been proposed and developed to support agent decision-making using sound
statistical methods [80]. Further, these foundations have been built upon to enable
agents to deal with false reporting or malicious behaviour, of the type expected in
open electronic communities [166, 165, 97]. However, these subjective Bayesian
approaches have not been applied within the context of dynamic market-based
environments where agents’ preferences and rational behaviour can diﬀer, or for
measuring the reputation of market-exchanges running multi-aribute resource
markets, whose behaviour cannot be described as simply ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Further,
the entry and exit dynamics (trader churn) of a market-based system directly
inﬂuence the outcomes of agent interactions, and thus potentially this reputation
approaches’ success in these environments.
6.1.1 Resear questions
e focus of this chapter is the applicability of subjective Bayesian reputation
approaches to the multi-aribute resource allocation model introduced in
Chapter 4. Particular focus is given to removing the assumption that traders exist
within the system for the duration of simulations, and instead it is assumed the
system possesses a constant trader urn, where traders enter and exit the system
at diﬀerent times. e main research questions considered in this chapter are:
• What impact do trader urn dynamics have on traders’ proﬁtability, and the
eﬃciency of resource allocations, when traders do or don’t, use reputation to
make market-selection decisions?
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• How well do objective and subjective reputation approaes deal with the
presence of strategic and non-strategic reputation information manipulation?
• How well do objective and subjective reputation approaes provide
market-selection signals to diﬀerent market segments in multi-nie
environments?
• What properties do emergent recommender networks possess?
6.2 A Bayesian Reputation Approa
In this section, a reputation approach, grounded in Bayesian statistics, and based
upon the use of Beta distributions is described. e Beta distribution is a
continuous probability distribution that can be used to represent probability
distributions of binary events [80]. e beta distribution is deﬁned in general by
two shape parameters: α and β [38]. e beta distribution is use extensively in
Bayesian statistics for estimating the posterior probability of binary events [25],
making it useful for applications that involve positive and negative experiences.
e probability density function for the beta distribution is deﬁned as:
f(pjα; β) = p
α 1(1  p)β 1Z 1
0
uα 1(1  u)β 1du
, where 0  p  1; α; β > 0 (6.1)
e expected value of the beta distribution is simple to calculate:
E(p) = αα + β : (6.2)
Supposing a process has two possible outcomes: positive (h) and negative (s), then
a Beta distribution can be used to estimate the probability of observing a positive
outcome based on a history of observations. Assuming bh andbs are the frequency
of observed positive and negative outcome, the distribution for estimating the
probability of observing a positive outcome h has parameters α = bh+ 1 and
β = bs+ 1 (ensuring α; β > 0 in the absence of observations). e prior distribution
f(pj1; 1) (where α = 1; β = 1), is special, as it is also the standard Uniform
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Distribution. It can model the absence of knowledge about a process. As such, all
possible values of p are equally likely to be observed; the prior probability of
observing a positive event in a process is therefore E(p) = 0:5. More process
observations increase the conﬁdence that the posterior probability f(pjα; β) of
observing a positive outcome of a process represents the true probability of
observing a positive outcome. Because the Beta distribution is a continuous
probability distribution—p has inﬁnitely many values—it is not possible to assign
a ﬁnite probability to observing a speciﬁc outcome, so one assigns a probability
to a range of outcomes [175].
To estimate the conﬁdence we have that the expected value of the beta
distribution is the true probability of observing a positive outcome of a process,
we can measure the integral of the distribution between two bounds deﬁned by ",
commonly done with the Beta Cumulative distribution function:
F(p) = Ip(α; β) =
Z p
0
uα 1(1  u)β 1duZ 1
0
uα 1(1  u)β 1du
, where 0  x  1; α; β > 0 (6.3)
In Equation 6.3, Ip(α; β) is the regularised Incomplete Beta Function. Supposing
some upper and lower bound deﬁned by ", conﬁdence is estimated as follows:
γp = Ip+"(α; β)  Ip "(α; β) (6.4)
Intuitively, the more observations one can make, generally the more conﬁdent
one can be about how close E(p) is to the true probability of observing a positive
outcome to the process being modelled.
6.2.1 Representing trust with Beta distributions
Reputations are formed from the aggregations of many individual’s direct
opinions of others, which are typically described by trust values. e Beta
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distribution forms the basis of market-exchange reputations system, by
representing the trust a trader has in a market-exchange. Each trading-day,
traders interacting with market-exchanges each observe three possible outcomes:
(i) the trader successfully trades with another trader, resulting in the trader
making a positive proﬁt; (ii) the trader trades but makes zero proﬁt, or the trader
is unable to trade but does not otherwise incur a loss; or (iii) the cost of exchange
charges are greater than any proﬁt made from a possible trade, resulting in a net
loss. e three possible outcomes a trader ai could observe aer a trading day t in
mk’s market, are represented by οtai;mk :
οtai;mk =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1 if P tai > 0
0:5 if P tai = 0
0 if P tai < 0;
(6.5)
where P tai is the daily proﬁt made by ai on day t. ough it may seem unlikely
that a trader would trade and make exactly zero proﬁt (case two in Equation 6.5),
it is more likely that a trader might join an exchange that does not charge
registration fees, but not manage to successfully trade. In such a case it seems
unreasonable to assign the same outcome as that which a trader incurring a loss
would experience (case three), thus case two neither labels the experience
positively or negatively while still adding information to the model in the form of
a neutral experience. While the outcomes traders can expect are ternary in this
model, the shape parameters for a Beta distribution can still be updated each day
in the same way as done in similar implementations for binary outcome models
in other domains [80, 165, 97], because it is a continuous distribution. e Beta
distribution is updated aer an observation accordingly:
αt+1ai;mk = α
t
ai;mk + ο
t
ai;mk
βt+1ai;mk = β
t
ai;mk + 1  οtai;mk
(6.6)
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e interaction history between ai and mk is represented by αtai;mk and βtai;mk When
t = 0, αtai;mk = βtai;mk = 1, so that in the absence of any observations of
interactions between ai and mk, the prior Beta distribution will be formed. Finally,
trust τai;mk that a trader ai has in market-exchange mk can be deﬁned:
τtai;mk = E[pai;mk jαtai;mk ; βtai;mk ] =
αtai;mk
αtai;mk + β
t
ai;mk
(6.7)
As one can see from Equation 6.7, τtai;mk is the expected value of the distribution
describing the probability pai;mk that trader ai will make a proﬁtable trade when it
next joins market-exchange mk on trading day t+ 1.
Time discounting
e dynamics of any open multi-agent system mean that either behaviours or
perception or behaviours can change over time. In accordance with previous
Bayesian reputation approaches [81, 97], the Beta distribution used to form τai;mk
is discounted at the end of every trading day t, by updating αai;mk and βai;mk for
each market-exchange mk:
αtai;mk = 1+ αtai;mk  δΔt
βtai;mk = 1+ βtai;mk  δΔt
(6.8)
where δ 2 [0; 1] represents the aggressiveness by which old information
contributes to current trust values, and is thus forgoen. When δ = 1:0, all
historical outcomes οai;mk contribute equally to αai;mk and βai;mk , while when
δ = 0:0, all previous outcomes are immediately forgoen and only the most
recent interaction is considered in building the trust value. In all the simulations
Δt = 0:95, which was found to be not too aggressive. Figure 6.1 shows that in the
absence of new observations, a beta distribution (and thus trust) that ai has for mk
decays back to the prior distribution; lowering the discounting factor increases
the decaying process.
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Figure 6.1: e eﬀect of diﬀerent time discounting factors on beta distributions
representing interaction histories. A lower discount factor of δ = 0:9 in Fig-
ure 6.1a leads to more aggressive forgeing of older information over time t =
1 : : : 15 : : : 30 : : : 45, compared to a higher value of δ = 0:95 in Figure 6.1b. is ex-
ample assumes no new observations are added each time step, thus the decaying
process reduces each distribution towards the uniform distribution.
6.2.2 Combining opinions to form reputations
Now we have deﬁned how traders can generate trust values for market-exchanges
using beta distributions built from previous interactions, we can show how
traders can combine others traders’ trust values to form market-exchange
reputations. Again, the Beta distribution has some nice properties for forming
market-exchange reputations by combining the traders’ trust distributions they
hold for each market-exchange. Aggregating multiple separate Beta distributions
is a maer of combining the shape parameters of the associated distributions [97],
e.g., f(pjα1; β1) + f(pjα2; β2) = f(pjα1 + α2; β1 + β2). For this model, a trader ai
gathers other traders’ interaction histories with market-exchange mk, by asking
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each trader aj 2 T for their αaj;mk and βaj;mk values as shown in Equation 6.9.
αrep;tai;mk =
jT jX
j=1;j6=i
αtaj;mk   1
βrep;tai;mk =
jT jX
j=1;j6=i
βtaj;mk   1
(6.9)
By decreasing each αtai;mk and βtai;mk by unity other agents’ prior distributions are
removed from the reputation calculation, as their uncertainty should not
contribute. ai can then use these values to build an aggregated beta distribution
representing the combined opinions of other agents. Figure 6.2, shows visually
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(a) Four agents’ beta distributions.
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(b) A combined beta distribution.
Figure 6.2: An example of how combining beta distributions is a maer of aggregat-
ing the α and β parameters of the relevant distributions. Although two distributions
in Figure 6.2a have high expected values, i.e., 0.75 and 0.87, the expected value of
the combined distribution in Figure 6.2b is only 0.43, because a distribution with a
low expected value of 0.2 in Figure 6.2a contains many observations, and impacts
the combined distribution more.
how various beta distributions can be combined to form an aggregated beta
distribution. In this case, it is assumed that a trader ai has no direct information
on market-exchange mk, thus αai;mk = βai;mk = 1; this is the (prior) uniform
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distribution shown in Figure 6.2a. ai asks other traders for their interaction
histories with mk, and three of them provide α and β values that form the
remaining three distributions in Figure 6.2a. Trader ai then combines these with
its own prior distribution to form an overall distribution, which it can use to
estimate the probability that joining market-exchange mk will result in a
proﬁtable trade. In terms of this model’s application of reputation, the value ρtai;mk
is deﬁned to represent the reputation of market-exchange mk from the point of
view of trader ai:
ρtai;mk =
αtai;mk + α
rep; t
ai;mk
αai;mk + α
rep; t
ai;mk + βtai;mk + β
rep; t
ai;mk
(6.10)
Equation 6.10 is the expected value of the distribution shown in Figure 6.2b; due
to Equation 6.6, ρtai;mk includes the prior distribution when it combines the direct
information that ai has of mk with information provided by others.
6.2.3 Making market-selection decisions using trust and
reputation
Direct information is usually more accurate than indirect information obtained
from third parties [18]. One approach to this—and one followed in this model—is
to prefer to use trust when there is enough conﬁdence in an assessment [166].
is is applied in this market-based model by specifying that traders prefer to use
trust to make market-selection decisions. However, if a trader has not interacted
enough with a market-exchange recently, then it will use publicly available
information to form a reputation of the market-exchange. e decision of which
information a trader ai will use to create a market-selection signal ςtai;aj at time t,
concerning market-exchange mk, is made as follows:
ςtai;mk =
8>><>>:
τtai;mk if γai;mk  γai
ρtai;mk otherwise
(6.11)
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where γai;mk is measured according to the Incomplete Beta Function from
Equation 6.4; γai represents a conﬁdence threshold that agent ai uses to decide
whether it needs to use reputation information to form a market-selection signal.
In previous work in this thesis, traders have been using the ε-greedy
market-selection strategy deﬁned in Section 4.4.3, on Page 108, which uses daily
proﬁt to learn the market-selection signals that govern market selection. As a
basis for comparing the impact that reputation has on market-selection,
compared to private proﬁt information, the ε-greedy market-selection strategy is
altered to incorporate reputation in the market-selection process in two ways:
(i) the discounting portion of the ε-greedy market-selection strategy is removed
because the reputation approach deals with this separately (Section 6.8); and
(ii) no reward signals are provided. Rather, each day, the market-exchange with
the highest reputation is joined with probability ε and a random exchange with
probability 1  ε.
6.3 Modelling Uncertain Market-based
Environments
is section is motivated by: (i) a desire to empirically evaluate the
appropriateness of reputation approaches for facilitating market-selection
decisions in a multi-aribute model of resource allocation; and (ii) noting that, as
deﬁned in the previous section, the accuracy of reputation information is
dependent upon other agents’ opinions being accurate. While subjective
Bayesian approaches [165, 96] have been proposed to deal with inaccurate
reputation information, they have not been applied in this type of domain, which,
as will be described, may contain diﬀerent types of agent behaviour. is section
extends the multi-aribute market-based model developed in this thesis by
introducing some of these agent behaviours, so that they can then be
incorporated into simulations to evaluate the appropriateness of subjective
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Bayesian approaches to reputation in this type of market-based model. In line
with the literature [43, 79, 165, 96], we focus on both strategic and non-strategic
non-conformist agent behaviours, but identify how they diﬀer in this model to
others.
6.3.1 Noisy recommenders
Incorrect opinions (or recommendations), i.e., those that diﬀer from reality, are
clearly a problem for the accuracy of reputations, which can lead to poor decision
making. Noisy Recommenders represent traders whose publicly distributed
opinion are: (i) random in nature and likely to diﬀer from their true opinions of
the market-exchanges they are distributing recommendations about; and
(ii) likely to be provided to all agents indiscriminately. at is to say, all traders
will receive the same information. Noisy Recommenders represent traders that
might, for example: (i) have soware faults; (ii) have some process acting on the
inter-agent communication protocol that results in their opinions being
corrupted; or (iii) be programmed to speciﬁcally aempt to distort the reputation
system, but without bias to any type of trader. Noisy recommenders are
represented as a subset of all traders: T NR  T . When a noisy recommender
ai 2 T NR is asked by another trading agent aj 2 T for its opinion τai;mk of
market-exchange agent mk, the opinion it provides, in the form of α and β values,
is generated in a stochastic way. Firstly, randomised bias _μ and scale _σ values are
drawn from uniform distributions:
_μ = U(0; 1)
_σ = U( _σmin; _σmax);
(6.12)
where 0 < _σmin  _σmax. _μ represents the type of opinion that ai will give
regarding market-exchange mk. e larger the value _μ takes, the higher the
opinion of mk that ai communicates. _σ represents the strength of the opinion. e
larger the value _σ takes, the more conﬁdence ai states it has in its opinion of
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market-exchange mk. ai will provide its opinion in the form of an α and β pair,
calculated as follows:
_αai;mk = 1+ _μ  _σ
_βai;mk = 1+ (1  _μ) _σ
(6.13)
While, other models for evaluating Bayesian reputation approaches [166, 165, 96]
consider noisily reported information, it is applied using Gaussian noise centred
in their true opinion. While this may be appropriate in the environments they
consider, e.g., when modelling communication noise or mild data corruption,
because the opinions are in expectation truthful, they don’t model well many
potential types of faulty agent. e deﬁnitions above ensure opinions provided by
noisy recommenders are entirely random, rather than simply noisy versions of
truthful information, which more closely models, for example, bugs in soware
code, which rarely result in Gaussian perturbations of truthful opinions.
6.3.2 Lying recommenders
As well as non-strategic noisy recommenders, agents oen receive strategic
opinions (recommendations) based on malicious information. Malicious opinions
are those that are provided purposely, and in an aempt to alter decisions of
other traders such that one’s own prospects are improved. Inaccurate opinions
are oen provided for two reason: (i) through the distribution of unfairly low
ratings, otherwise known as ‘bad-mouthing’; and (ii) through the distribution of
unfairly inﬂated high ratings [43]. Jin et al. [79] describes two diﬀerent types of
lying that a malicious agent might perform, within a multi-agent reputation
system: (i) Destructive lying is a complementary strategy, i.e., one in which agents
always provide opinions contrary to the reality they have experienced; and
(ii) Collusive lying, where malicious agents form a cohort that aempts to reduce
the reputation of other competing agents, by spreading incorrect opinions in
unison. ese types lying behaviour are quite general, and can be applied to
many open multi-agent systems. However, lying agent’s strategies may be
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diﬀerent in a market-based system, particularly because strategic traders rely on
the decisions of other traders in order to trade, and thus maximise proﬁt.
erefore malicious behaviour, speciﬁc to market-based systems with two-sided
markets, needs to be considered.
e Supply and Demand Atta
Supply and demand in a market run by one of the market-exchanges will
signiﬁcantly aﬀect traders’ transaction prices. A reduction in the number of
buyers within a market, for example, will result in reduced demand for the
resource within that market, lowering transaction prices—a desirable situation for
buyers. Alternatively, an increase in the number of buyers (or a reduction in the
number of sellers), resulting in an increase in demand (or reduction in supply),
will tend to increase transaction prices within the market—a desirable situation
for sellers.
e Supply and Demand Aa occurs when a trader ai speciﬁcally decides
what type of opinion to provide to a requesting trader aj, by considering whether
aj is a competitor to ai. e aim of this strategy is to alter the supply and demand
within a market, in the hope that the price of resources in the market becomes
more favourable for the aacker. Consider, as described in Chapter 5, a trader
context T made up of populations of traders with diﬀerent preferences and/or
constraints. As previously discussed, cohorts of these traders will form market
segments, and prefer to trade the same resources, which will, when market
niching is occurring, be provided by a market-exchange’s market. While traders
previously only used private information to make market-selection decisions,
with a reputation approach some traders could strategically aempt to either
aract or repel certain types of traders to or from the market they are trading in;
particularly if they had ways of identifying them easily.
Next, consider three trading agents a1, a2 and a3, each of which are
members of a subset T1 of traders occupying the same market segment, indicating
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the traders prefer to trade the same resources. Two traders (a1 and a2) are buyers,
while the other (a3) is a seller. Each agent would prefer to join the same resource
markets, and, in a longterm cooperative manner, each would be beer oﬀ by
sharing information about market-selection with each other, hopefully
encouraging more traders in the segment to join and creating a healthy market.
Assume that a1 is asked by a2 and a3 for its opinion of market-exchange mk. If one
assumes that a1, a buyer, is aware that a2 is a buyer and that a3 is a seller, if a1 was
using the supply and demand aack strategy, it would provide a truthful opinion
to a3, and a malicious and dishonest opinion to a2. us, the intended result of the
supply and demand aack, is to encourage traders you wish to trade
with—buyers try and aract sellers, seller try and aract buyers—to the same
market as you (by supplying truthful opinions), and to discourage competing
traders from joining the same market as you, with the intention of altering the
supply or demand in your favour. More formally, a trader ai who is using the
Supply and Demand Aa will provide an opinion to another trader aj, regarding
market-exchange mk, in the form of α and β values, as follows:
αai;mk =
8>><>>:
βai;mk if fai; ajg  Ts ^ (fai; ajg  B) _ fai; ajg  S))
αai;mk otherwise
βai;mk =
8>><>>:
αai;mk if fai; ajg  Ts ^ (fai; ajg  B) _ fai; ajg  S))
βai;mk otherwise
(6.14)
where B and S are the sets of all buyers and sellers respectively, and Ts refers to a
subset of traders all interested in the same type resource type, and thus from the
same market segment s. us, ai provides either honest opinions to a trader who
it may wish to trade with (or who poses no competitive threat), and dishonest
opinions to those traders who are directly competing over the same resources; as
shown in Equation 6.14, dishonest opinions are provided in the form of opposite
opinions.
191
CHAPTER 6. IMPROVED RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS USING SUBJECTIVE
REPUTATIONS
6.3.3 Trader urn
Trader churn is an important aspect of the extension to Chapter 4’s model
considered in this chapter. In many multi-agent systems, agent churn is a reality,
as agents leave and join the system. In P2P systems, the notion of node urn has
been well studied [162, 161], with overall conclusions suggesting that it is an
important aspect of any dynamic system, which should be considered when
designing multi-agent systems [36].
However, subjective Bayesian reputation approaches have not yet
considered the impact that trader churn within a market-based system might
have on the eﬀectiveness of the reputation mechanism. Trader churn may have a
signiﬁcant impact on the performance of the system. In other applications it is
oen the case that all agents are either universally good or bad, thus, when a new
agent joins the system it can be given reputation information informing it of the
bad agents to avoid (either interacting with, or using opinions o). However, in
this system new agents have to learn, via reputation information, more subtle
diﬀerences, such as that some markets may be good to one trader, but the same
market bad to another. erefore, it is important that the reputation approach can
accurately provide useful information to newcomers in the system, as well as be
robust to information loss from traders leaving. Trader churn describes the
process of traders entering and leaving the system over time. Speciﬁcally trader
churn is deﬁned in this model as:
• Trader Entry: when new traders enter the system with a lack of any
knowledge about the behaviour of other traders, and thus have uncertain
market-selection signals;
• Trader Exit: when traders who have spent time interacting with other
traders and market-exchanges in the environment leave the system.
Importantly, when these traders leave, all the private information they have
on market-exchanges is also removed from the system.
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6.4 A Subjective Reputation Approa for Uncertain
Environments
Section 6.2 described an objective reputation system. Unlike some applications
where an objective reputation system is applicable [120, 121, 98, 188], it is
hypothesised that in a multi-aribute market-based system, an objective
reputation system will not be as eﬀective as a subjective reputation system. In
any marketplace where consumer preferences diﬀer, subjective reputation
mechanisms should be be more advantageous, because they consider agents’
preferences when forming reputations. is section considers subjective Bayesian
reputation approaches [166, 165, 97], and applies them within the context of this
market-based model, so that the eﬀectiveness of this approach can be evaluated in
the next section. In this model, there are two main reasons why a subjective
approach is important:
• Heterogenous trader types: some traders, due to preferences or constraints
on aributes, will not be interested in the same resources. While one
market-exchange may be held in high regard by one portion of the trader
population, it may not be in other sections or segments of the trader
population. Unfortunately, market-exchange reputations in an objective
system are equivalent across traders.
• Inaccurate Recommendation Information: again, because all opinions are
considered equally when forming objective reputations, it is not possible to
distinguish between accurate and inaccurate opinions, which can lead to
undeserved poor reputations [5], or likewise inﬂated good reputations [43].
us, a mechanism is needed to help each trader learn which other traders’
opinions it should incorporate into market-exchange reputations, and to what
degree each should be weighted.
6.4.1 Recommendation weights for trader opinions
As previously deﬁned in Equation 6.9, a trader generates a reputation of a
market-exchange in the form of a beta distribution that combines multiple
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distributions, based on other traders’ interaction histories. By using a
recommendation weight—in the form of the function φ(ai; aj)—that deﬁnes how
useful trader ai considers trader aj’s opinions to be, trader ai can calculate a
personal and subjective distribution to describe market-exchange mk, as shown in
Equation 6.15.
αrep;tai;mk =
jT jX
j=1;j6=i
φ(ai; aj)
h
αtaj;mk   1
i
βrep;tai;mk =
jT jX
j=1;j6=i
φ(ai; aj)
h
βtaj;mk   1
i
(6.15)
e reputation ρtai;mk , which represents the reputation of market-exchange mk,
from the perspective of ai can be calculated in the same way as it was initially, in
Equation 6.10 on Page 186, but with αrep;tai;mk and βrep;tai;mk deﬁned according to
Equation 6.15. While Equation 6.15 still considers all publicly available
information, unlike the objective version, each opinion is weighted
independently. Some opinions are likely to be so unhelpful that their inclusion in
the calculation of ρtai;mk would not help trader ai at all. A trader can exclude these
opinions from the calculation of αrep;tai;mk and βrep;tai;mk , by giving them a
recommendation weight of zero, as follows:
φ(ai; aj) =
8>><>>:
bγai;aj if bγai;aj  bγai
0 otherwise
(6.16)
As one can see from Equation 6.16, the actual recommendation weight from
trader ai to trader aj is represented by bγai;aj , and the function φ(ai; aj) either
returns bγai;aj if it exceeds a minimum threshold bγai , or zero otherwise; thus,
traders in the system must have a recommendation weight of at least bγai for
trader ai to consider their opinions at all.
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6.4.2 Learning recommendation weights
Next, how a trader learns bγai;aj over time, is described. As with the rest of the
Bayesian reputation approach, one can use a Beta distribution to model the
process that describes the probability of trader ai receiving a useful opinion from
a trader aj, and set bγai;aj as the expected value of this distribution. When ai built
trust τai;mk in market-exchange mk, it updated αai;mk and βai;mk according to the
outcome οai;mk of interactions with mk. It does something similar to update bγai;aj ,
by updating bαai;mk and bβai;mk according to how useful an opinion given by another
trader aj was. To do this, however, one needs to quantify what useful opinion
means. Liu and Issarny [97, 96] describe a technique for quantifying whether an
opinion was useful, which is adapted for this model, though with new notation
applied. e technique works as follows: once a trader ai has interacted with a
market-exchange mk at time t, it takes each of the independent opinion
distributions it received from other traders at time t  1, and measures how
accurately those opinion distributions each predicted the outcome of the
interaction ai had with mk. From Equation 6.5, it is known that an outcome
between ai and mk depends on whether or not ai traded and made a proﬁt on the
exchange, and is the form οai;mk 2 f0; 0:5; 1:0g. erefore, to measure how
accurately an opinion from trader aj to ai at time t  1 predicts οtai;mk , one sees how
much of f(pjαt 1aj;mk ; βt 1aj;mk) falls into the range [οtai;mk   "ai ; οtai;mk + "ai ], as follows:
Λaj;tai;mk =
Z
min(οtai;mk+"ai ;1)
max(οtai;mk "ai ;0)
uα
t 1
aj;mk 1(1  u)βt 1aj;mk 1duZ 1
0
uα
t 1
aj;mk 1(1  u)βt 1aj;mk 1du
= Itοtai;mk+"ai (α
t 1
aj;mk ; β
t 1
aj;mk)  Itοtai;mk "ai (α
t 1
aj;mk ; β
t 1
aj;mk)
(6.17)
In Equation 6.17, Λaj;tai;mk measures the probability of an interaction outcome οai;mk
between ai and mk, falling in the range [οai;mk   "ai ; οai;mk + "ai ], according to the
opinion provided by trader aj. e term Itοtai;mk is the Regularised Incomplete Beta
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Function, which is the cumulative distribution function for the Beta distribution.
Calculating Λaj;tai;mk forms only part of the technique for measuring the usefulness
of aj’s opinion. Next, Λaj;tai;mk is compared to the probability of οtai;mk falling into the
range [οtai;mk   "ai ; οtai;mk + "ai ] according to the prior beta distribution, which we
measure as:
Λmin;tai;mk = I
t
οtai;mk+"ai
(1; 1)  Itοtai;mk "ai (1; 1) (6.18)
Λaj;tai;mk and Λmin;tai;mk can then be compared to ascertain just how useful trader aj’s
opinion was:
bοaj;tai;mk = max(min(Λaj;tai;mk   Λmin;tai;mk + 0:5; 1:0); 0:0) (6.19)
Equation 6.19 ensures that the usefulness of an opinion, bοaj;tai;mk , from trader aj to ai,
regarding mk, falls in the range [0; 1]. If Λaj;tai;mk > Λmin;tai;mk then trader ai can treat
trader aj’s opinion as useful, since it provides a more accurate probability of οt 1ai;mk
falling into the range [οtai;mk   "ai ; οtai;mk + "ai ] than the prior beta distribution; in
such a case bοaj;tai;mk > 0:5. On the other hand, if it is the case that Λaj;tai;mk < Λmin;tai;mk
then aj has provided an opinion to ai that is less useful than the one that would be
provided by the prior distribution, viz the reputation for mk formed by ai using
information from aj would have been more accurate if ai had excluded the
opinion from aj; in such a case bοaj;tai;mk < 0:5. Finally, if the opinion from aj’s
distribution is equally useful to the usefulness of one from a prior distribution
then bοaj;tai;mk = 0:5. Once the usefulness of an opinion bοaj;tai;mk has been calculated, it
can be used to update the shape parameters bαai;aj and bβai;aj for the beta
distribution that is being used to provide ai’s recommendation weight for aj:
bαt+1ai;aj = bαtai;aj + bοtai;ajbβt+1ai;aj = bβtai;aj + 1  bοtai;aj (6.20)
us, this distribution is updated in the same way as the one that is used for
calculating trust values in Equation 6.6 on Page 182. Finally, the recommendation
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weight that trader ai maintains for trader aj, in terms of the expected value of the
beta distribution formed from bαai;aj and bβai;aj can be deﬁned:
bγai;aj = E[pai;aj jbαai;aj ; bβai;aj ] = bαai;ajbαai;aj + bβai;aj ;where bαai;aj ; bβai;aj > 0 (6.21)
Recall that when using the objective reputation system in Section 6.2, a trader
uses only trust as its market-selection signal, if it believes that it has enough
conﬁdence in its trust value of a market-exchange, which is based on information
gathered from previous direct interactions (Equation 6.7). If if ﬁnds that it is not
conﬁdent enough in its own trust value, it will seek the opinions of others, and
form a reputation value by combining others’ opinions with its own trust, which
will then be used as the market-selection signal. In order to decide whether to use
reputation in market-selection signal formation, a parameter γai , representing the
conﬁdence threshold trader ai needs to be set. Using the subjective approach,
however, this parameter can be removed from the system, and replaced by bγai ,
which sets the threshold at which opinions are excluded. By always considering
other traders’ opinions, and using φ(ai; aj) to decide on their inclusion (and to
what degree of inﬂuence), a trader does not need to make an either/or decision
between its own direct information and publicly available information, but can
make a more ﬁne-grained decision, which can be based on some public
information, rather than based on no public information or all of it. In terms of
the subjective reputation system, once reputation ρtai;aj has been formed in
Equation 6.10, using the subjectively weighted values from Equation 6.15 the
market-selection signal simply becomes:
ςtai;aj = ρ
t
ai;aj (6.22)
Given this approach, the decision step involving whether to use exclusively trust
or reputation is removed, and they will be combined when making
market-selection decisions. Trust based on direct interactions always has a
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recommendation weight of 1:0, however the constant adjusting of
recommendation weights for the other traders means that the inﬂuence of
reputation information on market-selection can be adapted over time, according
to the environmental situation. is section concludes with an example of the
diﬀerence a subjective reputation system approach can make over an objective
one. In Figure 6.2 on Page 185, four separate beta distributions (three of which
were opinions from other traders) were objectively aggregated to form a
reputation using a combined Beta distribution, the expected value of which was
the objective reputation value. In Figure 6.3, the same four distributions are
assumed but with recommendation weights associated with them. e prior
distribution shown in this example belongs to the trader ai seeking opinions, thus
it has a recommendation weight bγai;ai = 1:0. Figure 6.3a plots the various beta
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Figure 6.3: e same collection of beta distributions as ﬁrst shown in Figure 6.2a
(Page 185) but weighted according to recommendation weights bγ. Note that when
combined, one of the distributions is disregarded in the calculation, due to its bγ =
0:1 value being below a threshold value (set atbγ = 0:65).e resulting distribution
has a high expected value of 0.84, unlike the unweighted one in Figure 6.2b, which
has an expected value of 0.43.
distributions formed from ai’s unknown prior distribution, and the opinions of
the other traders, weighted by the associated recommendation weights. Unlike
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the distributions in Figure 6.2a, the recommendation weights move the
distributions closer to the unknown prior distribution by an amount proportional
to their recommendation weight. When these distributions are combined, one of
them is ignored because their recommendation weight does not exceed the
recommendation threshold—in this example γai = 0:65. e remaining two
opinion distributions, and the trust distribution, which is the prior, due to ai’s
lack of direct interactions with the market-exchange in question, are combined to
form the overall reputation distribution in Figure 6.3b. In this example, the
market-selection signal ςai;mk = ρai;mk = E[pai;mk jbαai;mk ; bβai;mk] = 0:84, which is in
stark contrast to the objective reputation information, where all available sources
were included, resulting in ςai;mk = 0:43.
6.5 An Empirical Analysis of Reputation Approaes
In this section, both the objective and subjective Bayesian reputation approaches
described in this chapter are empirically assessed within a variety of
environmental contexts. Experiments in Section 6.5.1 concern the impacts of
trader churn on the system, and the impact a basic objective Bayesian approach
has. In Sections 6.5.2 and 6.5.3 false reporting is considered, in terms of the two
recommender behaviour models previously introduced, and a subjective
reputation approach is compared to an objective approach. Finally, in
Section 6.5.4 an initial statistical analysis is carried out on the formation and
emergence of recommendation networks between traders.
6.5.1 e eﬀects of trader urn on system performance
is section addresses the following research question:
What impact does trader urn have on traders’ proﬁtability and the overall
allocative eﬃciency in the system, and to what extent can reputation
information improve these metrics?
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is set of experiments is concerned with the impact that trader churn, as
described in Section 6.3.3, has on the allocative eﬃciency of the market-based
system under two experimental variants: (i) when traders use the ε-greedy
market-selection strategy that uses private historical proﬁt; and (ii) when traders
use the reputation-based market-selection strategy deﬁned in Section 6.2.3, on
Page 186. Recall that some unsuitable market-exchanges, e.g., those whose
resource markets don’t satisfy constraints, will be considered inept and not make
it into traders’ consideration sets. However, a trader needs time to learn which of
the exchanges that are in the consideration set will result in the most proﬁtable
trades when joined. In a large system, with many competing market-exchanges in
the environment, one would imagine several market-exchanges would end up
competing over market niches, resulting in traders having many choices in their
consideration sets. For a new trader—a newcomer–learning which of these
exchanges would be most proﬁtable to join takes time, and without any form of
public information about previous trader proﬁts made in the markets, newcomer
trading agents will likely make costly mistakes learning which of the
market-exchanges are most proﬁtable. Based on this reasoning, the following
hypothesis is formed:
Hypothesis 6.1. Allocative eﬃciency will be higher when traders have access to the
reputations of market-exanges, because reputation information provides a
market-selection signal to traders, whi in the absence of reputation they would
otherwise have to spend time learning directly.
Experimental setup
Hypothesis 6.1 is tested using the following simulation environment. To simulate
the scenario of multiple exchanges competing over the same niche, nine
market-exchanges are simulated. To simplify analysis, each market-exchange
provides the same market for trading resources with aribute-levels of
π = h1:0; 1:0i. However, each exchange has diﬀerent charging schemes. Results in
Chapter 5 suggested that it is diﬃcult to correlate explicit charges and fees with
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Number of Registration Transaction Bid/Ask
Market-exchanges Fee Fee Commission
3 0.01 0.01% 0.0%
3 0.05 0.02% 0.0%
3 0.02 0.03% 0.0%
Table 6.1: ree types of charging scheme were split equally across nine market-
exchanges. For more details on charging schemes see Section 4.1.1, on Page 85.
While it may seem intuitive that the cheapest market-exchange is best to join,
Shi et al. [154] has shown that there exist Nash equilibria in environments with
competing marketplace where all traders migrate to more expensive markets. It is
therefore non-trivial for a trader to know initially which market-exchange is best
to join each day.
how proﬁtable a market may be. Many other factors eﬀect market-selection, and
because one market-exchange is cheaper than others, does not mean that it will
be the best market to join [154], because complex dynamics based on the volumes
of traders within each market aﬀect where they migrate to, and thus which
market is most proﬁtable. erefore, it is non-trivial for a trader to know initially
which market-exchange is best to join each day. Table 6.1 provides details of how
charging schemes were instantiated on market-exchanges. For these simulations
the unconstrained single nie deﬁned in Section 5.3.1 (Page 135) was used, which
meant all exchanges and traders competed over the same market niche. At all
times there were 300 traders within the system; every time a new trader joined
the system, a trader was randomly selected to leave the system. Each newcomer
trader was randomly initialised according to the same parameters as the other
traders, i.e., with budgets constraints in the same range. Each simulation lasted
for 5000 trading days, and was repeated 50 times. For this analysis the distributed
nature of traders, and that they may not be able to communicate with all others is
not considered; thus, when calculating reputations, all traders can access all
others’ opinions. Further, this set of experiments only concerns itself with the
impact of churn, thus there are no noisy recommenders or lying agents in the
system. e exploration parameter used in both the reputation-based and private
value based market-selection strategies was set to the most common value
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ε = 0:1.
Experimental results
Hypothesis 6.1 was tested by running two sets of experimental simulations. In the
ﬁrst set, traders use the ε-greedy strategy to learn market-selection signals based
upon their historical proﬁt in markets. In the second set of simulations the traders
used the reputation-based market-selection strategy (Section 6.2.3), where they
choose between market-exchanges by calculating their reputations from asking
other traders within the system. Both sets of experiments were executed with
varying levels of trader urn in the system, ranging from 0%–10%. e same level
of churn was maintained for the duration of a simulation. Figure 6.4 shows the
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Figure 6.4: Overall mean system allocative eﬃciency for varying levels of trader
churn. Each point represents the mean system eﬃciency resulting from the type
of simulation deﬁned by the churn rate (x axis). ‘Private Information Only’ refers
to simulation where traders can only use their own proﬁt information to make
market-selection decisions, while ‘Reputation Information’ refers to simulations
where traders can ask other traders for opinions on market-exchanges, and use the
resulting reputations to make market-selection decisions. As the plot shows, in the
absence of any reputation information to form a market-selection signal for new
traders, allocative eﬃciency is reduced as the proportion of new traders increases.
Allocative eﬃciency is measured using the algorithm deﬁned in Chapter 4.
impact that both trader urn and the presence or absence of reputation has on
the allocative eﬃciency of the system; there are a number of interesting
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observations. Firstly, in the absence of churn, both private information and
reputation information based approaches lead to allocations with similar
eﬃciencies: 92% and 91.6% respectively. A t-test of equality of means¹ returns a
p-value < 0:005, which although signiﬁcant, the performance between the two is
very close with only a 0.4% diﬀerence in eﬃciency. is result is not surprising,
because private direct information is always more accurate, and in the absence of
churn traders can recoup the cost of learning, but the reputation approach
certainly does not substantially reduce the eﬃciency of allocations. However, as
the experimental variations are run with increasing levels of daily churn, the
detrimental aﬀect that trader churn has on the allocative eﬃciency of the system
becomes apparent. Even at low levels of churn, if newcomer traders can leverage
reputation information, they can locate the best markets faster, and much more
eﬃcient allocations are observed. ere is a clear statistical signiﬁcance between
the two setups for the 2–10% churn cases; for example, a t-test of equality of
means for the 10% case returns a p-value < 0:005 and a t-value of 15:11. When
reputation is available, newcomer traders can quickly be notiﬁed via other
traders’ opinions, which of the exchanges are the best to join, which leads to
more traders trading in the same market, and thus more eﬃcient outcomes. While
the trend in Figure 6.4 suggests that increases in churn always aﬀects eﬃciency,
this is likely because the dynamics created by traders joining and leaving can
aﬀect the equilibrium price of the market, which the traders must learn to adapt
to, using their ZIP pricing algorithms.
Finally, Figure 6.5 shows the impact that trader churn has on the proportion
of system proﬁts the traders keep, in the absence of presence of reputation. While
the manner in which the total utility—measured as proﬁt—of an allocation is split
between exchanges and traders does not aﬀect that allocation’s eﬃciency, it is of
interest to know what impact the reputation approach has on traders’ share of
system proﬁts. In the absence of reputation, trader proﬁt-share drops as churn
¹All simulation allocative eﬃciency data samples tested within this chapter were found to be
normally distributed.
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Figure 6.5: Given the overall mean system utility, as measured in proﬁts, this ﬁgure
shows the proportion of total system proﬁts kept by the trader population. e re-
mainder of the proﬁts are taken by the market-exchanges through fees and charges.
When the traders use the reputation approach to market-selection, they join the
more proﬁtable markets faster, because they use others’ opinions to form market-
exchange reputations. As the simulations are repeated with increasing levels of
churn, trader proﬁts are generally maintained at the same level in the reputation
approach. However, in the absence of reputation the impact of newcomer traders
making costly mistakes exploring diﬀerent market becomes apparent.
increases, consistent with newcomer traders joining expensive markets or ones
they can’t trade in—part of the private learning process. With the reputation
approach, however, there is no distinguishable drop in trader proﬁt-share as
churn increases because market-selection signals can be provided by reputation
information.
6.5.2 Dealing with noisy recommenders
In this and the next sections, comparisons between a subjective and objective
reputation approach and are made. Of particular interest is how each of these
approaches deal with: (i) diﬀerent types of recommender traders; and (ii) trader
contexts with traders that have diﬀerent preferences and constraints over
resources, and thus prefer diﬀerent niches. e following research questions are
of immediate interest:
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• How well do objective and subjective reputation approaes provide
market-selection signals to traders in multi-nie environments?
• What impact do increasing levels of noisy recommenders have on resource
allocations when objective and subjective reputation approaes are utilised?
Traders who are satisﬁed by diﬀerent market niches will prefer to trade in
diﬀerent resource markets. erefore, positive or negative opinions may be
helpful or unhelpful to diﬀerent traders in a multi-niche environment.
Hypothesis 6.2. Market-selection signals that are formed using a subjective
reputation approa will be more accurate than those formed using an objective
reputation approa, because traders can subjectively adjust the importance of
diﬀerent traders’ opinions in forming market-selection signals.
And, in terms of the second research question above:
Hypothesis 6.3. In the presence of noisy recommenders, resource allocations will
always be more eﬃcient when market-selection signals are formed using a subjective
approa, because it enables traders to identify noisy recommenders and ignore their
opinions.
Experimental setup
is section is concerned with environments where reputation approaches are
assumed to be required, and is investigating diﬀerences between an objective and
subjective approach. In adherence, the system is assumed to have a reasonable
amount of churn (10%) at all times. Further, in the spirit of extending the previous
Chapter’s work, market-exchanges are now able to adjust their aribute-levels, in
this case using ε-greedy aribute-level selection strategies. Again, nine
market-exchanges are considered, with the same charging schemes in Table 6.1.
In terms of traders, the constraint-induced nies trader context (Section 5.3.1,
Page 135), where there are multiple niches, is used. erefore, in this set of
experiments, nine market-exchanges are adapting in an aempt to ﬁnd market
niches within an environment where 300 traders have potentially diﬀerent
preferences and constraints over resources, creating dynamic environments and
diﬃcult market-selection decisions for new traders.
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Noisy recommenders are chosen randomly at initialisation time. If a noisy
recommender leaves the system it is replaced by a new one; further, a new trader
has the same preferences and constraints as the one its replaces, but a randomly
generated budget constraint. Noisy recommenders use: _σmin = 10; _σmax = 30,
which allowed for reasonably strong opinions. e Bayesian reputation
mechanism’s parameters, aer some initial exploratory simulations, were chosen
inline with other studies that have made use of similar Bayesian approaches [97].
Traders discount their opinions according to Δt = 0:95; conﬁdence bounds on
Beta distributions are measured using " = 0:4; when using the objective approach
the conﬁdence threshold γai = 0:6, while for the subjective approach the
recommendation weight threshold, used to indicate when to completely ignore
an agent’s opinions was set to bγai = 0:6.
Experimental results
Each data point reported is the mean value from 50 simulation repetitions. We
ﬁrst test Hypothesis 6.2 by comparing allocative eﬃciency values for two
experimental variations: one using the objective reputation approach in
Section 6.2, and one using the subjective approach described in Section 6.4. When
traders used the objective approach and there were no noisy recommenders,
mean allocative eﬃciency was 44:0% 3:9% versus 66:1% 3:7% when the
subjective system was in place. A t-test of equality of means resulted in a p-value
< 0:005, thus these means are statistically distinct and Hypothesis 6.2 can be
accepted. Figure 6.6 presents results from simulations with varying proportions of
noisy recommender in the trader population. Simulations with 0%–50% of noisy
recommenders were considered. e allocative eﬃciency of the system was
signiﬁcantly higher for all simulations where the subjective approach was used,
therefore Hypothesis 6.3 is accepted. Rather interestingly, allocative eﬃciency is
maintained even when 50% of the traders are providing random opinions, with
the subjective reputation approach in use. Without the support of the subjective
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Figure 6.6: Mean system allocative eﬃciency for simulations involving varying lev-
els of noisy recommenders in the trader population. A subjective reputation ap-
proach is quite resilient to very high levels of noisy recommenders, and accurate
market-selection signals are still available even when 50% of the population is pro-
viding random opinions. By observing the results for 0% noisy recommenders it is
possible to accept Hypothesis 6.2.
reputation approach, noisy recommenders certainly have a harmful impact in the
system, as seen by a reduction in allocative eﬃciency for proportions of 30% or
more. Figure 6.7 shows the incremental change in allocative eﬃciency as the
proportion of noisy recommenders is increased. Again, eﬃciency loss gets worse
in the objective reputation case, as the proportion of noisy recommenders
decreases. Clearly, the subjective reputation system is performing very well, in
terms of allowing traders to ignore noisy recommenders. Finally in this section,
trader recommendation connection dynamics are analysed. Recall that if ai’s
recommendation weight bγai;aj of aj is in excess threshold bγai = 0:65, ai uses aj’s
opinion in reputation calculation, otherwise it is ignored. e following
deﬁnitions, using the constraint-induced nies trader context notation introduced
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Figure 6.7: Incremental change in allocative eﬃciency experiments with increas-
ing proportions of noisy recommenders. Not only does an objective reputation ap-
proach result in reduced eﬃciency as noisy recommenders increase, but the change
in eﬃciency getsworse as the proportion of noise recommenders increases. Provid-
ing an explanation for some eﬃciency increases with noisy recommendations, e.g.,
from 0–10%, requires further investigation, but it is expected that it is increasing
the explorative nature of traders, which may suggest that ε seing used for their
reputation-based market-selection strategies may not be optimal.
in Section 5.3.1, are provided to help label diﬀerent cohorts of traders:
B1 = fai 2 T : ai 2 B \ T CI1 g
B2 = fai 2 T : ai 2 B \ T CI2 g
S1 = fai 2 T : ai 2 S \ T CI1 g
S2 = fai 2 T : ai 2 S \ T CI2 g
Due to constraints in the constraint-induced nies trader context, B1 and B2
buyers prefer to trade in the same markets as S1 and S2 traders respectively. us,
to a trader ai 2 B1, for example, the opinions of a trader aj 2 B2 [ S2 are not
going to be helpful, because they are interested in diﬀerent market niches.
Figure 6.8 visualises the mean frequency of recommendation weights bγai;aj  bγai
(considered maintained recommendation connections) between diﬀerent cohorts of
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Figure 6.8: Mean frequency of recommender connections maintained between dif-
ferent cohorts of traders. Cohorts are identiﬁed as follows. ‘B’ refers to buyer and
‘S’ to seller, traders. ‘1’ and ‘2’ refer to diﬀerent preference and constraint seings.
Traders in this trader context prefer to trade one of two types of resource, thus there
are twomarket niches in the environment, whichmarket-exchangeswill try to ﬁnd.
‘B1’ and ‘S1’ traders would prefer a separate market to ‘B2’ and ‘S2’ traders. ere-
fore, opinions from traders in ‘1’ cohorts will not be helpful to traders in ‘2’ cohorts,
and if traders’ recommendation weights for other decrease below the conﬁdence
threshold they will ignore the associated traders’ opinions. Firstly, the subjective
approach enables traders to only maintain recommendation connections (and thus
consider opinions) to traders that are helpful. Secondly, as the proportion of noisy
traders increases, traders ignore their opinions, as evidenced by a general reduction
in connections. One side eﬀect of noisy recommenders is that due to their random
recommendations, a small proportion of otherwise useless recommenders in fact
provide (by chance) useful recommendations. is is seen in the small increase in
some connection frequencies.
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traders using the subjective reputation approach. ere are two interesting
observations: (i) traders maintain more recommendation connections to traders
whose opinions are helpful to them, i.e, are interested in the same markets; and
(ii) less recommendation connections are maintained as the proportion of noisy
recommenders increases. is suggests that not only does the subjective
approach enable traders to identify noisy recommenders and ignore them, but it
also appears to enable traders to identify and consider opinions from traders who
are interested in the same markets.
6.5.3 Dealing with lying recommenders
e empirical comparison between objective and subjective reputation
approaches is continued in this set of experiments by assessing the impact of
lying recommenders. e main research question to answer in this section is:
What impact do increasing levels of lying recommenders have on resource
allocations when objective and subjective reputation approaes are utilised?
Based upon the success of the previous experiments an intuitive hypothesis
would be:
Hypothesis 6.4. In the presence of lying recommenders, resource allocations will
always be more eﬃcient when market-selection signals are formed using a subjective
approa, because it enables traders to identify lying recommenders and ignore their
opinions.
An experimental setup identical to the last set of experiments is used, with the
exception that lying recommenders are used instead of noisy recommenders.
Experimental Results
Each simulation was repeated 50 times, and mean results are reported. Again,
experimental variations with increasing numbers of lying recommenders are
carried out, as shown in Figure 6.9. In a similar fashion to the experiments
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Figure 6.9: Mean allocative eﬃciency for simulations involving various levels of
lying recommenders that are using the Supply and Demand Aa. Lying recom-
menders, because of their strategic information manipulation, are very damaging
to the overall system eﬃciency, when, in the objective reputation approach, their
opinions are considered equally to others. Lying recommenders speciﬁcally try to
disrupt market equilibria to increase their own proﬁts, which leads to ineﬃcient
allocations. Traders using the subjective reputation approach, however, are able to
ignore the opinions of traders using this aack, resulting in the maintenance of
high allocative eﬃciencies even when 50% of the opinions in the system are lies.
involving noisy recommenders, we ﬁnd that the even with half of the trader
population aempting to subvert the reputation of some market-exchanges,
allocative eﬃciency is maintained only when the subjective reputation system is
in use. Of particular interest is that the impact of lying recommenders is far more
detrimental to the system than noisy recommenders, yet the subjective reputation
approach still performs equally well. us, Hypothesis 6.4 is also accepted.
Figure 6.10 clearly shows that as the proportion of Lying Recommenders is
increased, the change in system allocative eﬃciency is minimal, while when the
objective reputation approach is used, eﬃciencies get progressively worse as the
proportion of liars increases. Finally, a recommender connection analysis is
performed and visualised in Figure 6.11. In contrast to the noisy recommender
simulations (Figure 6.8), only certain cohorts of traders have their connections
reduced as the number of liars using the Supply and Demand Aa increases.
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Figure 6.10: As with the experiments looking at the proportion of noisy recom-
menders, in this set of experiments the use of an objective reputation system results
in the incremental change in allocative eﬃciency geing worse as the proportion
of lying traders increases.
us, lying traders will only have their opinions ignored by a section of the
population, because they still provide truthful opinions to other sections. is is a
useful property in these types of market-based system where opinions may be
both helpful and unhelpful to diﬀerent traders.
6.5.4 Recommender Network analysis
is section analyses some of the topological properties of the recommender
networks that emerge within the system. A recommender network is a directed
graph containing all the trader in the system, where an edge from trader ai to
trader aj indicates that ai uses aj’s opinion when forming reputations of
market-exchanges. Formally, given a recommender network graph G(T ;E),
where T is the set of all traders and E  T  T is the set of directed edges
between traders, in the form of ordered pairs  ai; aj, which satisfy:
bγai;aj  bγai ()  ai; aj 2 E; (6.23)
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Figure 6.11: Mean frequency of recommender connections maintained between dif-
ferent cohorts of traders in simulations where there are varying proportions of
lying recommenders. For explanations of the cohort labels and associated types
see Figure 6.8 and Section 6.5.2. An increase in lying recommender proportions re-
sults in traders reducing the number of recommender connections it maintains to
its own type. is is because lying recommenders only lie to traders who they are
in competition with. For example, in the top le ﬁgure ‘B2’ traders ignore more
‘B2’ traders as the proportion of liars increase (top le), but the recommendation
frequencies of helpful traders, e.g., ‘S2’ traders (that may also be liars), are not sig-
niﬁcantly eﬀected. erefore, the subjective reputation approach allows traders to
ignore or include selected types of traders when forming reputations, even if those
traders’ opinions are helpful or unhelpful to other traders.
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where bγai;aj is the recommendation weight ai holds for aj and bγai is ai’s conﬁdence
threshold for including other traders’ opinions. e recommendation weight
learning process that occurs when agents are using the subjective reputation
approach is particularly interesting, and understanding more about the resulting
recommendation networks may help take a step towards the beer design of
reputation approaches for multi-aribute resource allocation systems. e
overarching research question within this section is:
What kinds of topological properties do recommender networks, emerging as a
result of trader learning processes, possess?
As well as wishing to visualise the recommender networks in order to
qualitatively analyse some of the topological properties, a statistical quantitative
analysis of the recommender hierary is carried out. In many real-world
marketplaces and social hubs there exist inﬂuential entities that
coordinate—intentionally or not—the decisions of other entities in the system, by
facilitating consensus between other system participants. Examples of these
inﬂuencers might include newspaper critics, ﬁnancial advisors, or prominent
academics. ese types of networks can be useful in distributed systems,
particularly if consensus and coordination are desirable properties. Such
properties are certainly useful for the model studied within this thesis, because it
can encourage the self-organisation of traders into markets that satisfy their
market niche, leading to more eﬃcient resource allocations. Of particular interest
is whether the recommendation weight learning process within the subjective
reputation approach results in the emergence of inﬂuential traders that might
provide useful opinions to many traders, thus imposing consensus on
market-selection.
ere are many ways to measure how inﬂuential a trader is. Graph
theorists, for example, might look at the centrality [16] of the trader in the
recommender network, but given our recommendation network is weighted, that
analysis doesn’t capture the notion of inﬂuence very well. Rather, by asking each
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trader for their favoured recommenders, e.g., their top three by recommendation
weight strength, and then building a new Favourite Recommender graph, based on
that information from all traders, a more meaningful analysis can be performed.
Deﬁnition 6.1. (Favourite Recommender Graph): is a subgraph bG k(T ;E k) of the
recommendation network graph G(T ;E), where the Favourite Recommender
Graph edge set E k contains for each ai at most k ordered pairs of edges
(ai; aj) 2 E k. In the case that ai has more than k edges (ai; aj) in the
recommendation network graph edge set E, the k edges (ai; aj) 2 E with the
largest bγai;aj values are put into E k, subject to bγai;aj  bγai .
erefore, based on Deﬁnition 6.1, the Favourite Recommender Graph will be a
subgraph of the recommender network graph where for each trader vertex
ai 2 T , the trader’s strongest k recommendation weights to other traders are
represented as directed outgoing edges (ai; aj). If k = jT j   1 thenbG k(T ;E k)  G(T ;E), while in the case that k = 1, each trader in the graph has at
most one outgoing edge to the trader whose opinions they ﬁnd most helpful.
Given an ordered pair (ai; aj) 2 E k, aj is deﬁned as a favoured recommender of ai.
Measuring the number of incoming edges that each trader has (its
in-degree) in a Favoured Recommender Graph, it is possible to build an in-degree
frequency distribution, and reveal the proportion of traders that are generally
favoured more than others (and thus have a high in-degree). However, in many
topologies it is common for some vertices to have more edges than others, even
when randomly generated. To know whether an underlying mechanism is
responsible for the in-degree distribution of the Favourite Recommender Graph
(rather than it being a random artefact), one can compare a Favourite
Recommender Graph frequency distribution to one that is randomly generated
using the same recommender network supergraph.
Deﬁnition 6.2. Random Recommender Graph: A Random Recommender GrapheG k(T ;E k) is a subgraph of a recommender network graph G(T ;E). It is formed
in almost exactly the same way as the Favourite Recommender Graph bG k(T ;E k)
in Deﬁnition 6.1, with following diﬀerence: rather than selecting the top k
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ordered pairs (ai; aj) according to ai’s recommendation weight for each aj, for
each ai, k pairs are randomly chosen from the set of pairs (ai; aj) 2 E, subject tobγai;aj  bγai . us, eG k(T ;E k) is a random subgraph of G(T ;E), where each trader
ai has at most k outgoing edges.
0 10 20 30 40
100
101
102
103
104
105
Trader in−degree
Tr
ad
er
 F
re
qu
en
cy
Favourite Recommender Graph
0 10 20 30 40
100
101
102
103
104
105
Trader in−degree
Tr
ad
er
 F
re
qu
en
cy
Random Recommender Graph
Figure 6.12: In-degree frequency density functions for the Favourite Recommender
Graph and the Random Recommender Graph, built from a recommendation network
graph taken from a typical simulation. e Favourite Recommender Graph has a
longer tail, indicating that most traders are not considered favoured recommenders
by any other traders (le side of distribution), but a few traders are considered
favoured recommenders by many traders (right side of distribution). erefore, a
few traders within the system are very inﬂuential. Because the Random Recom-
mender Graph is randomly generated from the same supergraph, and the distribu-
tions are statistically distinct, it is argued that a non-random process is responsible
for the emergence of these inﬂuential traders.
In Figure 6.12, the in-degree frequency distributions for a Favourite
Recommender Graph from a typical simulation, is calculated and ploed, where
k = 3. Firstly, many traders have an in-degree of zero, indicating that most
traders are not considered favoured recommenders by others, however a few
traders have very high in-degrees, indicating that in some cases up to 40 traders
(13% of the population) consider them as one of their favoured recommenders.
e Kolmogorov–Smirnov² (KS) test non-parametrically tests the null hypothesis
²e K-S test assumes that a continuous empirical CDF [155] is provided, as this allows the KS
statistic to converge to a well behaved distribution, as the sample size approaches inﬁnity; thus the
KS test in the discrete case is an approximation.
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that the frequency of events observed in two independent samples are consistent
with each other, i.e., arise from the same distribution. Williams [181] provides
several arguments as to why the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test may be more
accurate than the more commonly used Pearson’s Chi-Squared Test [131], which
also only allows one to compare against a theoretical distribution. Performing the
KS test on the two distributions shown in Figure 6.12 reveals that the null
hypothesis—the samples are from the same distribution—can be rejected, and
thus they are statistically distinct distributions. e reported p-value < 0:005, and
the KS test statistic = 0:2179; the two samples were made up of 350,000
observations each. is suggests that the subjective reputation system is capable
of allowing these types of hierarchies to emerge.
Visualising Recommender Networks
is section provides the reader with some visualisations of recommender
networks from typical simulations. To do this, the Java Universal Network and
Graph Framework [122] was integrated into the simulation framework, which
allows traders to be visualised as vertices and recommendation weights as edges.
ere were several initial motivations for analysing the networks in this way:
(i) it is not clear from only performing in-degree and out-degree frequency
analysis, who traders connect to; and (ii) what impact do trader preferences and
constraints or proﬁtability have on the connections they maintain? e network
visualisations are typical of a simulation that contains either 300 constraint-based,
or preference-based traders. Each trader ai can have many out-going
recommendation weights bγai;aj to other traders aj 2 T that satisfy bγai;aj  bγai .
However, visualising all of these connections leads to a very dense graph, which is
hard to analyse, so instead the Favourite Recommender Graph is visualised where
k = 3. e following visualisations provide support to the previous result,
namely: most traders have a low in-degree, while a few have a high in-degree.
Further, they provide evidence to show the self-organising properties of the
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subjective-reputation approach. Figure 6.13 visualises a Favourite Recommender
Figure 6.13: A visualisation of a typical Favoured Recommender Graph from a sim-
ulation using a constraint-induced nies trader context, at a single point in time.
Diﬀerent shades indicate traders that belong to diﬀerent market segments and thus
prefer to trade in diﬀerent markets, i.e., darkly (lightly) shaded traders in gen-
eral ﬁnd the opinions from other darkly (lightly) shaded traders helpful. Buyers
are coloured blue and sellers red. Extra-marginal traders—those who have recently
failed to successfully trade—are drawn with a square, while intra-marginal—those
who have recently traded—traders are drawn with a circle. Edges between traders
are directed such that an out-going edge from trader ai to aj means that ai uses the
opinions of aj to form reputations of market-exchanges, i.e., bγai;aj  bγai . A force-
based algorithm [60] is used to position the traders within the space. Traders can
have at most k = 3 outgoing edges, but potentially up to jT j   1 incoming edges.
e more incoming and outgoing connections a vertex has, the more centrally it is
positioned.
Graph from a snapshot of a simulation containing multiple niches, and thus
traders who prefer diﬀerent market segments. Notice several observations:
1. Traders with similar resource preferences, i.e., prefer the same market
niche, are generally highly connected;
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2. Extra-marginal traders don’t share many connections with intra-marginal
traders, but they do tend to share connections with ea other. is suggests
that if—due to an exchange selecting a new resource type—a beer market
becomes available, they can quickly share that information with each other;
3. Extra-marginal traders also tend to be more connected to all trader types
(indicated by dark and lighter shades connecting). is may facilitate the
quick spreading of information regarding the previous point.
Finally, the reader may notice a reasonable amount of connectivity between some
intra-marginal dark red sellers, and traders of other types, i.e, lightly coloured.
is is because traders that are dark can provide all resource types (they have no
minimum aribute-level constraints) to any buyer, thus they share opinions on
market-selection. Figure 6.14 visualises a Favourite Recommender Graph of a
simulation containing traders from the preference-induced nies trader context.
Because these traders don’t have constraints (only preferences over aributes),
there are fewer extra-marginal traders (traders can trade resources with any
aribute-levels). Due to the lower extra-marginal traders, more traders tend to
connect together, as there is less chance an opinion results in a trader not
trading—thus all opinions are generally more helpful.
6.6 Conclusions and Discussion
Prior to this chapter, trading agents only considered their own private
information when making market-selection decisions, which was an expensive
initial process when entering the system involving having to always directly join
markets to evaluate their suitability. is chapter considered, for the ﬁrst time, the
application of a subjective reputation approach, grounded in Bayesian statistics,
to the problem of facilitating market-selection in the novel multi-aribute model
of resource allocation studied throughout this thesis. Inline with real-world open
and dynamic multi-agent systems, this chapter considers an extension to the
multi-aribute market-based model, by assuming trader urn exists within the
model, which is deﬁned as diﬀerent traders joining and leaving at diﬀerent times.
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Figure 6.14: A visualisation of a typical Favoured Recommender Graph from a sim-
ulation using a preference-induced nies trader context, at a single point in time.
In the preference-induces nies trader context, there are two market niches. ere-
fore, there are again dark and lightly shaded traders. Buyers that prefer the ﬁrst
resource aribute, and sellers that can provide the ﬁrst aribute at less cost, are
lightly shaded. While those who prefer and can supply more cheaply, the second
aribute, are darkly shaded. While one trader appears to be heavily linked to both
types of trader in the population, situations such as this tend to appear and dis-
appear quite oen when viewing simulations, presenting some interesting future
work tomore closely analyse the dynamics of the recommender networks. All other
details are explained in Figure 6.13.
While other subjective Bayesian approaches [166, 165, 97] have considered
both noisy and manipulative information, the domains they consider are diﬀerent
to the market-based model in this chapter, and it is unclear of the eﬀectiveness of
these approaches in multi-aribute resource allocation models. is chapter made
progress in this direction by designing two new behaviour models: Noisy
Recommenders, which are designed to mimic potentially faulty soware agents,
and Lying Recommenders, which using the Supply and Demand Aa, are
engineered to speciﬁcally manipulate the reputation system such that it directly
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improves their proﬁt margins.
Using these, as well as a variety of market conditions, this chapter
empirically analyses both the impact that churn has on the eﬃciency of resource
allocations, and impact that a subjective reputation approach has on eﬃciency.
Results demonstrated that in the absence of reputation, system churn reduces the
allocative eﬃciency of the system dramatically as it increases, while when traders
use reputation information this loss is signiﬁcantly reduced. Further, results also
demonstrated that the subjective reputation approaches were also able to deal
with the presence of signiﬁcant proportions of noisy and lying recommenders
without any measurable loss to system eﬃciency.
erefore, the contributions of this chapter are:
• e proposal and application of a subjective reputation approach to tackle
the problem of market-selection in a market-based environment containing
multiple competing marketplaces;
• Models of two types of trader behaviour expected within a multi-aribute
market-based model: Noisy Recommenders, and Lying Recommenders, who
aempt to strategically manipulate reputation information to alter supply
and demand in a two-sided market;
• Experimental evidence showing not only that reputation information
improves market-selection signals under dynamic scenarios, leading to
more eﬃcient resource allocations, but that a subjective reputation
approach allows traders to maintain connections to helpful recommenders
and ignores harmful or inaccurate ones;
• An initial analysis of the properties of emergent recommender networks,
using visualisation techniques and a novel statistical graph reduction
approach to measure the inﬂuential properties of traders using the
subjective reputation approach.
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is chapter does not claim that the reputation approach used is necessarily the
best, and as such does not compare performance of diﬀerent reputation systems.
e main aim of the chapter was to see what impact reputation, in terms of
publicly shared market-selection decisions, had on the outcomes of the system.
While previous work has already shown subjective reputation approaches can
work well in the presence of malicious or false information, this chapter has
advanced the state-of-the-art by showing that subjective reputation information
can also be very important in market-based systems for allowing cohorts of
traders to signal to each other which markets they should all join, thus improving
market segmentation, and the eﬃciency of allocations.
Statistical analysis of typical recommender networks found that while a
large proportion of traders were no-ones’ favoured recommenders, a few were
highly favoured by many. is leads to frequency distributions that are
remarkably similar (though not identical) to Pareto distributed networks [171],
and large interconnected networks similar to those found in other studies of
social networks used for spreading gossip or opinions [190]. Because these
approaches appear to lead to highly inﬂuential groups of traders, which
encourages cohesive decisions within the population, future work should look at
any negative eﬀects this process may cause. For example, phenomena such as
Groupthink [75], where a tightly-knit group of individuals fail to eﬀectively
examine all alternatives in favour having a consensus view, might actually lead to
sub-optimal market-selection in some cases. Further, weighted recommendation
networks of type studied in this chapter might encourage a type of
disconﬁrmation bias [50], where conﬂicting traders are overwhelmed by
third-party information supporting one view when they are a small group may
have conﬂicting information. Further work will explore these phenomena further,
overall focussing on the design of more eﬀective and robust reputation
approaches for trader market-selection.
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is thesis has studied a novel approach for allocating multi-aribute
computational resources in distributed, dynamic and open environments. e
approach considers multiple competing marketplaces oﬀering double auction
markets for speciﬁc types of computational resources, while resource consumers
and providers, using decision-making behaviours inspired by marketing models
grounded in consumer theory, choose between markets according to whichever
best satisﬁes their preferences and constraints. e approach satisﬁes a number of
properties desirable in distributed utility computing environments (see
Section 2.1.3). Speciﬁcally, the approach is:
• robust: because it does not rely on a single centralised co-ordinator or
mechanism;
• scaleable: because more marketplaces can be added without the need to
coordinate or communicate with any existing ones;
• expedient and available: because it uses a continuous mechanism to allocate
resources between traders as soon as two matching traders submit
matching oﬀers;
• open: because traders do not need to have complex bidding or bargaining
strategies, and the public nature of marketplaces means all trader have
equal access to prices within a market.
While approaches to single-aribute resource allocation via competing
marketplaces have been considered within the literature before, eﬀectively
allocating multi-aribute resources in a similar way required tackling several
challenges, as well as developing a new market-based model. In Chapter 4, a
model of multi-aribute resource allocation via competing marketplaces was
formally described, and mechanisms describing agent behaviour developed, as
well as an algorithm for measuring the eﬃciency of the market-based system
during simulation.
Chapter 5 considered the automatic niing problem, which exists because it
is desirable that market-exchanges are able to autonomously locate and compete
over the market niches that most satisfy segments of the trader population; this
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particularly challenging due to the multiple learning processes occurring in the
environment. Approaches for tackling this challenge, using aribute-level
selection (ALS) strategies were proposed and analysed, and results suggested that
under a variety of conditions, market-exchanges were able to locate the market
niche(s) that most satisﬁed various market segments, leading to eﬃcient
outcomes. Further to this, the novel methodology developed in Chapter 3 for
quantitatively and qualitatively assessing the generalisation properties of market
mechanisms, was applied to the study of ALS strategy performance. Results of a
comprehensive computational study revealed that although no ALS strategy was
robust against all environmental conditions, a number of environmental factors
that aﬀected ALS strategy performance were discovered, hopefully taking a step
towards designing more robust strategies in the future.
Finally, Chapter 6 considered a more dynamic extension to the model, in
which traders continually leave the system, while new ones join, as might be
expected in a real-world distributed and open seing. Under such conditions the
dynamic nature of marketplaces makes learning accurate market-selection signals
potentially expensive for new traders. Chapter 6 considered the application of a
Bayesian statistics reputation approach to the problem of facilitating traders’
market-selection decisions, and demonstrated that subjective reputation-based
market-selection strategies lead to more eﬃcient resource allocations in a variety
of dynamic environmental seings. As well as subjective reputation
information—where traders value diﬀerent traders’ opinions
diﬀerently—enabling traders to ignore spurious opinions within the system, the
information also enabled them to identify inﬂuential traders. is leads to more
consensual market selection by traders in general, resulting in higher volume and
more liquid markets, leading to more eﬃcient resource allocations.
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7.1 Summary of esis Contributions
In summary, this thesis has made the following main contributions:
• A novel methodology for measuring the generalisation properties of
competing market mechanisms in coevolutionary trading environments.
e methodology was applied to market mechanisms submied to TAC
Market Design Competitions, and showed that a number of these
mechanisms did not generalise across environmental situations,
demonstrating the methodology’s appropriateness.
• A novel approach for allocating distributed multi-aribute computational
resources, using multiple competing marketplaces, which each satisfy
market segments by running markets for speciﬁc types of computational
resource.
• e formulation of decision-making models for traders, which allows them
to value multi-aribute computational resources, and reason over
marketplaces oﬀering these, using marketing models grounded in consumer
theory.
• An algorithm for calculating the optimal allocation of multi-aribute
computational resources between traders with diﬀerent preferences and
constraints over resource aributes, using combinatorial optimisation
methods.
• e ﬁrst clear formulation of the automatic niing problem, which presents
itself when marketplaces must decide what type of resource market to oﬀer
to traders with unknown and diverse resource preferences and constraints,
and within an environment with competing marketplaces aempting to do
the same.
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• A thorough empirical analysis of the eﬀectiveness of n-armed bandit and
evolutionary optimisation market niching strategies for tackling the
automatic niching problem, within a variety of representative
environmental situations.
• e ﬁrst application of a reputation-based approach for facilitating
selection between double-auction marketplaces by integrating reputation
information into market-selection strategies.
• An analysis of the performance of reputation-based approaches to
market-selection, demonstrating that subjective reputation information
improves market-selection decisions, which leads to more eﬃcient
allocations globally.
In terms of market-based approaches to multi-aribute resource allocation, the
approach advocated and studied within this thesis sits—with purposeful
pragmatism—somewhere between fully decentralised and fully centralised
models of resource allocation. Allocating multi-aribute computational resources
via multiple competing marketplaces creates a distributed market-based
environment, where traders are free to migrate between various institutional
exchanges, and thus do not rely upon any single mechanism. Further, allocations
are oen very eﬃcient because: (i) traders are aware of market prices and, when a
reputation approach is used, aware of the most proﬁtable markets, thus no
individual trader is at a disadvantage; and (ii) market-exchanges, using
aribute-level selection-strategies, are in many cases able to locate the market
niches that most satisfy traders’ preferences and constraints. erefore, the
approach, and thus contributions within this thesis supporting the approach, are
signiﬁcant, because the approach represents a valid alternative to either fully
decentralised (robust but economically ineﬃcient) or fully centralised
(economically eﬃcient but computationally prohibitive and brile), models of
multi-aribute resource allocation. However, this thesis does not claim that this
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approach is generally beer than any other, only that it satisﬁes designer
objectives, and therefore is suitable, for the application envisaged, viz., the
allocation of distributed multi-aribute computational resources between
self-interested soware agents.
One of the underlying issues in this thesis was generalisation and
robustness, particularly in terms of double auction market mechanisms competing
in dynamic and open environments. e complexities of these coevolutionary
systems preclude using theoretical approaches to design mechanisms that can
generalise across all environments or situations. us, signiﬁcant research eﬀort
focusses on empirical approaches to the design of more robust market
mechanisms, which generalise well across environments. In that respect,
contributions made within this thesis are signiﬁcant for two reasons: (i) the
mechanisms developed within this thesis are adaptive by design—in their absence
the market-based system would be less robust against various environmental
factors; and (ii) the methodology developed for empirically assessing the
generalisation properties of market mechanisms can be used by others working in
this research area, to guide the design of mechanisms that generalise beer.
Finally, much of the work carried out within this thesis involves exploring
aspects of competition between marketplaces. To that end, several techniques
were developed for discovering not just mechanisms’ sensitivities to competitors,
but also for visualising the outcomes of complex interactions between competing
market mechanisms. In that case, it is hoped that these methods and techniques
will be useful for anybody that is interested in analysing competition between
marketplaces, be it from a computer science, economics, or marketing,
perspective.
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7.2 Future Work
is thesis is a stepping stone towards the design of robust and eﬃcient
market-based approaches to computational resource allocation in large-scale
distributed systems. erefore, in this last section, some future work is outlined,
by considering some of the limitations of the work described within this thesis.
is thesis did not claim that the approach studied was the best approach to
tackling computational resource allocation problems, only that it was suitable. It
is hard to directly compare this approach to others, such as fully decentralised or
fully centralised approaches, because ‘beer’ is multi-objective in nature,
encompassing, for example: economic eﬃciency, scaleability, and robustness.
However, it would be interesting and important to directly compare this
approach with others across the multiple objectives, so that other researchers or
practitioners could beer understand what approach would suit their needs best.
To make this assessment, the methodology developed in Chapter 3 could be
extended so that it considers performance within multiple dimensions, when
assessing the generalisation properties of market mechanisms within diﬀerent
environments. Potentially, a researcher or practitioner could then beer design
mechanisms for the environments they are expected to operate in.
In terms of directly improving the market-based approach studied in this
thesis, a signiﬁcant next step would be to consider more generalised versions of
the model, which would have properties closer to those expected within a
real-world implementation. Speciﬁcally, the model presented in Chapter 4 is
purposely simpliﬁed to ease analysis within this thesis. All resources modelled in
this thesis had two non-price aributes, yet it is quite common for real-world
computational resources to have more for example [2], so an important next step
is to consider the impact of resources with higher numbers of aributes. Another
simplifying step was to create very clear market segments, which aided the
identiﬁcation of well-deﬁned market niches, in the form of resource types that
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large proportions of the trader population clearly preferred. Increasing the
number of resource aributes, and making market segments less clear, potentially
has signiﬁcant impacts on the performance of market-exchanges’ aribute-level
selection-strategies. While results suggested in Chapter 5 that bandit strategies
signiﬁcantly out-performed evolutionary optimisation approaches, as the
dimensionality of the aribute-level space increases and the market segmentation
in the trader population becomes less clear, it is less likely that bandit strategies’
action sets will contain the resource types that most satisfy available market
segments. In such a case, the aractiveness of evolutionary optimisation
approaches, which can select any point in the resource-aribute space, increases.
Indeed, Chapter 5 did not claim that n-armed bandit approaches were beer than
evolutionary optimisation approaches in general, only in the representative
environments considered within the constraints of the model studied. It is
possible, for example, that diversity techniques such as ﬁtness-sharing semes
[149] will improve evolutionary ALS strategy performance in higher-dimensional
resource-aribute spaces.
Finally, Chapter 6 considered using reputation only in a signalling role, but
not in a sanctioning role. A very important extension to this work is to consider
the potential issue of market failure that could occur if this model is situated
within real-world open distributed systems. Market failure can occur in
real-world markets when there is either adverse selection [1] or moral hazard
[27]. And, because of the considerable distance among trading partners, both
types of information asymmetry are possible [37, p. 31]. Real-world ﬁnancial
exchanges deal with moral hazard under the term counterparty risk, and they
mitigate against it by demanding all market participants leave enough margin in
their accounts—suitable funds for the exchange to reimburse any party that loses
out in a transaction. Within this model, market-exchange reputation is even more
important, because exchanges would be required to be trusted with participants’
funds.
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Adverse selection behaviour might include sellers intentionally entering a
market and providing resources that are not of the same type as those described.
Two approaches for dealing with this include the use of a two-stage mechanism,
such as [170], or, perhaps more preferably, allowing traders to factor in losses and
incorrect resource provision into marketplace reputation. In that case,
market-exchanges would be incentivised to actively monitor which types of seller
are allowed into their markets, or perhaps incentivise good behaviour by
charging fees according to seller performance. In general, this type of research
begins to reach into many other areas, including computer security, economics,
and network theory.
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Well, I don’t, I don’t really think that the end can be assessed: : : uh as of
itself as being the end because what does the end feel like? It’s like
saying when you try to extrapolate the end of the universe you say if the
universe is indeed inﬁnite then how—what does that mean? How far is,
is, is all the way and then if it stops what’s stoppin’ it and what’s behind
what’s stoppin’ it, so what’s the end, you know, is my question to you: : :
—is Is Spinal Tap (1984)
